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If the crisis has a single lesson, it is that the too-big-to-fail problem 
must be solved.1 
–Federal Reserve Board (FRB) Chairman Ben S. Bernanke 
Because of this law, the American people will never again be asked 
to foot the bill for Wall Street’s mistakes....  There will be no more 
taxpayer-funded bailouts.  Period.2 
–President Barack Obama 
The [Dodd-Frank Act] went from what is best to what could be 
passed.3 
–Former FRB Chairman Paul Volcker 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
he recent financial crisis—widely viewed as “the worst financial 
crisis since the Great Depression”4—inflicted tremendous 
damage on financial markets and economies around the world.  The 
 
* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.  I would like to thank 
Interim Dean Gregory Maggs for a summer research grant that supported my work on this 
Article.  I am also grateful for excellent research assistance provided by C. Scott Pollock, a 
member of our class of 2010; Sarah Trumble, a member of our class of 2013; and 
Germaine Leahy, Head of Reference for the Jacob Burns Law Library.  I am indebted to 
Cheryl Block, John Buchman, John Day, Ross Delston, Anna Gelpern, Jeff Gordon, Kim 
Krawiec, Jeff Manns, Pat McCoy, Larry Mitchell, Heidi Schooner, and Cynthia Williams 
for helpful comments and conversations.   Unless otherwise indicated, this Article includes 
developments through December 31, 2010. 
1 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Causes of the Recent Financial and 
Economic Crisis, Statement Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (Sept. 2, 
2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke201009 
02a.htm. 
2 Stacy Kaper, Obama Signs Historic Regulatory Reform Bill into Law, AM. BANKER 
(July 21, 2010), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/obama-1022698-1.html (quoting 
statement made by President Obama upon signing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act). 
3 Louis Uchitelle, Volcker: Loud and Clear: Pushing for Stronger Reforms, and 
Regretting Decades of Silence, N.Y TIMES, July 11, 2010, at BU 1. 
4 Angela Maddaloni & José-Luis Peydró, Bank Risk-Taking, Securitization, Supervision 
and Low Interest Rates: Evidence from the Euro Area and the U.S. Lending Standards 7 
(European Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 1248, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1679689; accord Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: 
Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. 
REV. 963, 966 n.3 (2009); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, U.S. Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the 
Swearing-In Ceremony, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 3, 2010), available at http://www.federal 
reserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100203a.htm. 
T
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crisis revealed fundamental weaknesses in the financial regulatory 
systems of the United States, the United Kingdom, and other 
European nations.  Those weaknesses have made regulatory reforms 
an urgent priority.  Publicly funded bailouts of “too big to fail” 
(TBTF) financial institutions during the crisis provided indisputable 
proof that TBTF institutions benefit from large explicit and implicit 
public subsidies, including the expectation that such institutions will 
receive comparable public support during future emergencies.  TBTF 
subsidies undermine market discipline and distort economic 
incentives for large, complex financial institutions (LCFIs) that are 
viewed by the financial markets as likely to qualify for TBTF 
treatment.5  Accordingly, as I argued in a recent article, a primary 
objective of regulatory reforms must be to eliminate (or at least 
greatly reduce) TBTF subsidies, thereby forcing LCFIs to internalize 
the risks and costs of their activities.6 
In July 2010, Congress passed and President Obama signed the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.7  
Dodd-Frank’s preamble proclaims that one of the statute’s primary 
purposes is “to end ‘too big to fail’ [and] to protect the American 
taxpayer by ending bailouts.”8  As he signed Dodd-Frank, President 
Obama declared, “Because of this law, . . . [t]here will be no more 
taxpayer-funded bailouts.  Period.”9 
Dodd-Frank does contain useful reforms, including potentially 
favorable alterations to the supervisory and resolution regimes for 
LCFIs that are designated as systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs).  However, this Article concludes that Dodd-
Frank’s provisions fall far short of the changes that would be needed 
to prevent future taxpayer-financed bailouts and to remove other 
public subsidies for TBTF institutions.  As explained below, Dodd-
Frank fails to make fundamental structural reforms that could largely 
eliminate the subsidies currently exploited by LCFIs. 
 
5 As used in this Article, the term “large, complex financial institution” (LCFI) includes 
major commercial banks, securities firms, and insurance companies, as well as “universal 
banks” (i.e., financial conglomerates that have authority to engage, either directly or 
through affiliates, in a combination of banking, securities, and insurance activities).  See 
Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 968 n.15. 
6 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-to-
Fail Problem, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 707 (2010).  Portions of this Article are adapted from 
that previous article. 
7 H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010). 
8 Id. pmbl.; accord S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 1, 4–6 (2010). 
9 See Kaper, supra note 2. 
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Parts II and III of this Article briefly describe the consequences and 
causes of the financial crisis that led up to the enactment of the Dodd-
Frank.  As discussed in those sections, LCFIs were the primary 
private-sector catalysts for the crisis, and they received the lion’s 
share of support from government programs that were established 
during the crisis to preserve financial stability.  Public alarm over the 
severity of the financial crisis and public outrage over government 
bailouts of LCFIs produced a strong consensus in favor of financial 
reform.  That public consensus pushed Congress to enact Dodd-
Frank.  As Part IV explains, governmental rescues of LCFIs 
highlighted the economic distortions created by TBTF policies, as 
well as the urgent need to reduce public subsidies created by those 
policies. 
In an article written a few months before Dodd-Frank was enacted, 
I proposed five reforms that were designed to prevent excessive risk 
taking by LCFIs and to shrink TBTF subsidies.  My proposed reforms 
would have (1) strengthened existing statutory restrictions on the 
growth of LCFIs; (2) created a special resolution process to manage 
the orderly liquidation or restructuring of SIFIs; (3) established a 
consolidated supervisory regime and enhanced capital requirements 
for SIFIs; (4) created a special insurance fund, pre-funded by risk-
based assessments paid by SIFIs, to cover the costs of resolving failed 
SIFIs; and (5) rigorously insulated FDIC-insured banks that are 
owned by LCFIs from the activities and risks of their nonbank 
affiliates.10 
Part V of this Article compares the relevant provisions of Dodd-
Frank to my proposed reforms and evaluates whether the new statute 
is likely to solve the TBTF problem.  Dodd-Frank includes provisions 
(similar to my proposals) that make potentially helpful improvements 
in the regulation of large financial conglomerates.  The statute 
establishes a new umbrella oversight body (the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council) that will designate SIFIs and make 
recommendations for their regulation.  The statute also authorizes the 
FRB to apply enhanced supervisory requirements to SIFIs.  Most 
importantly, Dodd-Frank establishes a new systemic resolution 
regime (the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA)) that should 
provide a superior alternative to the choice of “bailout or bankruptcy” 
that federal regulators confronted when they dealt with failing SIFIs 
during the financial crisis. 
 
10 See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 747–79. 
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Nevertheless, Dodd-Frank does not solve the TBTF problem.  
Congress did not adequately strengthen statutory limits on the ability 
of LCFIs to grow through mergers and acquisitions.  The enhanced 
prudential standards to be imposed on SIFIs under Dodd-Frank will 
rely heavily on a supervisory tool—capital-based regulation—that 
failed to prevent systemic financial crises in the past.  Moreover, the 
success of Dodd-Frank’s supervisory reforms will depend on many of 
the same federal regulatory agencies that did not stop excessive risk 
taking by LCFIs in the past and, in the process, demonstrated their 
vulnerability to political influence from LCFIs and their trade 
associations. 
Dodd-Frank’s most promising regulatory reform—the OLA—does 
not completely close the door to future transactions that protect 
creditors of failing LCFIs.  The FRB and the Federal Home Loan 
Banks retain authority to provide emergency liquidity assistance to 
troubled LCFIs.  The FDIC can borrow from the U.S. Treasury and 
can also use the “systemic risk exception” to the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act in order to generate funding to protect creditors of 
failed SIFIs and their subsidiary banks.  While Dodd-Frank has made 
TBTF bailouts more difficult, the continued existence of these 
additional sources of financial assistance indicates that Dodd-Frank 
probably will not prevent TBTF rescues during future episodes of 
systemic financial distress. 
Contrary to my previous recommendation, Dodd-Frank does not 
require SIFIs to pay risk-based assessments to pre-fund the Orderly 
Liquidation Fund (OLF), which will cover the costs of resolving 
failed SIFIs.  Instead, the OLF will be obliged to borrow funds in the 
first instance from the Treasury Department (i.e., the taxpayers) to 
pay for the costs of such resolutions, with the hope that such costs can 
eventually be recovered by ex post assessments on surviving SIFIs.  
Dodd-Frank also does not include my earlier proposal for a strict 
regime of structural separation between SIFI-owned banks and their 
nonbank affiliates.  Thus, unlike Dodd-Frank, my proposals would (1) 
require SIFIs to internalize the potential costs of their risk taking by 
paying risk-based premiums to pre-fund the OLF and (2) prevent 
SIFI-owned banks from transferring their safety net subsidies to 
nonbank affiliates. 
In combination, my proposals would strip away many of the public 
subsidies currently exploited by financial conglomerates and would 
subject them to the same type of market discipline that investors have 
applied in over the past three decades in breaking up inefficient 
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commercial and industrial conglomerates.  Financial conglomerates 
have never demonstrated their ability to provide beneficial services to 
customers and attractive returns to investors without relying on 
federal safety net subsidies during good times and taxpayer-financed 
bailouts during crises.  I believe that LCFIs are unlikely to produce 
favorable returns if they lose their access to public subsidies.  
Accordingly, Congress must remove those subsidies and create a true 
“market test” for LCFIs.  If such a test were applied, I expect that 
market forces would compel many LCFIs to break up voluntarily. 
II 
THE SEVERITY AND PERSISTENCE OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The financial crisis caused governments and central banks around 
the globe to provide more than $11 trillion of assistance to financial 
institutions and to spend more than $6 trillion on economic stimulus 
programs.  The largest financial support and economic stimulus 
programs were implemented by the United State, the United 
Kingdom, and other European nations, where the financial crisis 
caused the greatest harm.11  By October 2009, the United States had 
provided more than $6 trillion of assistance to financial institutions 
through central bank loans and other government loans, guarantees, 
asset purchases and capital infusions, while the United Kingdom and 
other European Union (EU) nations gave more than $4 trillion of 
similar assistance.12  In addition to the assistance provided to 
financial institutions, the U.S. Congress sought to support the general 
economy by passing an $800 billion stimulus bill in early 2009, and 
 
11 Adrian Blundell-Wignall et al., The Elephant in the Room: The Need to Deal with 
What Banks Do, 2 OECD J.: FIN. MARKET TRENDS 1, 4–5, 14, 15 tbl.4 (2009), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/8/44357464.pdf (showing that leading nations around 
the world provided $11.4 trillion of capital infusions, asset purchases, asset guarantees, 
and debt guarantees to financial institutions through October 2009); Debate Rages over 
Stimulus Fallout, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news 
/2010/feb/23/world-of-debate-rages-over-fallout-from-stimulus/?feat=home_headlines; see 
also INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: NAVIGATING THE 
FINANCIAL CHALLENGES AHEAD 4–5, 6–10, 24–29 (2009), available at http://www.imf 
.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/02/pdf/text.pdf; Tightening Economic Policy: Withdrawing 
the Drugs, ECONOMIST (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/15498185. 
12 Blundell-Wignall et al., supra note 11, at 15 tbl.4 (showing that the United States 
provided $6.4 trillion of assistance to financial institutions, while the United Kingdom and 
other European nations provided $4.3 trillion of assistance). 
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many other nations approved comparable measures to bolster their 
economies.13 
Government agencies acted most dramatically in rescuing LCFIs 
that were threatened with failure.  U.S. authorities provided massive 
bailouts to prevent the failures of two of the three largest U.S. banks 
and the largest U.S. insurance company.14  In addition, (1) federal 
regulators provided financial support for emergency acquisitions of 
two other major banks, the two largest thrifts, and two of the five 
largest securities firms, and (2) regulators approved emergency 
conversions of two other leading securities firms into bank holding 
companies (BHCs), thereby placing those institutions under the 
FRB’s protective umbrella.15  Federal regulators also conducted 
 
13 See Debate Rages over Stimulus Fallout, supra note 11; Michael A. Fletcher, Obama 
Leaves D.C. to Sign Stimulus Bill, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2009, at A5; William Pesek, 
After the Stimulus Binge, A Debt Hangover, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 26, 2010), 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_04/b4164014458592.htm; Tightening 
Economic Policy, supra note 11. 
14 For discussions of the federal government’s bailouts of Citigroup, Bank of America, 
and American International Group (AIG), see ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: 
THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES 373–407, 513–34 (2009); DAVID WESSEL, IN 
FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE’S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC 3, 25–26, 189–97, 239–41, 
259–63 (2009); Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result 
of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1364–66 (2009); OFFICE 
OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, 
EMERGENCY CAPITAL INJECTIONS PROVIDED TO SUPPORT THE VIABILITY OF BANK OF 
AMERICA, OTHER MAJOR BANKS, AND THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM, SIGTARP-10-001,  
at 14–31 (2009), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/2009/Emergency 
_Capital_Injections_Provided_to_Support_the_Viability_of_Bank_of_America..._100509 
.pdf [hereinafter SIGTARP BANK OF AMERICA REPORT]; OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL 
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, EXTRAORDINARY 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO CITIGROUP, INC., SIGTARP-11-002, at 4–32, 41–
44 (2011), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/2011/Extraordinary% 
20Financial%20Assistance%20Provided%20to%20Citigroup,%20Inc.pdf [hereinafter 
SIGTARP CITIGROUP REPORT]; CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: 
THE AIG RESCUE, ITS IMPACT ON MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNMENT’S EXIT STRATEGY, 
at 58–179 (2010), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-061010-report.pdf. 
15 For descriptions of the federal government’s support for the acquisitions of Wachovia 
by Wells Fargo, of National City Bank by PNC, of Bear Stearns (“Bear”) and Washington 
Mutual (“WaMu”) by JP Morgan Chase (“Chase”), and of Countrywide and Merrill Lynch 
(“Merrill”) by Bank of America, as well as the rapid conversions of Goldman Sachs 
(“Goldman”) and Morgan Stanley into BHCs, see SORKIN, supra note 14, at 414–503; 
DAVID P. STOWELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENT BANKS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND 
PRIVATE EQUITY: THE NEW PARADIGM 182–84, 398–405, 410–17 (2010); WESSEL, supra 
note 14, at 8–9, 18–19, 147–72, 217–26, 239–41, 259–63; Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 
1044–45; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Cuomo v. Clearing House: The Supreme Court 
Responds to the Subprime Financial Crisis and Delivers a Major Victory for the Dual 
Banking System and Consumer Protection 27–30 (George Washington Univ. Law Sch. 
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“stress tests” on the nineteen largest BHCs—each with more than 
$100 billion of assets—and injected more than $220 billion of capital 
into eighteen of those companies.16  Before regulators performed the 
stress tests, they announced that the federal government would 
provide any additional capital that the nineteen banking firms needed 
but could not raise on their own.  By giving that public assurance, 
regulators indicated that all nineteen firms were presumptively TBTF, 
at least for the duration of the financial crisis.17 
Similarly, the United Kingdom and other European nations 
implemented more than eighty rescue programs to support their 
financial systems.  Those programs included costly bailouts of several 
major EU banks, including ABN Amro, Commerzbank, Fortis, ING, 
Lloyds HBOS, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), and UBS.18 
Notwithstanding these extraordinary measures of governmental 
support, financial institutions and investors suffered huge losses in the 
United States and in other developed nations.  Between the outbreak 
of the crisis in mid-2007 and the spring of 2010, LCFIs around the 
world recorded $1.5 trillion of losses on risky loans and investments 
made during the preceding credit boom.19  During 2008 alone, the 
value of global financial assets declined by an estimated $50 trillion, 
 
Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 479, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1499216. 
16 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 713, 713 n.11. 
17 In announcing the “stress test” for the nineteen largest banking firms in early 2009, 
federal regulators “emphasized that none of the banks would be allowed to fail the test, 
because the government would provide any capital that was needed to ensure the survival 
of all nineteen banks.”  Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 1050 n.449 (citing speech by Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York President William C. Dudley and congressional testimony by 
FRB Chairman Ben Bernanke); Joe Adler, In Focus: Stress Tests Complicate ‘Too Big to 
Fail’ Debate, AM. BANKER, May 19, 2009, at 1 (stating that “[b]y drawing a line at $100 
billion of assets, and promising to give the 19 institutions over that mark enough capital to 
weather an economic downturn, the government appears to have defined which banks are 
indeed ‘too big to fail’”).  Based on the stress tests, regulators determined that ten of the 
nineteen firms required additional capital.  Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 713, 713 n.12.  Nine 
of those firms were successful in raising the needed funds, but the federal government 
provided $11.3 billion of additional capital to GMAC when that company could not raise 
the required capital on its own.  Id. 
18 For descriptions of governmental support measures for financial institutions in the 
United Kingdom and other European nations, see authorities cited in Wilmarth, supra note 
6, at 714, 714 n.13. 
19 Rodney Yap & Dave Pierson, Subprime Mortgage-Related Losses Exceed $1.77 
Trillion: Table, BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 11, 2010 (showing that global banks, securities 
firms, and insurers incurred $1.51 trillion of write-downs and credit losses due to the 
financial crisis, while Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac suffered an additional $270 billion of 
losses). 
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equal to a year of the world’s gross domestic product.20  Household 
net worth in the United States fell by more than one-fifth (from $64.2 
trillion to $48.8 trillion) from the end of 2007 through the first quarter 
of 2009.21  The financial crisis pushed the economies of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and other European nations into deep 
recessions during 2008 and the first half of 2009.22 
Economies in all three regions began to improve in the second half 
of 2009, but the recoveries were tentative and fragile.23  During the 
first half of 2010, economies in all three areas continued to face 
significant challenges, including (1) high unemployment rates and 
shortages of bank credit that caused consumers to reduce spending 
and businesses to forgo new investments, and (2) large budget 
deficits, caused in part by the massive costs of financial rescue 
programs, which impaired the ability of governments to provide 
additional fiscal stimulus.24 
 
20 Shamim Adam, Global Financial Assets Lost $50 Trillion Last Year, ADB Says, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive 
&sid=aZ1kcJ7y3LDM. 
21 BD. OF GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE: 
FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDING, 
SECOND QUARTER 2010, at 104 tbl.B.100 (2010), available at http://www.federalreserve 
.gov/RELEASES/z1/20100917/z1.pdf. 
22 See INT’L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, APRIL 2009: CRISIS 
AND RECOVERY 1–96 (2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009 
/01/pdf/text.pdf.  A recent study concluded that the recession of 2007–2009 was much 
more severe, both in the United States and globally, than the preceding recessions of 1975, 
1982, and 1991.  Stijn Claessens et al., The Global Financial Crisis: How Similar? How 
Different? How Costly? 3, 19–20 (Mar. 17, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573958; see also Steve Matthews, Longest U.S. Slump Since 
’30s Ended in June ’09, Group Says, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www 
.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-20/u-s-recession-ended-in-june-2009-was-longest-since     
-wwii-nber-panel-says.html (reporting that, according to the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, the U.S. economy “shrank 4.1 percent from the fourth quarter of 2007 to the 
second quarter of 2009, the biggest slump since the 1930s”). 
23 INT’L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, OCTOBER 2009: 
SUSTAINING THE RECOVERY 1–92 (2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs 
/ft/weo/2009/02/pdf/text.pdf; Timothy R. Homan, U.S. Economy Grew at 2.2% Annual 
Rate Last Quarter (Update2), BLOOMBERG (Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.bloomberg 
.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aVeAMaVRygoM (reporting that the U.S. 
economy grew during the third quarter of 2009 “at a slower pace than anticipated” 
following a steep decline during the previous year); Marcus Walker & Brian Blackstone, 
Euro-Zone Economy Returns to Expansion, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2009, at A6 (reporting 
that “[t]he euro-zone economy returned to modest growth in the third quarter [of 2009], 
marking an apparent end to five quarters of recession, but the region’s recovery looks set 
to be anemic”). 
24 Peter Coy & Cotton Timberlake, Funny, It Doesn’t Feel Like a Recovery, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK May 31–June 6, 2010, at 9; Rich Miller, U.S. Rebound Seen 
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A major threat to economic recovery appeared in the spring of 
2010, as Greece and several other deeply indebted European nations 
struggled to avoid defaulting on their sovereign debts.25  In May 
2010, the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced 
a $1 trillion emergency package of loan guarantees to reassure 
investors that EU nations would continue to meet their debt 
obligations.26  However, many analysts questioned the rescue 
package’s adequacy, and bond investors shunned financial institutions 
with large exposures to heavily indebted countries.27  The European 
sovereign debt crisis—along with high unemployment rates, growing 
budget deficits, and shortages of bank credit—created serious 
concerns about the prospects for continued economic growth in both 
the United States and Europe during the second half of 2010.28 
 
Slowing Most Since 2002 on Europe Debt Woes, BLOOMBERG (June 7, 2010), 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-07/u-s-rebound-seen-slowing-most-since     
-2002-on-europe-debt-woes.html; Jon Hilsenrath, Credit Remains Scarce in Hurdle to 
Recovery, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2010, at A2; Neil Irwin & Lori Montgomery, Dearth of 
New Jobs Threatens Recovery: Data Point to Sluggish Growth, WASH. POST, July 3, 2010, 
at A1; Simone Meier, Europe’s Recovery Almost Stalls as Germany Stagnates (Update 2),  
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 12, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive 
&sid=akPchh4Ed0Vo; Mark Deen, European Economy Risks Decoupling from Global 
Growth Recovery, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www 
.businessweek.com/news/2010-02-25/european-economy-risks-decoupling-from-global     
-growth-recovery.html; Howard Schneider & Anthony Faiola, Debt Is Ballooning into a 
Global Crisis: Developed Nations May Have to Raise Taxes and Cut Programs, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 9, 2010, at A1. 
25 Simon Kennedy & James G. Neuger, EU Faces Demands to Broaden Crisis Fight as 
G-7 Meets (Update3), BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 7, 2010), http://www 
.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-07/eu-faces-demands-to-broaden-crisis-fight-as-g-7      
-meets-update3-.html; Simon Kennedy et al., Now It’s a European Banking Crisis, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine 
/content/10_19/b4177011719842.htm; Sandrine Rastello, IMF Says Government Debt 
Poses Biggest Risk to Global Growth, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 20, 2010), 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-20/imf-says-government-debt-poses-biggest 
-risk-to-global-growth.html. 
26 Joe Kirwin et al., International Economics: EU Ministers, ECB, IMF Marshal Forces 
to Stabilize Euro with Trillion Dollar Plan, 94 Banking Rep. (BNA) 897 (May 11, 2010); 
Pierre Paulden, When Banks Don’t Trust Banks, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 27, 
2010), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_23/b4181006668043.htm; 
Landon Thomas, Jr. & Jack Ewing, A Trillion for Europe, with Doubts Attached: Trying to 
Solve Debt Crisis with More Debt, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2010, at A1. 
27 Gavin Finch & John Glover, Europe’s Banks Face a Funding Squeeze, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (June 17, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_26 
/b4184051394516.htm; Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Europe’s Banks Hit by Rising Loan 
Costs, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2010, at A1. 
28 Peter Coy, The U.S. Economy: Stuck in Neutral, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 
14, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_43/b4200013889287.htm; 
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The severity and duration of the financial crisis, along with rising 
costs of governmental support for troubled LCFIs, produced public 
outrage and created a strong consensus in favor of reforming financial 
regulation in both the United Kingdom and the United States.29  
Indeed, “deep public anger over the 2008 financial collapse” caused 
“a handful of Republicans who [faced] re-election . . . to support the 
[Dodd-Frank] legislation,” in spite of the unified opposition by 
Republican congressional leaders against the bill.30 
At the same time, a sputtering economic recovery and continuing 
public resentment against bailouts received by leading financial 
institutions created widespread public skepticism and distrust in the 
United States about the direction and likely effectiveness of financial 
reform.  A Bloomberg national poll found that almost four-fifths of 
respondents had “little or no confidence” that Dodd-Frank would 
prevent a similar financial crisis in the future or protect their 
savings.31 
 
Peter Coy, Opening Remarks: Shred the Debt, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 4–10, 
2010, at 5; Anthony Faiola, Debt Crisis Escalates in Europe: Fears Grow About Spain, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2010, at A1; Robert J. Samuelson, In Ireland’s Debt Crisis, an 
Ominous Reckoning for Europe, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2010; Motoko Rich, Jobless Rate 
Rises to 9.8% in Blow to Recovery Hopes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2010, at A1. 
29 For example, the United Kingdom’s House of Commons Treasury Committee stated, 
in a March 2010 report, “One thing at least is now abundantly clear: the [U.K.] public will 
not stand for another bailout.  The political case for action is as strong as the economic 
one.”  HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY COMM., TOO IMPORTANT TO FAIL—TOO 
IMPORTANT TO IGNORE 6 (2010), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa 
/cm200910/cmselect/cmtreasy/261/261i.pdf; accord Simon Clark, ‘Lepers’ in London 
Defend Right to Make Money as Election Looms, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 24, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=al4xP78iSZhM (describing 
public anger directed against large U.K. banks “after British taxpayers assumed liabilities 
of more than [$1.23 trillion] to bail out the country’s lenders”); Phil Mattingly, Frank Says 
Senate’s Stronger Rules Will Sway Financial Bill, BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2010), 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-17/frank-says-senate-s-stronger-rules-will    
-sway-financial-bill.html (describing public pressure for stronger reform measures during 
the Senate’s consideration of Dodd-Frank because “[t]he public has gotten a lot angrier 
and the game has changed due to a rise in anti-bank fever” (quoting Robert Litan)). 
30 David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Republicans Call Reform Bill a ‘Takeover’ of the 
Banking Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2010, at B3; accord Brady Dennis, Historic 
Financial Bill Passes Senate: Four GOP Votes for Regulation, WASH. POST, May 21, 
2010, at A1 (reporting that four Republican senators voted in favor of passing Dodd-
Frank). 
31 Rich Miller, Wall Street Fix Seen Ineffectual by Four of Five in U.S., BLOOMBERG 
(July 13, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-13/wall-street-fix-from            
-congress-seen-ineffectual-by-four-out-of-five-in-u-s-.html. 
 Almost four out of five Americans surveyed in a Bloomberg National Poll this 
month say they have just a little or no confidence that [Dodd-Frank] will prevent 
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III 
LCFIS PLAYED KEY ROLES IN PRECIPITATING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
In order to determine whether Dodd-Frank’s reforms are adequate 
to prevent a similar crisis in the future, it is essential to understand 
that (1) LCFIs were the primary private-sector catalysts for the 
current financial crisis and (2) the dominant position of LCFIs in the 
financial markets has become even more entrenched due to the TBTF 
subsidies they received both before and during the crisis.  This Part 
briefly summarizes the crucial roles played by LCFIs in helping to 
produce the financial and economic conditions that led to the crisis, as 
well as governmental policies that compounded the disastrous errors 
of LCFIs.  Part IV discusses how TBTF subsidies encouraged rapid 
growth and consolidation among LCFIs. 
A.  LCFIs Originated Huge Volumes of Risky Loans and Helped to 
Inflate a Massive Credit Boom That Precipitated the Crisis 
During the past two decades, and especially between 2000 and 
2007, LCFIs helped to generate an enormous credit boom that set the 
stage for the financial crisis.  LCFIs used securitization techniques to 
earn large amounts of fee income by (1) originating high-risk loans, 
including nonprime residential mortgages, credit card loans, 
commercial mortgages, and leveraged buyout (LBO) loans; and (2) 
pooling those loans to create securities that could be sold to 
investors.32  LCFIs ostensibly followed an “originate to distribute” 
 
or significantly soften a future crisis.  More than three-quarters say they don’t 
have much or any confidence the proposal will make their savings and financial 
assets more secure. 
 . . . . 
 Most Americans reject any new government rescues of financial institutions, 
such as arranged for [Citigroup and AIG] . . . . 
Id.; accord Brian Faler, TARP a ‘Four-Letter Word’ for Voters Even as Bailout Cost 
Drops, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com 
/bwdaily/dnflash/content/oct2010/db2010108_268416.htm (describing widespread public 
resentment against the government’s rescue program for large financial institutions during 
the financial crisis); John B. Judis, The Unnecessary Fall: A Counter-History of the 
Obama Presidency, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 2010, at 12, 13 (“The public’s [negative] 
view of the bank bailout and the AIG bonuses colored its view of the auto bailout, the 
stimulus, and health care reform.  One of the rallying cries for the populist opposition to 
[President] Obama was ‘where’s my bailout?’”). 
32 Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 984–91, 1037–40 (reporting that, in 2007, residential 
mortgage-backed securities accounted for nearly two-thirds of all U.S. residential 
mortgages, while commercial mortgage-backed securities represented almost a quarter of 
domestic commercial mortgages, asset-backed securities accounted for more than a quarter 
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business strategy, which caused regulators and market analysts to 
assume that LCFIs were transferring the risks embedded in their 
securitized loans to widely dispersed investors.33 
Securitization allowed LCFIs—with the blessing of regulators—to 
reduce their capital requirements significantly as well as their 
apparent credit risks.34  LCFIs created structured-finance securities 
that typically included senior, mezzanine, and junior (or equity) 
“tranches.” Those tranches represented a hierarchy of rights (along a 
scale from the most senior to the most subordinated) to receive cash 
flows produced by the pooled loans.  LCFIs marketed the tranches to 
satisfy the demands of various types of investors for different 
combinations of yield and risk.  Structured-finance securities included 
(1) asset-backed securities (ABS), which represented interests in 
pools of credit card loans, auto loans, student loans and other 
consumer loans; (2) residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), 
which represented interests in pools of residential mortgages; and (3) 
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), which represented 
interests in pools of commercial mortgages.35 
LCFIs created “second-level securitizations” by bundling tranches 
of ABS and MBS into cash flow collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs), and they similarly packaged syndicated loans for corporate 
leveraged buyouts (LBOs) into collateralized loan obligations 
(CLOs).36  LCFIs also created third-level securitizations by 
 
of domestic consumer loans, and collateralized loan obligations included more than a tenth 
of global leveraged syndicated loans). 
33 Id. at 995–96, 1025–30, 1040–43 (discussing the widespread belief that the “originate 
to distribute” business model enabled LCFIs to transfer the risks of securitized loans to 
investors); James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical 
Assessment of the ‘New Financial Architecture,’ 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 563, 567–68 
(2009). 
34 Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 984–85, 995–96; Viral V. Acharya et al., Prologue: A 
Bird’s-Eye View: The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009: Causes and Remedies, in 
RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 1, 14–23 (Viral V. 
Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009) [hereinafter RESTORING FINANCIAL 
STABILITY]; Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis, 21 
CRITICAL REV. 195, 198–200 (2009). 
35 Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 984–90; see also Joshua Coval et al., The Economics of 
Structured Finance, 23 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES No. 1, at 3, 5–7 (2009); Efraim Benmelech 
& Jennifer Dlugosz, The Credit Rating Crisis 3–6, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 15045, 2009); Kenneth E. Scott, The Financial Crisis: Causes and 
Lessons, 22 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. No. 3, at 22, 23–24 (2010).  RMBS and CMBS are 
sometimes hereinafter collectively referred to as “mortgage-backed securities” (MBS). 
36 Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 990–91.  The term “CDOs” is hereinafter used to refer 
collectively to CDOs and CLOs, as well as collateralized bond obligations (CBOs).  See 
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assembling pools of tranches from cash flow CDOs to construct 
“CDOs-squared.”37  The IMF estimated that private-sector financial 
institutions issued about $15 trillion of ABS, MBS, and CDOs in 
global markets between 2000 and 2007, including $9 trillion issued in 
the United States.38  Another study determined that $11 trillion of 
structured-finance securities were outstanding in the U.S. market in 
2008.39 
LCFIs intensified the risks of securitization by writing over-the-
counter (OTC) credit derivatives known as “credit default swaps” 
(CDS).  CDS provided “the equivalent of insurance against default 
events” that might occur with reference to loans in securitized pools 
or tranches of ABS, MBS and CDOs.40  While CDS could be used for 
hedging purposes, financial institutions and other investors 
increasingly used CDS to speculate on the default risks of securitized 
loans and structured-finance securities.41  LCFIs further increased the 
 
STOWELL, supra note 15, at 105–06, 456.  As Frank Partnoy has noted, many CDOs 
functioned as “‘second-level’ securitizations of ‘first-level’ mortgage-backed securities 
(which were securitizations of mortgages).”  Frank Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit 
Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the Crisis 5 (Univ. San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies, 
Research Paper No. 09-015, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430653.  CDOs 
consisting of tranches of MBS are sometimes referred to as collateralized mortgage 
obligations (CMOs) but are referred to herein as CDOs.  See Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra 
note 35, at 6. 
37 LCFIs frequently used mezzanine tranches of CDOs to create CDOs-squared because 
the mezzanine tranches were the least attractive (in terms of their risk-yield trade-off) to 
most investors.  Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 990–91, 1027–30; see also Scott, supra note 
35, at 23–24, 24 fig.3.  CDOs and CDOs-squared are sometimes hereinafter collectively 
referred to as CDOs. 
38 INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 84, 84 fig.2.2 & fig.2.3 (indicating that 
$15.3 trillion of “private-label” issues of ABS, MBS, CDOs, and CDOs-squared were 
issued in global markets between 2000 and 2007, of which $9.4 trillion was issued in the 
United States).  “Private-label” securitizations refer to asset-backed securities issued by 
private-sector financial institutions, in contrast to securitizations created by government-
sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  Id. at 77 n.1; see also 
Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 988–89. 
39 Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 35, at 1. 
40 Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee 
Approach for Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1011, 1036–37 (2009); see 
also Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 991–93, 1031–32; Viral V. Acharya et al., Centralized 
Clearing for Credit Derivatives, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 34, at 
251, 254 (explaining that “a [CDS] is like an insurance contract”). 
41 Crotty, supra note 33, at 569 (summarizing (1) a 2007 report by Fitch Ratings, 
concluding that “58% of banks that buy and sell credit derivatives acknowledged that 
‘trading’ or gambling is their ‘dominant’ motivation for operating in this market, whereas 
less than 30% said that ‘hedging/credit risk management’ was their primary motive,” and 
(2) a statement by New York Superintendent of Insurance Eric Dinallo, concluding that 
“80% of the estimated $62 trillion in CDSs outstanding in 2008 were speculative”); 
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financial system’s aggregate exposure to the risks of securitized loans 
by using pools of CDS to create synthetic CDOs.  Synthetic CDOs 
were generally constructed to mimic the performance of cash flow 
CDOs, and synthetic CDOs issued yet another series of tranched, 
structured-finance securities to investors.42  By 2007, the total 
notional amounts of CDS and synthetic CDOs written with reference 
to securitized loans, ABS, MBS or cash flow CDOs may have 
exceeded $15 trillion.43 
Thus, based on available estimates, approximately $25 trillion of 
structured-finance securities and related derivatives were outstanding 
in the U.S. financial markets at the peak of the credit boom in 2007.44  
Eighteen giant LCFIs, including ten U.S. and eight foreign financial 
institutions, originated the lion’s share of those complex 
instruments.45  Structured-finance securities and related derivatives 
not only financed but also far exceeded about $9 trillion of risky 
private-sector debt that was outstanding in U.S. financial markets 
when the credit crisis broke out.46  The combined volume of MBS, 
 
Manns, supra note 40, at 1036–37 (noting the use of CDS as “speculative instruments”); 
Michael Lewis, Betting on the Blind Side, VANITY FAIR (April 2010), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2010/04/wall-street-excerpt-201004 (“In the 
beginning, credit-default swaps had been a tool for hedging . . . .  Very quickly, however, 
the new derivatives became tools for speculation . . . .”). 
42 Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 993–94, 1030–32. 
43 Id. at 994 n.126, 1032 (citing estimates indicating that, at the peak of the credit boom, 
$1.25 trillion to $6 trillion of synthetic CDOs were outstanding and that about one-third of 
the $45 trillion of outstanding CDS were written to protect holders of CDOs, CLOs, and 
other structured-finance instruments). 
44 See supra notes 38–39, 43 and accompanying text. 
45 During the credit boom that led to the financial crisis, the eighteen leading global 
LCFIs (the “big eighteen”) included the four largest U.S. banks (Bank of America, Chase, 
Citigroup, and Wachovia), the five largest U.S. securities firms (Bear, Goldman, Lehman 
Brothers (Lehman), Merrill, and Morgan Stanley), and the largest U.S. insurer (AIG), and 
eight foreign universal banks (Barclays, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse, Deutsche, HSBC, 
RBS, Société Générale, and UBS).  The big eighteen dominated global and U.S. markets 
for securities underwriting, securitizations, structured financial products, and OTC 
derivatives.  See Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 980–84, 989–90, 994–95, 1019–20, 1031–33; 
Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 721, 721–22 n.45; see also Dwight Jaffee et al., Mortgage 
Origination and Securitization in the Financial Crisis, in RESTORING FINANCIAL 
STABILITY, supra note 34, at 61, 69 tbl.1.4 (showing that eleven of the “big eighteen” 
LCFIs ranked among the top twelve global underwriters of CDOs between 2004 and 
2008); Anthony Saunders et al., Enhanced Regulation of Large, Complex Financial 
Institutions, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 34, at 139, 142 tbl.5.2 
(showing that all of the “big eighteen” LCFIs, except for AIG, ranked among the top 
twenty-three global providers of wholesale financial services in 2006 and 2007). 
46 About $6.3 trillion of nonprime residential mortgage loans, credit card loans, and 
CRE loans were outstanding in the U.S. market in 2008.  Of that amount, about $2.8 
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cash flow CDOs, CDS and synthetic CDOs created an “inverted 
pyramid of risk,” which enabled investors to place “multiple layers of 
financial bets” on the performance of high-risk loans in securitized 
pools.47  Consequently, when the underlying loans began to default, 
the leverage inherent in this “pyramid of risk” produced losses that 
were far larger than the face amounts of the defaulted loans.48 
B.  LCFIs Used Inflated Credit Ratings to Promote the Sale of Risky 
Structured-Finance Securities 
LCFIs made structured-finance securities attractive to investors by 
paying large fees to credit rating agencies (CRAs) in order to secure 
investment-grade ratings (BBB- and above) for most tranches of those 
securities.49  CRAs charged fees for their ratings based on an “issuer 
pays” business model, which required an issuer of securities to pay 
fees to one or more CRAs in order to secure credit ratings for its 
securities.  The “issuer pays” model created an obvious conflict of 
interest between a CRA’s desire to earn fees from issuers of securities 
and the CRA’s stake in preserving its reputation for making reliable 
risk assessments.  Structured-finance securitizations heightened this 
conflict of interest because LCFIs often paid additional consulting 
fees to obtain advice from CRAs on how to structure securitizations 
to produce the maximum percentage of AAA-rated securities.50 
 
trillion of loans were held in securitized pools, and many of the securitized loans and other 
loans were referenced by CDS.  See Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 988–94, 1024–41.  In 
addition, about $2.5 trillion of LBO loans and high-yield (“junk”) bonds were outstanding 
in the U.S. market in 2008, and a significant portion of that debt was securitized or 
referenced by CDS.  Id. at 1039–43; see also CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TWO TRILLION 
DOLLAR MELTDOWN: EASY MONEY, HIGH ROLLERS, AND THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH 
123–26, 134–39 (2008). 
47 Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 991–94, 1027–32. 
48 See MORRIS, supra note 46, at 73–79, 113–14, 123–32; Michael Lewis, The End, 
PORTFOLIO.COM (Nov. 11, 2008), http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news 
/portfolio/2008/11/11/The-End-of-Wall-Streets-Boom.  Hedge fund manager Steve 
Eisman explained that Wall Street firms built an “engine of doom” with cash flow CDOs 
and synthetic CDOs because those instruments created “several towers of debt” on top of 
“the original subprime loans,” and “that’s why the losses are so much greater than the 
loans.”  Id. 
49 Manns, supra note 40, at 1050–52; Timothy E. Lynch, Deeply and Persistently 
Conflicted: Credit Rating Agencies in the Current Regulatory Environment, 59 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 227, 244–46 (2009); Frank Partnoy, Rethinking Regulation of Credit Rating 
Agencies: An Institutional Investor Perspective 4–6 (Univ. San Diego Sch. of Law Legal 
Studies, Research Paper No. 09-014, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430608. 
50 See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 49, at 246–48, 256–61; Manns, supra note 40, at 1052; 
Partnoy, supra note 36, at 3–7; David Reiss, Rating Agencies and Reputational Risk 4–8 
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Moreover, a small group of LCFIs dominated the securitization 
markets and, therefore, were significant repeat players in those 
markets.  Accordingly, LCFIs could strongly influence a CRA’s 
decision on whether to assign favorable ratings to an issue of 
structured-finance securities by threatening to switch to other CRAs 
to obtain higher ratings for the same type of securities.51  Given the 
generous fees that CRAs received from LCFIs for rating structured-
finance securities and for providing additional consulting services, it 
is not surprising that CRAs typically assigned AAA ratings to three-
quarters or more of the tranches of ABS, RMBS, CDOs, and CDOs-
squared.52 
Investors relied heavily on credit ratings and usually did not 
perform any meaningful due diligence before deciding to buy 
structured-finance securities.  In addition, regulations issued by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) allowed issuers to sell 
ABS, RMBS, and CDOs to investors based on limited disclosures 
beyond the instruments’ credit ratings.53  Many issuers provided 
descriptions of the underlying loans that were incomplete and 
materially misleading.54  The complexity of structured-finance 
transactions made it difficult for investors to evaluate the risks of 
first-level securitizations and nearly impossible for investors to 
ascertain the risks of second- and third-level securitizations.55 
 
(Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 136, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1358316. 
51 Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 35, at 16–21, 25; Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A 
Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, § MM (Magazine), at 36; Lynch, supra note 49, at 
256–58; Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 988–94, 1011–12, 1017–20, 1027–42. 
52 Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 35, at 4; Jaffee et al., supra note 45, at 73–74; 
Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 1028–29. 
53 Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of 
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2070–73 (2007) (discussing limited 
disclosures given to institutional investors who bought structured-finance securities in 
private placements under SEC Rule 144A); Richard E. Mendales, Collateralized Explosive 
Devices: Why Securities Regulation Failed to Prevent the CDO Meltdown, and How to Fix 
It, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1360–62, 1373–87 (2009) (discussing additional reasons 
why SEC regulations failed to require adequate disclosures for offerings of CDOs and 
instead encouraged investors to rely on credit ratings). 
54 Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime 
Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257, 1305–06 (2009); Kurt Eggert, Beyond “Skin in the 
Game”: The Structural Flaws in Private-Label Mortgage Securitization That Caused the 
Mortgage Meltdown, Testimony Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 11–13 
(Sept. 23, 2010) (on file with author). 
55 Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 1026–28; Jaffee et al., supra note 45, at 73–74; Scott, 
supra note 35, at 23–24, 26; INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 81. 
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Investors also had strong incentives not to question the ratings 
assigned to structured-finance securities by CRAs.  AAA-rated 
structured-finance securities paid yields that were significantly higher 
than conventional AAA-rated bonds.  Structured-finance securities 
were therefore very attractive to investors who were seeking the 
highest available yields on supposedly “safe” debt securities during 
the low-interest, low-inflation environment of the pre-crisis period.56  
The AAA ratings issued by CRAs enabled LCFIs to transform 
“trillions of dollars of risky assets . . . into securities that were widely 
considered to be safe,” and were “eagerly bought up by investors 
around the world.”57 
The CRAs’ pervasive conflicts of interest encouraged them to issue 
credit ratings that either misperceived or misrepresented the true risks 
embedded in structured-finance securities.  CRAs, along with the 
LCFIs that issued the securities, made the following crucial errors: (1) 
giving too much weight to the benefits of diversification from pooling 
large numbers of high-risk loans; (2) failing to recognize that RMBS 
and CDOs became more risky as mortgage lending standards 
deteriorated between 2004 and 2007; (3) failing to appreciate that 
RMBS and CDOs often contained dangerous concentrations of loans 
from high-risk states like California, Florida and Nevada; (4) 
underestimating the risk that a serious economic downturn would 
trigger widespread correlated defaults among risky loans of similar 
types; (5) relying on historical data drawn from a relatively brief 
period in which benign economic conditions prevailed; and (6) 
assuming that housing prices would never decline on a nationwide 
basis.58  By mid-2009, CRAs had cut their ratings on tens of 
 
56 See Coval et al., supra note 35, at 4, 19; Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 1028–29; INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 81; see also Acharya & Richardson, supra note 34, at 
205 (stating that, in June 2006, “AAA-rated tranches of subprime CDOs offered twice the 
premium of the typical AAA credit-default swap of a corporation”); FIN. SERVS. AUTH., 
THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 12–
15 (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf (explaining 
that LCFIs created novel types of securitized credit instruments to satisfy “a ferocious 
search for yield” by investors in the context of “very low medium- and long-term real 
interest rates”); Mark Astley et al., Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis, Q3 BANK 
ENG. Q. BULL. 178, 181 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=1478419 (“The low interest rate environment seems to have interacted with 
strong competitive pressures on banks and asset managers to maintain returns, leading to a 
‘search for yield’ in financial markets.”). 
57 Coval et al., supra note 35, at 3–4. 
58 Id. at 3–4, 8–21; Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 35, at 2, 13–15, 21–23, 25; 
Partnoy, supra note 36, at 6–11; Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 1034; Lowenstein, supra note 
51. 
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thousands of investment-grade tranches of RMBS and CDOs, and 
securitization markets had collapsed.59 
C.  LCFIs Promoted an Unsustainable Credit Boom That Set the 
Stage for the Financial Crisis 
The LCFIs’ large-scale securitizations of credit helped to create an 
enormous credit boom in the U.S. financial markets between 1991 
and 2007.  Nominal domestic private-sector debt nearly quadrupled, 
rising from $10.3 trillion to $39.9 trillion during that period, and the 
largest increases occurred in the financial and household sectors.60  
Total U.S. private-sector debt as a percentage of gross domestic 
product (GDP) rose from 150% in 1987 to almost 300% in 2007 and, 
by that measure, exceeded even the huge credit boom that led to the 
Great Depression.61  Financial sector debt as a percentage of GDP 
rose from 40% in 1988 to 70% in 1998 and to 120% in 2008.62  
Meanwhile, household sector debt grew from two-thirds of GDP in 
the early 1990s to 100% of GDP in 2008.63 
The credit boom greatly increased the financial sector’s importance 
within the broader economy.  Financial sector earnings doubled from 
13% of total corporate pretax profits in 1980 to 27% of such profits in 
2007.64  Stocks of financial firms included in the Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P) 500 index held the highest aggregate market value of any 
 
59 INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 93 fig.2.12; Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra 
note 35, at 8–9, 31 tbl.2 (reporting that Moody’s had issued 45,000 downgrades affecting 
36,000 tranches of structured-finance securities during 2007 and the first nine months of 
2008 and that Moody’s average downgrade during that period was 5.2 rating notches). 
60 Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 1002, 1002 nn.174–76 (reporting that financial sector debt 
accounted for $13 trillion of the rise in domestic nongovernmental debt between 1991 and 
2007, while household debt grew by $10 trillion and nonfinancial business debt increased 
by $6.4 trillion). 
61 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 56, at 18 (exhibit 1.10); see also STOWELL, supra 
note 15, at 456 (exhibit 3) (showing the rapid growth of total domestic nongovernmental 
debt as a percentage of GDP between the mid-1980s and the end of 2007); Wilmarth, 
supra note 4, at 974, 974 n.26 (referring to the credit boom of the 1920s that precipitated 
the Great Depression). 
62 A Special Report on Financial Risk: The Gods Strike Back, ECONOMIST (Feb. 11, 
2010), http://www.economist.com/node/15474137. 
63 Peter Coy, Why the Fed Isn’t Igniting Inflation, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 
29, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/09_26/b4137020225264.htm. 
64 Justin Lahart, Has the Financial Industry’s Heyday Come and Gone?, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 28, 2008, at A2; see also Buttonwood: The Profits Puzzle, ECONOMIST (Sept. 13, 
2007), http://www.economist.com/node/9804566 (reporting that the financial sector 
contributed “around 27% of the profits made by companies in the S&P 500 index [in 
2007], up from 19% in 1996”). 
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industry sector of that index from 1995 to 1998, and again from 2002 
to 2007.65 
As the credit boom inflated and the financial sector grew in size 
and importance to the overall economy, LCFIs also became more 
leveraged, more fragile, and more vulnerable to a systemic crisis.  At 
the end of 2007, the ten largest U.S. financial institutions—all of 
which were leading participants in structured-finance securitization—
had an average leverage ratio of 27:1 when their off-balance-sheet 
(OBS) commitments were taken into account.66 
As I noted in a previous article, “[b]y 2007, the health of the U.S. 
economy relied on a massive confidence game—indeed, some might 
say, a Ponzi scheme—operated by its leading financial institutions.”67  
This “confidence game,” which sustained the credit boom, could 
continue only as long as investors were willing “to keep buying new 
debt instruments that would enable overstretched borrowers to expand 
their consumption and service their debts.”68  In the summer of 2007, 
when investors lost confidence in the ability of subprime borrowers to 
meet their obligations, “the game collapsed and a severe financial 
crisis began.”69 
D.  LCFIs Retained Exposures to Many of the Hazards Embedded in 
Their High-Risk Lending 
During the credit boom, as explained above, LCFIs pursued a 
securitization strategy that produced highly leveraged risk taking 
through the use of complex structured-finance products, CDS and 
OBS vehicles.70  This securitization strategy was highly attractive in 
the short term, because LCFIs (as well as the mortgage brokers, 
 
65 Elizabeth Stanton, Bank Stocks Cede Biggest S&P Weighting to Technology 
(Update2), BLOOMBERG (May 21, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid 
=newsarchive&sid=adD4MfoIscYo; see also Tom Lauricella, Crumbling Profit Center: 
Financial Sector Showing Life, but Don’t Bank on Long-Term Revival, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
24, 2008, at C1 (reporting that financial stocks accounted for 22.3% of the value of all 
stocks included in the S&P index at the end of 2006, “up from just 13% at the end of 
1995”). 
66 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 727–28, 728 n.72. 
67 Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 1008 (footnote omitted). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Viral V. Acharya & Philipp Schnabl, How Banks Played the Leverage Game, in 
RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 34, at 83–89; Blundell-Wignall et al., supra 
note 11, at 3–13; Saunders et al., supra note 45, at 140–45; Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 
1027–41. 
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nonbank lenders and CRAs who worked with LCFIs) collected 
lucrative fees at each stage of originating, securitizing, rating and 
marketing the risky residential mortgages, commercial mortgages, 
credit card loans, and LBO loans.71  Based on the widespread belief 
that LCFIs were following an “originate to distribute” strategy, both 
managers and regulators of LCFIs operated under the illusion that the 
credit risks inherent in the securitized loans were being transferred to 
the ultimate purchasers of structured-finance securities.72  In 
significant ways, however, LCFIs actually pursued an “originate to 
not really distribute” program, in which they retained significant risk 
exposures from their securitization programs.73 
For example, LCFIs decided to keep large amounts of highly rated, 
structured-finance securities on their balance sheets because 
regulators allowed LCFIs to do so with a minimum of capital.  In the 
U.S., LCFIs took advantage of a regulation issued by the federal 
banking agencies in November 2001, which greatly reduced the risk-
based capital charge for structured-finance securities rated “AAA” or 
“AA” by CRAs.  The 2001 regulation assigned a risk weighting of 
only 20% to such securities in determining the amount of risk-based 
capital that banks were required to hold.74  As a practical matter, the 
2001 rule cut the risk-based capital requirement for highly rated 
tranches of RMBS and related CDOs from 4% to only 1.6%.75 
In Europe, LCFIs similarly retained AAA-rated structured-finance 
securities on their balance sheets because the Basel I and Basel II 
capital accords assigned very low risk weights to such securities.  In 
contrast to the United States, European nations did not require banks 
to maintain a minimum leverage capital ratio and instead required 
banks only to meet the Basel risk-weighted capital standards.  As a 
result, European banks did not incur significant capital charges for 
 
71 Crotty, supra note 33, at 565–66; Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 984–87, 995–96, 1017–
20, 1034–42; see also id. at 995 (noting that “[f]ee income at the largest U.S. banks 
(including BofA, Chase and Citigroup) rose from 40% of total earnings in 1995 to 76% of 
total earnings in 2007”). 
72 Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 995–96, 1025–26, 1041–42. 
73 Id. at 970–71, 1032–35, 1039–43, 1046–48; see also Acharya & Richardson, supra 
note 34, at 198–201; FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 56, at 15–21. 
74 See Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,614, 59,625–27 (Nov. 29, 2001); 
ARNOLD KLING, NOT WHAT THEY HAD IN MIND: A HISTORY OF POLICIES THAT 
PRODUCED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008, at 25–26 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1474430. 
75 KLING, supra note 74, at 25 fig.4. 
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holding on-balance-sheet, AAA-rated instruments, due to their low 
risk weights under Basel rules.76 
LCFIs also had revenue-based incentives to keep highly rated 
structured finance securities on their balance sheets.  As the credit 
boom reached its peak, LCFIs found it difficult to locate investors to 
purchase all of the AAA-rated tranches they were producing.  
Managers at aggressive LCFIs decided to assume “warehouse risk” 
by keeping AAA-rated tranches on their balance sheets because they 
wanted to complete more securitization deals, earn more fees, 
produce higher short-term profits, and distribute larger compensation 
packages to executives and key employees.77  By 2007, Citigroup, 
Merrill, and UBS together held more than $175 billion of AAA-rated 
CDOs on their books.78  The huge losses suffered by those 
institutions on retained CDO exposures were a significant reason why 
all three institutions needed extensive governmental assistance to 
avoid failure.79 
In addition, LCFIs retained risk exposures for many of the assets 
they ostensibly transferred to OBS entities through securitization.  
Regulators in the United States and Europe allowed LCFIs to sponsor 
structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and other OBS conduits, which 
were frequently used as dumping grounds for RMBS and CDOs that 
 
76 Acharya & Schnabl, supra note 70, at 94–98; ANDREW G. HALDANE, EXEC. DIR., 
FIN. STABILITY, BANK OF ENG., BANKING ON THE STATE 5–8 (2009), available at 
http://www.bis.org/review/r091111e.pdf.  Because European banks did not have to comply 
with a minimum leverage capital ratio, the thirteen largest European banks operated in 
2008 with an average leverage capital ratio of 2.68%, compared to an average leverage 
capital ratio of 5.88% for the ten largest U.S. banks (which were required by regulators to 
maintain a leverage capital ratio of at least 4%).  Similarly, the four largest U.S. securities 
firms had an average leverage capital ratio of only 3.33% because the SEC did not require 
those firms to comply with a minimum leverage ratio.  Adrian Blundell-Wignall & Paul 
Atkinson, The Sub-prime Crisis: Causal Distortions and Regulatory Reform, in LESSONS 
FROM THE FINANCIAL TURMOIL OF 2007 AND 2008, at 55, 93–94, 95 tbl.6 (Paul Bloxham 
& Christopher Kent eds., 2008), available at http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/confs 
/2008/conf-vol-2008.pdf; see also McCoy et al., supra note 14, at 1358–60 (explaining 
that the SEC allowed the five largest U.S. securities firms to determine their capital 
requirements based on internal risk models, with the result that leverage at the five firms 
increased to about 30:1 by 2008). 
77 Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 1032–33; see also Gian Luca Clementi et al., Rethinking 
Compensation in Financial Firms, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 34, at 
197, 198–200; Crotty, supra note 33, at 568–69; Jaffee et al., supra note 45, at 71–73. 
78 Clementi et al., supra note 77, at 198–200. 
79 GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. 
MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 
133–39 (2009); Blundell-Wignall et al., supra note 11, at 4, 7–11; Jaffee et al., supra note 
45, at 68–69, 72–73. 
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LCFIs were unable to sell to arms-length investors.  The sponsored 
conduits sold asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) to investors 
and used the proceeds to buy structured-finance securities 
underwritten by the sponsoring LCFIs.  The conduits faced a 
potentially dangerous funding mismatch between their longer-term, 
structured-finance assets and their shorter-term, ABCP liabilities.  
The sponsoring LCFIs covered that mismatch (in whole or in part) by 
providing explicit credit enhancements (including lines of credit) or 
implicit commitments to ensure the availability of liquidity if the 
sponsored conduits could not roll over their ABCP.80 
U.S. regulators adopted risk-based capital rules that encouraged the 
use of ABCP conduits.  Those rules did not assess any capital charges 
against LCFIs for transferring securitized assets to sponsored 
conduits.  Instead, the rules required LCFIs to post capital only if they 
provided explicit credit enhancements to their conduits.81  Moreover, 
a 2004 regulation approved a very low capital charge for sponsors’ 
lines of credit, equal to only one-tenth of the usual capital charge of 
8%, as long as the lines of credit had maturities of one year or less.82 
ABCP conduits sponsored by LCFIs grew rapidly during the peak 
years of the credit boom.  As a result, the ABCP market in the United 
States nearly doubled after 2003 and reached $1.2 trillion in August 
2007.  Three-quarters of that amount was held in 300 conduits 
sponsored by U.S. and European LCFIs.83  Citigroup was the largest 
conduit sponsor, and seven of the top ten sponsors were members of 
the “big eighteen” club of LCFIs.84  As a result of their risk exposures 
to conduits and their other OBS commitments, many of the leading 
LCFIs were much more highly leveraged than their balance sheets 
indicated.85 
 
80 For discussions of the risk exposures of LCFIs to SIVs and other sponsored conduits, 
see TETT, supra note 79, at 97–98, 127–28, 136, 196–98; Acharya & Schnabl, supra note 
70, at 88–94; Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 1033. 
81 Acharya & Schnabl, supra note 70, at 89. 
82 Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 69 Fed. Reg. 44,908, 44,910–11 (July 28, 2004); see 
also Acharya & Schnabl, supra note 70, at 89 (noting that capital requirements for short-
term “liquidity enhancements” were “only 0.8 percent of asset value”). 
83 Marcin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, When Safe Proved Risky: Commercial Paper 
During the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, 24 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 29, 32–34, 38 fig.1 
(2010). 
84 Acharya & Schnabl, supra note 70, at 93 tbl.2.1 (listing Citigroup, Bank of America, 
Chase, HSBC, Société Générale, Deutsche, and Barclays among the top ten conduit 
sponsors); supra note 45 (listing the “big eighteen” LCFIs). 
85 TETT, supra note 79, at 97–98; Crotty, supra note 33, at 570. 
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After the financial crisis broke out in August 2007, conduits 
suffered large losses on their holdings of structured-finance securities.  
Many conduits were faced with imminent default because they could 
not roll over their ABCP.  Investors refused to buy new issues of 
ABCP because of the presumed exposure of ABCP conduits to losses 
from subprime mortgages.86  In order to avoid damage to their 
reputations, most LCFI sponsors went beyond their legal obligations 
and either brought conduit assets back onto their balance sheets or 
provided explicit credit enhancements that enabled conduits to remain 
in business.87 
Thus, notwithstanding the widely shared assumption that LCFIs 
were following an “originate to distribute” strategy, LCFIs did not 
transfer many of the credit risks created by their securitization 
programs.  Instead, “they ‘warehoused’ nonprime mortgage-related 
assets . . . [and] transferred similar assets to sponsored OBS 
entities.”88  One study estimated that LCFIs retained risk exposures to 
about half of the outstanding AAA-rated ABS in mid-2008 through 
their “warehoused” and OBS positions.89  Hence, in many respects, 
“LCFIs pursued an ‘originate to not really distribute’ strategy, which 
prevented financial regulators and analysts from understanding the 
true risks created by the LCFIs’ involvement with nonprime 
mortgage-related assets.”90 
E.  While Other Factors Contributed to the Financial Crisis, LCFIs 
Were the Most Important Private-Sector Catalysts for the Crisis 
Excessive risk-taking by LCFIs was not the only cause of the 
current financial crisis.  Several additional factors played an important 
role.  First, many analysts have criticized the FRB for maintaining an 
excessively loose monetary policy during the second half of the 1990s 
and again between 2001 and 2005.  Critics charge that the FRB’s 
monetary policy mistakes produced speculative asset booms that led 
 
86 Acharya & Schnabl, supra note 70, at 89–92. 
87 Id. at 91–94; see also Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 1033 (observing that the conduit 
rescues “showed that LCFIs felt obliged, for reasons of ‘reputation risk,’ to support OBS 
entities that they had sponsored, even when they did not have explicit contractual 
commitments to do so”).  Citigroup absorbed $84 billion of assets onto its balance sheet 
from seven SIVs, while HSBC and Société Générale together took back $50 billion of 
assets from their SIVs.  Id. at 1033 n.358. 
88 Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 1033. 
89 Acharya & Schnabl, supra note 70, at 97 tbl.2.2, 97–98. 
90 Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 1034. 
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to the dotcom-telecom bust in the stock market between 2000 and 
2002 and the bursting of the housing bubble after 2006.91  A recent 
European Central Bank staff study found that lax monetary policy in 
the United States and the euro area produced a prolonged period of 
low, short-term interest rates in both regions between 2002 and 2006.  
The study concluded that “too low for too long monetary policy rates, 
by inducing a softening of lending standards and a consequent 
buildup of risk on banks’ assets, were a key factor leading to the 
financial crisis” on both continents.92 
Second, during the past decade several Asian nations that were 
large exporters of goods (including China, Japan, and South Korea) 
maintained artificially low exchange rates for their currencies against 
the dollar, the pound sterling, and the euro.  Those nations preserved 
advantageous exchange rates for their currencies (thereby boosting 
exports) by purchasing Western government securities and investing 
in Western financial markets.  In addition, many oil-exporting 
countries invested large amounts in Western assets.  Thus, nations 
with significant balance-of-trade surpluses provided large amounts of 
credit and investment capital that boosted the value of Western 
currencies, supported low interest rates, and thereby promoted asset 
booms in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other European 
countries.93 
Third, Robert Shiller and others have argued that “bubble thinking” 
caused home buyers, LCFIs, CRAs, investors in structured-finance 
securities and regulators to believe that the housing boom would 
continue indefinitely and “could not end badly.”94  According to these 
 
91 For critiques of the FRB’s monetary policy, see Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 1005–06 
(summarizing analysis by various critics of the FRB); JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF 
TRACK: HOW GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, PROLONGED, AND 
WORSENED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 1–6, 11–13 (2009) (contending that the FRB’s “extra-
easy [monetary] policy accelerated the housing boom and thereby ultimately led to the 
housing bust”); KLING, supra note 74, at 38–39.  For an impassioned attack on the FRB’s 
monetary policy between the mid-1990s and 2005, see WILLIAM A. FLECKENSTEIN & 
FREDERICK SHEEHAN, GREENSPAN’S BUBBLES: THE AGE OF IGNORANCE AT THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE (2008). 
92 Maddloni & Peydró, supra note 4, at 9–10, 14–15, 25–26 (quote at 25). 
93 For discussion of the impact of large purchases of Western government securities and 
other investments in Western financial markets by Asian nations and oil-exporting 
countries, see MORRIS, supra note 46, at 88–104; Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 1006–07; 
Astley et al., supra note 56, at 180–82. 
94 ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION 48–54 (2008); see also MORRIS, 
supra note 46, at 65–69; Astley et al., supra note 56, at 181; Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 
1007–08. 
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analysts, a “social contagion of boom thinking” helps to explain both 
why the housing bubble continued to inflate for several years and why 
regulators failed to stop LCFIs from making high-risk loans to 
borrowers who had no capacity to repay or refinance their loans 
unless their properties continued to appreciate in value.95 
Finally, Fannie Mae (“Fannie”) and Freddie Mac (“Freddie”) 
contributed to the housing bubble by purchasing large quantities of 
nonprime mortgages and RMBS beginning in 2003. Those 
government-sponsored entities (GSEs) purchased nonprime 
mortgages and RMBS because (1) Congress pressured them to fulfill 
affordable housing goals, (2) large nonprime mortgage lenders 
(including Countrywide) threatened to sell most of their mortgages to 
Wall Street firms if the GSEs failed to purchase more of their 
nonprime loans, and (3) Fannie’s and Freddie’s senior executives 
feared a continuing loss of market share and profits to LCFIs that 
were aggressively securitizing nonprime mortgages into private-label 
RMBS.  In 2007, the two GSEs held risk exposures connected to 
more than $400 billion of nonprime mortgages, representing a fifth of 
the nonprime market.  Heavy losses on those risk exposures 
contributed to the collapse of Fannie and Freddie in 2008.96 
Notwithstanding the significance of the foregoing factors, LCFIs 
were clearly “the primary private-sector catalysts for the destructive 
credit boom that led to the subprime financial crisis, and they 
[became] the epicenter of the current global financial mess.”97  As 
indicated above, the “big eighteen” LCFIs were dominant players in 
global securities and derivatives markets during the credit boom.98  
Those LCFIs included most of the top underwriters for nonprime 
RMBS, ABS, CMBS, and LBO loans, as well as related CDOs, 
 
95 SHILLER, supra note 94, at 41–54; see also Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 1007–08. 
96 For discussions of Fannie’s and Freddie’s purchases of nonprime mortgages and 
RMBS and the reasons for such purchases, see, e.g., Dwight Jaffee et al., What to Do 
About the Government-Sponsored Enterprises, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY, 
supra note 34, at 121, 124–30; Christopher L. Peterson, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and 
the Home Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis, 10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 149, 163–168 (2009); Jo 
Becker et al., White House Philosophy Stoked Mortgage Bonfire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21iht-21admin.188415 
72.html; Paul Davidson, Lawmakers Blast Former Freddie, Fannie CEOs: Execs Say 
Competition Played Role in Decisions, USA TODAY, Dec. 10, 2008, at 3B; Charles 
Duhigg, Pressured to Take More Risk, Fannie Reached Tipping Point, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/05/business/05fannie.html. 
97 Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 1046. 
98 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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CLOs, and CDS.99  While Fannie and Freddie funded about a fifth of 
the nonprime mortgage market between 2003 and 2007, they did so 
primarily by purchasing nonprime mortgages and private-label RMBS 
that were originated or underwritten by LCFIs.100  LCFIs provided 
most of the rest of the funding for nonprime mortgages, as well as 
much of the financing for risky credit card loans, CRE loans, and 
LBO loans.101 
The central role of LCFIs in the financial crisis is confirmed by the 
enormous losses they suffered and the huge bailouts they received.  
The “big eighteen” LCFIs accounted for three-fifths of the $1.5 
trillion of total worldwide losses recorded by banks, securities firms, 
and insurers between the outbreak of the financial crisis in mid-2007 
and the spring of 2010.102  The list of leading LCFIs is “a who’s who 
of the current financial crisis,” which includes “[m]any of the firms 
[that] either went bust . . . or suffered huge write-downs that led to 
significant government intervention.”103  Lehman failed, while two 
other members of the “big eighteen” LCFIs (AIG and RBS) were 
nationalized, and three others (Bear, Merrill, and Wachovia) were 
acquired by other LCFIs with substantial governmental assistance.104  
Three additional members of the group (Citigroup, Bank of America, 
and UBS) survived only because they received costly government 
bailouts.105  Chase, Goldman, and Morgan Stanley received 
substantial infusions of capital under the federal government’s 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), and Goldman and Morgan 
 
99 Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 982–84, 989–91, 1019–20, 1031–35, 1039–42; see also 
Jaffee et al., supra note 45, at 69 tbl.1.4 (showing that the “big eighteen” LCFIs included 
eleven of the twelve top global underwriters of CDOs during 2006 and 2007). 
100 See Peterson, supra note 96, at 167–69; supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
101 See Jaffee et al., supra note 45, at 68–73; Saunders et al., supra note 45, at 143–45; 
supra notes 33–48 and accompanying text. 
102 Yap & Pierson, supra note 19 (showing that the “big eighteen” LCFIs accounted for 
$892 billion of the $1.51 trillion of losses suffered by banks, securities firms, and insurers 
during that period); see also Saunders et al., supra note 45, at 144–45 tbl.5.3. 
103 Jaffee et al., supra note 45, at 69. 
104 STOWELL, supra note 15, at 182–84, 398–405, 408–17; Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 
1044–45; Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 28–30. 
105 Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 1044–45 (explaining that Citigroup and Bank of America 
“received huge bailout packages from the U.S. government that included $90 billion of 
capital infusions and more than $400 billion of asset price guarantees,” while UBS 
“received a $60 billion bailout package from the Swiss government”); see also WESSEL, 
supra note 14, at 239–41, 259–63 (discussing bailouts of Citigroup and Bank of America); 
SIGTARP BANK OF AMERICA REPORT, supra note 14, at 19–21, 28–29; SIGTARP 
CITIGROUP REPORT, supra note 14, at 5–7, 19–32. 
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Stanley quickly converted to BHCs to secure permanent access to the 
FRB’s discount window as well as “the Fed’s public promise of 
protection.”106 
Thus, of the “big eighteen” LCFIs, only Lehman failed, but the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and European nations provided 
extensive assistance to ensure the survival of at least twelve other 
members of the group.107  In the United States, the federal 
government guaranteed the viability of the nineteen largest BHCs as 
well as AIG.108  Those institutions received $290 billion of capital 
infusions from the federal government, and they also issued $235 
billion of debt that was guaranteed (and thereby subsidized) by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).  In contrast, smaller 
banks received only $41 billion of capital assistance and issued only 
$11 billion of FDIC-guaranteed debt.109  A senior Federal Reserve 
official observed in 2009 that LCFIs “were central to this crisis as it 
expanded and became a global recession. . . .  [S]tockholders and 
creditors of these firms enjoyed special protection funded by the 
American taxpayer.”110  He further remarked, “It is no longer 
conjecture that the largest institutions in the United States have been 
determined to be too big to fail.  They have been bailed out . . . .”111 
 
106 WESSEL, supra note 14, at 217–18, 227, 236–40 (noting that Chase received $25 
billion of TARP capital while Goldman and Morgan Stanley each received $10 billion). 
107 See Fabio Benedetti-Valentini, SocGen Predicts ‘Challenging’ 2009, Posts Profit 
(Update2), BLOOMBERG (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid 
=newsarchive&sid=a7hahfcNNpPE&refer=Europe; supra notes 104–06 and 
accompanying text.  After Lehman’s collapse severely disrupted global financial markets, 
federal authorities decided to take all necessary measures to prevent any additional failures 
by major LCFIs.  That decision led to the federal government’s bailouts of AIG, Citigroup, 
and Bank of America; the infusions of TARP capital into other LCFIs; and other 
extraordinary measures of support for the financial markets.  See SORKIN, supra note 14, 
at 373–537; WESSEL, supra note 14, at 189–241. 
108 See Robert Schmidt, Geithner Slams Bonuses, Says Banks Would Have Failed 
(Update 2), BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid 
=newsarchive&sid=aCUCZcFhssuY (quoting statement by Treasury Secretary Timothy 
Geithner that “none” of the biggest U.S. banks would have survived if the federal 
government had not intervened to support the financial system); supra notes 14–17 and 
accompanying text. 
109 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 737–38, 738 n.122. 
110 Thomas M. Hoenig, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Regulatory 
Reform and the Economy: We Can Do Better, Speech at the 2009 Colorado Economic 
Forums 8 (Oct. 6, 2009), available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/SpeechBio 
/HoenigPDF/Denver.Forums.10.06.09.pdf. 
111 Thomas M. Hoenig, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Leverage and 
Debt: The Impact of Today’s Choices on Tomorrow, Speech at the 2009 Annual Meeting 
of the Kansas Bankers Ass’n (Aug. 6, 2009), available at http://www.kansascityfed.org 
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IV 
GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS DEMONSTRATED THAT LCFIS BENEFIT 
FROM HUGE TBTF SUBSIDIES 
As shown above, LCFIs pursued aggressive and speculative 
business strategies that exposed them to huge losses and potential 
failures when asset bubbles in U.S. and European housing markets, 
CRE markets, and LBO markets burst in the second half of 2007.112  
The systemic risk created by LCFIs during the credit boom caused the 
United States and other nations to implement massive bailouts of 
LCFIs, including leading securities firms and insurance companies as 
well as banks.113 
At the height of the financial crisis in March 2009, FRB Chairman 
Bernanke declared that the federal government was committed to 
ensure the survival of “systemically important financial institutions” 
(SIFIs) in order to prevent a systemic collapse of the financial 
markets and an economic depression.114  Chairman Bernanke 
defended the federal government’s decision to ensure “the continued 
viability” of SIFIs in the following terms: 
In the midst of this crisis, given the highly fragile state of financial 
markets and the global economy, government assistance to avoid 
the failures of major financial institutions has been necessary to 
avoid a further serious destabilization of the financial system, and 
our commitment to avoiding such a failure remains firm.115 
Chairman Bernanke acknowledged that “the too-big-to-fail issue 
has emerged as an enormous problem” because “it reduces market 
discipline and encourages excessive risk-taking” by TBTF firms.116  
 
/SpeechBio/HoenigPDF/hoenigKBA.08.06.09.pdf; accord Charles I. Plosser, President 
and CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Some Observations About Policy Lessons from the 
Crisis, Speech at the Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum 3 (Dec. 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/publications/speeches/plosser/2009/12-04-09_fed-policy   
-forum.pdf (“During this crisis and through the implementation of the stress tests, we have 
effectively declared at least 19 institutions as too big to fail . . . .”). 
112 Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 1032–43; Saunders et al., supra note 45, at 143–45. 
113 See Liam Pleven & Dan Fitzpatrick, Struggling Hartford Taps McGee as New CEO, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2009, at C1 (reporting that Hartford, a large insurance company, 
received  a capital infusion of $3.4 billion from the Treasury Department under the TARP 
program); supra notes 14–18, 103–11 and accompanying text. 
114 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Financial Reform to Address 
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In subsequent testimony delivered in September 2010, Chairman 
Bernanke confirmed that “[m]any of the vulnerabilities that amplified 
the crisis are linked with the problem of so-called too-big-to-fail 
firms,” and he declared, “[i]f the crisis has a single lesson, it is that 
the too-big-to-fail problem must be solved.”117 
In an October 2009 speech, Governor Mervyn King of the Bank of 
England condemned the perverse incentives created by TBTF 
subsidies in even stronger terms.  Governor King maintained that 
“[t]he massive support extended to the banking sector around the 
world, while necessary to avert economic disaster, has created 
possibly the biggest moral hazard in history.”118  He further argued 
that TBTF subsidies provided a partial explanation for decisions by 
LCFIs to engage in high-risk strategies during the credit boom: 
Why were banks willing to take risks that proved so damaging to 
themselves and the rest of the economy?  One of the key reasons—
mentioned by market participants in conversations before the crisis 
hit—is that incentives to manage risk and to increase leverage were 
distorted by the implicit support or guarantee provided by 
government to creditors of banks that were seen as “too important 
to fail.” . . .  Banks and their creditors knew that if they were 
sufficiently important to the economy or the rest of the financial 
system, and things went wrong, the government would always stand 
behind them.  And they were right.119 
Industry studies and anecdotal evidence confirm that TBTF 
subsidies create significant economic distortions and promote moral 
hazard.  During the past three decades, and particularly during the 
financial crisis, LCFIs that were perceived as TBTF received benefits 
that extended well beyond customary access to federal deposit 
insurance and the Fed’s discount window.  Both before and during the 
crisis, LCFIs operated with much lower capital ratios and benefited 
from  significantly higher stock prices (adjusted for risk) and much 
lower funding costs compared to smaller banks.120  CRAs and bond 
 
117 Bernanke, supra note 1. 
118 Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of Eng., Speech to Scottish Business 
Organizations in Edinburgh 4 (Oct. 20, 2009), available at http://www.bankofengland 
.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech406.pdf; see also RICHARD S. CARNELL ET AL., 
THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 326 (4th ed. 2009) (explaining that 
“moral hazard” results from the fact that “[i]nsurance changes the incentives of the person 
insured . . . .  [I]f you no longer fear a harm [due to insurance], you no longer have an 
incentive to take precautions against it.”). 
119 King, supra note 118, at 3. 
120 See Allen N. Berger et al., How Do Large Banking Organizations Manage Their 
Capital Ratios?, 34 J. FIN. SERVS. RESEARCH 123, 138–39, 145 (2008) (finding that banks 
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investors gave preferential treatment to TBTF institutions because of 
the explicit and implicit government backing they received.121 
For example, Bertrand Rime found evidence of TBTF benefits 
based on an analysis of credit ratings given by Moody’s and Fitch to 
banks in twenty-one industrialized nations between 1999 and 2003.  
During that period, Moody’s and Fitch gave each bank an 
“individual” rating based on its “intrinsic” resources and an “issuer” 
rating that also considered the bank’s ability to draw support from 
third parties, including governmental agencies.  The rated banks 
ranged in size from $1 billion to $1 trillion.  The study found that 
Moody’s and Fitch gave banks with assets of $100 to $400 billion a 
significant ratings upgrade compared to smaller banks with similar 
financial characteristics.  Moody’s and Fitch also gave banks with 
assets of $400 billion to $1 trillion an even larger ratings upgrade.  
The study concluded that “proxies of the TBTF status of a bank (total 
assets and market share) have a positive and significant effect on 
large banks’ issuer ratings, and . . . the rating bonus also implies a 
substantial reduction of the refinancing costs of those banks that are 
regarded as TBTF by rating agencies.”122 
 
with more than $50 billion of assets maintained significantly lower capital ratios, 
compared to smaller banks, between 1992 and 2006); Hoenig, supra note 111 (observing 
that the ten largest U.S. banks operated with a Tier 1 common stock capital ratio of 3.2% 
during the first quarter of 2009, compared to a ratio of 6.0% for banks smaller than the 
top-twenty banks); Priyank Gandhi & Hanno Lustig, Size Anomalies in U.S. Bank Stock 
Returns: A Fiscal Explanation 1–13, 30–34 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 16553, 2010) (determining, based on risk-adjusted stock prices of U.S. banks 
from 1970 to 2008, that (1) the largest banks received an implicit cost of capital “subsidy” 
of 3.1%, due to the financial markets’ belief that the federal government would protect 
those banks from “disaster risk” during financial crises, and (2) smaller banks paid an 
implicit cost of capital “tax” of 3.25% because they did not receive comparable protection 
from the government); Gretchen Morgenson, The Cost of Saving These Whales, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/04 /business/economy/04gret.html; 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 
1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 
295, 301–02 (2002). 
121 See, e.g., GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 30–37, 60–79 (2004) (describing the preferential 
treatment given to TBTF banks by CRAs and other participants in the financial markets); 
Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 301, 301 n.359 (same). 
122 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT, GOVERNMENTAL 
RESCUES OF “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 12 (2010) (alteration in 
original) (on file with author) (summarizing and quoting a 2005 study by Bertrand Rime).  
I was the principal drafter of this staff report while I worked as a consultant to the FCIC 
during the summer of 2010. 
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The preferential status of TBTF institutions was confirmed by the 
fact that major financial institutions received by far the largest share 
of governmental assistance in the form of TARP capital assistance, 
FDIC debt guarantees, and the FRB’s emergency lending 
programs.123  As noted above, federal regulators publicly announced 
in early 2009, before they began the “stress tests” on the nineteen 
largest BHCs, that the federal government would provide any capital 
needed to ensure the survival of those institutions.  As a practical 
matter, regulators certified the TBTF status of all nineteen BHCs.124 
After the stress tests were completed, Moody’s gave the following 
ratings upgrades for deposits and senior debt issued by the six largest 
U.S. banks, based on Moody’s expectation of “a very high probability 
of systemic support” for such banks from the U.S. government: 
• Bank of America—a five-notch upgrade for the bank’s deposits 
above its “unsupported” or “stand-alone” rating; 
• Citibank—a four-notch upgrade for the bank’s deposits and 
senior debt above its unsupported rating; 
• Goldman Sachs—a one-notch upgrade for the bank’s deposits and 
senior debt above its unsupported rating; 
• JP Morgan Chase—a two-notch upgrade for the bank’s deposits 
above its unsupported rating; 
• Morgan Stanley—a two-notch upgrade for the bank’s deposits 
and senior debt above its unsupported rating; and 
• Wells Fargo—a four-notch upgrade for the bank’s deposits above 
its unsupported rating.125 
Similarly, a newspaper article published in November 2009 stated 
that S&P, the other leading CRA, “gave Bank of America, Citigroup, 
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley ratings upgrades of three 
notches, four notches, two notches and three notches, respectively, 
 
123 See supra notes 106, 108–09 and accompanying text (discussing TARP assistance 
and FDIC debt guarantees provided to the largest banks); Gretchen Morgenson, So That’s 
Where the Money Went, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010, § BU, at 1 (reporting that Citigroup, 
Morgan Stanley, Merrill, and Bank of America were the “biggest recipients,” and 
Goldman was a “large beneficiary,” among institutions that received $3.3 trillion of 
liquidity assistance from the FRB during the financial crisis). 
124 See supra notes 16–17, 108–11 and accompanying text. 
125 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 122, at 33–34 (citations omitted) 
(summarizing and quoting Moody’s investor reports issued between May and December 
2009). 
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because of their presumed access to governmental assistance.”126  
Thus, the largest banks benefited significantly during the financial 
crisis from their status as TBTF institutions, because they received 
explicit and implicit public support that was far more generous than 
the assistance given to smaller banks.127 
Given the major advantages conferred by TBTF status, it is not 
surprising that LCFIs have pursued aggressive growth strategies 
during the past two decades to reach a size at which they would be 
presumptively TBTF.128  All of today’s four largest U.S. banks (Bank 
of America, Chase, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo) are the products of 
serial acquisitions and explosive growth since 1990.129  Bank of 
America’s and Citigroup’s rapid expansions led them to brink of 
failure, from which they were saved by huge federal bailouts.130  
Wachovia (the fourth-largest U.S. bank at the beginning of the crisis) 
pursued a similar path of frenetic growth until it collapsed in 2008 
 
126 Id. at 34; accord Peter Eavis, Banks’ Safety Net Fraying, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 
2009, at C6 (reporting that “S&P gives Citigroup a single-A rating, but adds that it would 
be rated triple-B-minus, four notches lower, with no [governmental] assistance,” while 
“Morgan Stanley and Bank of America get a three-notch lift,” and “Goldman Sachs Group 
enjoys a two-notch benefit”). 
127 See Cheryl D. Block, Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout, 88 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 149, 174–78, 183–85, 201–06, 218–19, 224–25 (2010); Nadezhda Malysheva & 
John R. Walter, How Large Has the Federal Financial Safety Net Become?, 96 FED. RES. 
BANK RICHMOND ECON. Q. No. 3, at 273, 273–81 (2010), available at http://www 
.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_quarterly/2010/q3/pdf/walter.pdf. 
128 See, e.g., Robert De Young et al., Mergers and Acquisitions of Financial 
Institutions: A Review of the Post-2000 Literature, 36 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 87, 96–97, 104 
(2009) (reviewing studies and finding that “subsidies associated with becoming ‘too big to 
fail’ are important incentives for large bank acquisitions”); Elijah Brewer, III & Julapa 
Jagtiani, How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-to-Fail and to Become 
Systemically Important?, 20–22, 33–35 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper, 
2009) (determining that large banks paid significantly higher premiums to acquire smaller 
banks when (1) the acquisition produced an institution that crossed a presumptive TBTF 
threshold, such as $100 billion in assets or $20 billion in market capitalization, or (2) a 
bank that was already TBTF acquired another bank and thereby enhanced its TBTF 
status), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1548105; Todd Davenport, Understanding 
the Endgame: Scale Will Matter, but How Much?, AM. BANKER, Aug. 30, 2006, at 1 
(describing the widespread belief among banking industry executives that “size is the best 
guarantor of survival” and that “[t]he best way—and certainly the quickest way—to 
achieve scale is to buy it”); Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 300–08 (citing additional 
evidence for the conclusion that “TBTF status allows megabanks to operate with virtual 
‘fail-safe’ insulation from both market and regulatory discipline”). 
129 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 745, 745–46 n.150. 
130 See supra notes 14, 105 and accompanying text. 
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and was rescued by Wells Fargo in a federally assisted merger.131  A 
comparable pattern of rapid expansion, collapse, and bailout occurred 
among several European LCFIs.132 
Unfortunately, the emergency acquisitions of LCFIs arranged by 
U.S. regulators have produced domestic financial markets in which 
the largest institutions hold even greater dominance.133  In 2009, the 
four largest U.S. banks (Bank of America, Chase, Citigroup, and 
Wells Fargo) controlled 56% of domestic banking assets, up from 
35% in 2000, while the top ten U.S. banks controlled 75% of 
domestic banking assets, up from 54% in 2000.134  The four largest 
banks also controlled a majority of the product markets for home 
mortgages, home equity loans, and credit card loans.135  The same 
four banks and Goldman Sachs accounted for 97% of the aggregate 
notional values of OTC derivatives contracts written by U.S. 
banks.136 
The combined assets of the six largest banks—the foregoing five 
institutions plus Morgan Stanley—were equal to 63% of the U.S. 
GDP in 2009, compared to only 17% of the GDP in 1995.137  Nomi 
Prins has observed that, as a result of the financial crisis, “we have 
larger players who are more powerful, who are more dependent on 
government capital and who are harder to regulate than they were to 
 
131 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 746, 746 n.152; see also Block, supra note 127, at 216–
19 (discussing a controversial tax ruling issued by the Treasury Department, which 
facilitated Wells Fargo’s acquisition of Wachovia by allowing Wells Fargo to offset 
Wachovia’s pre-acquisition losses against Wells Fargo’s future earnings). 
132 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 746, 746 n.153. 
133 See supra notes 15, 104 and accompanying text (discussing acquisitions of 
Countrywide and Merrill by Bank of America, of Bear and WaMu by Chase, and of 
Wachovia by Wells Fargo). 
134 Peter Eavis, Finance Fixers Still Living in Denial, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2009, at 
C18 (discussing assets held by the four largest banks); Heather Landy, What’s Lost, 
Gained if Giants Get Downsized, AM. BANKER, Nov. 5, 2009, at 1 (reviewing assets held 
by the top ten banks). 
135 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 747, 747 n.157. 
136 Id. at 747, 747 n.158. 
137 SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER 
AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 202–04, 217 (2010); Peter Boone & Simon 
Johnson, Shooting Banks, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 11, 2010, at 20; see also Thomas M. 
Hoenig, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City, It’s Not Over ‘Til It’s Over: 
Leadership and Financial Regulation (Oct. 10, 2010) (noting that “the largest five [U.S. 
BHCs] control $8.4 trillion of assets, nearly 60 percent of GDP, and the largest 20 control 
$12.8 trillion of assets or almost 90 percent of GDP”), available at 
http://www.kansascityfed.org /speechbio/hoenigpdf/william-taylor-hoenig-10-10-10.pdf. 
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begin with.”138  Similarly, Simon Johnson and James Kwak contend 
that “the problem at the heart of the financial system [is] the 
enormous growth of top-tier financial institutions and the 
corresponding increase in their economic and political power.”139 
V 
THE DODD-FRANK ACT DOES NOT SOLVE THE TBTF PROBLEM 
In 2002, I warned that “the TBTF policy is the great unresolved 
problem of bank supervision” because it “undermines the 
effectiveness of both supervisory and market discipline, and it creates 
moral hazard incentives for managers, depositors, and other uninsured 
creditors of [LCFIs].”140  During the current financial crisis, as noted 
above, the U.S. and European nations followed a TBTF policy that 
provided more than $10 trillion of support to the entire financial 
sector.141  Three studies concluded that the TARP capital infusions 
and FDIC debt guarantees announced in October 2008 represented 
very large transfers of wealth from taxpayers to the shareholders and 
creditors of the largest U.S. LCFIs.142 
 
138 Alison Fitzgerald & Christine Harper, Lehman Monday Morning Lesson Lost with 
Obama Regulator-in-Chief, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 11, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com 
/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aUTh4YMmI6QE (quoting Nomi Prins). 
139 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 137, at 191. 
140 Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 475. 
141 See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
142 Elijah Brewer, III & Anne Marie Klingenhagen, Be Careful What You Wish for: The 
Stock Market Reactions to Bailing Out Large Financial Institutions, 18 J. FIN. REG. & 
COMPLIANCE 56, 57–59, 64–66 (2010) (finding significant increases in stock market 
valuations for the twenty-five largest U.S. banks as a result of Treasury Secretary 
Paulson’s announcement, on Oct. 14, 2008, of $250 billion of TARP capital infusions into 
the banking system, including $125 billion for the nine largest banks); Pietro Veronesi & 
Luigi Zingales, Paulson’s Gift 2–3, 11–31 (Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 09-42, 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1498548 (concluding that the TARP capital 
infusions and FDIC debt guarantees produced $130 billion of gains for holders of equity 
and debt securities of the nine largest U.S. banks at an estimated cost to taxpayers of $21 
to $44 billion); see also CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FEBRUARY OVERSIGHT REPORT: 
VALUING TREASURY’S ACQUISITIONS 4–8, 26–29, 36–38 (2009), available at 
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-020609-report.pdf (presenting a valuation study 
concluding (1) that capital infusions into eight major banks (Bank of America, Citigroup, 
Chase, Goldman, Morgan Stanley, US Bancorp, and Wells Fargo) that were made under 
TARP’s Capital Purchase Program provided an average subsidy to those banks equal to 
22% of the Treasury’s investment and (2) that additional capital infusions into AIG and 
Citigroup under TARP provided an average subsidy to those institutions equal to 59% of 
the Treasury’s investment). 
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The enormous competitive advantages enjoyed by TBTF 
institutions must be eliminated (or at least significantly reduced) in 
order to restore a more level playing field for smaller financial 
institutions and to encourage the voluntary breakup of inefficient and 
risky financial conglomerates.143  The financial crisis has proven, 
beyond any reasonable doubt, that large universal banks operate based 
on a dangerous business model that is riddled with conflicts of 
interest and prone to speculative risk taking.144 
Accordingly, U.S. and European governments must rapidly adopt 
reforms that will (1) greatly reduce the scope of governmental safety 
nets and thereby significantly diminish the subsidies currently 
provided to LCFIs and (2) facilitate the orderly failure and liquidation 
of LCFIs under governmental supervision, with consequential losses 
to managers, shareholders, and creditors of LCFIs.  A few months 
before Dodd-Frank was enacted, I wrote an article proposing five key 
reforms to accomplish these objectives.  My proposed reforms would 
have (1) strengthened existing statutory restrictions on the growth of 
LCFIs, (2) created a special resolution process to manage the orderly 
liquidation or restructuring of systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs), (3) established a consolidated supervisory regime 
and enhanced capital requirements for SIFIs, (4) created a special 
insurance fund to cover the costs of resolving failed SIFIs, and (5) 
rigorously insulated FDIC-insured banks that are owned by LCFIs 
from the activities and risks of their nonbank affiliates.145 
The following sections of Part V of this Article discusses my 
proposed reforms and compare those proposals to relevant provisions 
of Dodd-Frank.  As shown below, Dodd-Frank includes a portion of 
my first proposal as well as the major components of my second and 
third proposals.  However, Dodd-Frank omits most of my last two 
proposals.  In my opinion, Dodd-Frank’s omissions are highly 
significant and raise serious doubts about the statute’s ability to 
prevent TBTF bailouts in the future.  As explained below, a careful 
reading of Dodd-Frank  indicates that Congress has left the door open 
 
143 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 740–44.  As I argued in a previous article, large financial 
conglomerates have never proven their ability to achieve superior performance without the 
extensive TBTF subsidies they currently receive.  Id. at 748–49. 
144 Saunders et al., supra note 45, at 143–47; Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 970–72, 994–
1002, 1024–50; JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 137, at 74–87, 120–41, 193, 202–05; John 
Kay, Narrow Banking: The Reform of Banking Regulation 12–16, 41–44, 86–88 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.johnkay.com/wp-content/uploads/2009 
/12/JK-Narrow-Banking.pdf. 
145 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 747–79. 
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for taxpayer-funded protection of creditors of SIFIs during future 
financial crises. 
A.  Dodd-Frank Modestly Strengthened Existing Statutory Limits on 
the Growth of LCFIs but Did Not Close Significant Loopholes 
Congress authorized nationwide banking—via interstate branching 
and interstate acquisitions of banks by BHCs—when it passed the 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Act of 1994.146  To 
prevent the emergence of dominant megabanks, the Riegle-Neal Act 
imposed nationwide and statewide deposit concentration limits 
(“deposit caps”) on interstate expansion by large banking 
organizations.147  Under the Riegle-Neal Act, a BHC may not acquire 
a bank in another state, and a bank may not merge with another bank 
across state lines, if the resulting banking organization (together with 
all affiliated FDIC-insured depository institutions) would hold (1) 
10% or more of the total deposits of all depository institutions in the 
United States or (2) 30% or more of the total deposits of all 
depository institutions in a single state.148 
Unfortunately, the Riegle-Neal Act’s nationwide and statewide 
deposit caps contained three major loopholes.  First, the deposit caps 
applied only to interstate bank acquisitions and interstate bank 
mergers, and the deposit caps therefore did not restrict combinations 
between banking organizations headquartered in the same state.  
Second, the deposit caps did not apply to acquisitions of, or mergers 
with, thrift institutions and industrial banks because those institutions 
were not treated as “banks” under the Riegle-Neal Act.149  Third, the 
deposit caps did not apply to acquisitions of, or mergers with, banks 
 
146 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching (Riegle-Neal) Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338. 
147 See H.R. REP. NO. 103-448, at 65–66 (1994) (explaining that the Riegle-Neal Act 
“adds two new concentration limits to address concerns about potential concentration of 
financial power at the state and national levels”), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2039, 
2065–66. 
148 Riegle-Neal Act §§ 101, 102, 108 Stat. at 2340, 2345 (codified as amended in 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1831u(b)(2), 1842(d)(2)).  The Riegle-Neal Act permits a state to waive or 
relax, by statute, regulation, or order, the 30% statewide concentration limit with respect to 
interstate mergers or acquisitions involving banks located in that state.  See 12 U.S.C. §§ 
1831u(b)(2)(D), 1842(d)(2)(D). 
149 See Order Approving the Acquisition of a Savings Association and an Industrial 
Loan Company, 95 Fed. Res. Bull. B13, B14 n.6 (Mar. 2009) [hereinafter FRB Bank of 
America and Merrill Order] (noting that thrifts and industrial banks “are not ‘banks’ for 
purposes of the [Riegle-Neal] Act and its nationwide deposit cap”). 
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that are “in default or in danger of default” (the “failing bank” 
exception).150 
The emergency acquisitions of Countrywide, Merrill, Washington 
Mutual (WaMu), and Wachovia in 2008 demonstrated the 
significance of the Riegle-Neal Act’s loopholes and the necessity of 
closing them.  Based on the “non-bank” loophole, the FRB approved 
Bank of America’s acquisitions of Countrywide and Merrill even 
though (1) both firms controlled FDIC-insured depository institutions 
(a thrift, in the case of Countrywide, and a thrift and industrial bank, 
in the case of Merrill) and (2) both transactions allowed Bank of 
America to exceed the 10% nationwide deposit cap.151  Similarly, 
after the FDIC seized control of WaMu as a failed depository 
institution, the “non-bank” loophole enabled the FDIC to sell the 
giant thrift to Chase even though the transaction enabled Chase to 
exceed the 10% nationwide deposit cap.152  Finally, although the FRB 
determined that Wells Fargo’s acquisition of Wachovia gave Wells 
Fargo control of just under 10% of nationwide deposits, the FRB 
probably could have approved the acquisition in any case by 
designating Wachovia as a bank in danger of default.153 
As a result of the foregoing acquisitions, Bank of America, Chase, 
and Wells Fargo each surpassed the 10% nationwide deposit cap in 
October 2008.154  To prevent further breaches of the Riegle-Neal 
Act’s concentration limits, I proposed that Congress should extend the 
 
150 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831u(e), 1842(d)(5). 
151 See Order Approving the Acquisition of a Savings Association and Other 
Nonbanking Activities, 94 Fed. Res. Bull. C81–C82, C83 n.13 (Aug. 2008) (approving 
Bank of America’s acquisition of Countrywide and Countrywide’s thrift subsidiary, even 
though the transaction resulted in Bank of America’s ownership of 10.9% of nationwide 
deposits); FRB Bank of America and Merrill Order, supra note 149, at B13–B14, B14 n.6 
(approving Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill and Merrill’s thrift and industrial 
bank subsidiaries, even though the transaction resulted in Bank of America’s ownership of 
11.9% of nationwide deposits). 
152 Joe Adler, Thrift M&A Could Suffer as Frank Slams ‘Loophole,’ AM. BANKER, Dec. 
10, 2009, at 1. 
153 See Statement by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Regarding 
the Application and Notices by Wells Fargo & Company to Acquire Wachovia 
Corporation and Wachovia’s Subsidiary Banks and Nonbanking Companies, 95 Fed. Res. 
Bull. B40, B41–42 (Mar. 2009) (determining that “the combined organization would not 
control an amount of deposits that would exceed the nationwide deposit cap on 
consummation of the proposal”); id. at B48 (concluding that “expeditious approval of the 
proposal was warranted in light of the weakened condition of Wachovia”). 
154 See Matt Ackerman, Big 3 Deposit Share Approaches 33%, AM. BANKER, Oct. 28, 
2008, at 16 (reporting the nationwide deposit shares for Bank of America, Chase, and 
Wells Fargo as 11.31%, 10.20%, and 11.18%, respectively). 
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nationwide and statewide deposit caps to cover all intrastate and 
interstate transactions involving any type of FDIC-insured depository 
institution, including thrifts and industrial banks.  In addition, I 
proposed that Congress should significantly narrow the failing bank 
exception by requiring federal regulators to make a “systemic risk 
determination” (SRD) in order to approve any acquisition involving a 
failing depository institution that would exceed either the nationwide 
or statewide deposit caps.155 
Under my proposed standard for an SRD, the FRB and the FDIC 
could not invoke the failing bank exception unless they determined 
jointly, with the concurrence of the Treasury Secretary, that the 
proposed acquisition was necessary “to avoid a substantial threat of 
severe systemic injury to the banking system, the financial markets or 
the national economy.”156  In addition, each invocation of an SRD 
would be subject to post-transaction review in the form of (1) an audit 
by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to determine 
whether regulators satisfied the criteria for an SRD and (2) a joint 
hearing held by the House and Senate committees with oversight of 
the financial markets (the “SRD Review Procedure”).  My proposed 
SRD requirements would have ensured much greater public 
transparency of, and scrutiny for, any federal agency order that 
invoked the failing bank exception to the Riegle-Neal Act’s deposit 
caps.157 
Section 623 of Dodd-Frank does extend the Riegle-Neal Act’s 10% 
nationwide deposit cap to reach all interstate acquisitions and mergers 
involving any type of FDIC-insured depository institution.  Thus, 
interstate acquisitions and mergers involving thrift institutions and 
industrial banks are now subject to the nationwide deposit cap to the 
same extent as interstate acquisitions and mergers involving 
commercial banks.158  However, section 623 leaves open the other 
Riegle-Neal Act loopholes because (1) it does not apply the 
nationwide deposit cap to intrastate acquisitions or mergers, (2) it 
does not apply the statewide deposit cap to interstate transactions 
 
155 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 752. 
156 Id. 
157 Id.  As discussed below, section 203 of Dodd-Frank establishes a similar “Systemic 
Risk Determination” requirement and procedure for authorizing the FDIC to act as 
receiver for a failing SIFI.  See infra notes 185–86 and accompanying text. 
158 Dodd-Frank Act § 623 (applying the nationwide deposit cap to interstate mergers 
involving any type of FDIC-insured depository institutions and interstate acquisitions of 
such depository institutions by either BHCs or savings and loan holding companies). 
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involving thrifts or industrial banks or to any type of intrastate 
transaction, and (3) it does not impose any enhanced substantive or 
procedural requirements for invoking the failing bank exception.  
Thus, section 623 of Dodd-Frank closes one important loophole but 
fails to close other significant exemptions that continue to undermine 
the effectiveness of the Riegle-Neal Act’s deposit caps.159 
Section 622 of Dodd-Frank authorizes federal regulators to impose 
a separate concentration limit on mergers and acquisitions involving 
“financial companies.”  As defined in section 622, the term “financial 
companies” includes insured depository institutions and their holding 
companies, nonbank SIFIs and foreign banks operating in the U.S.160  
Subject to two significant exceptions described below, section 622 
potentially bars any acquisition or merger that would give a “financial 
company” control of more than 10% of the total “liabilities” of all 
financial companies.161  This limitation on control of nationwide 
liabilities (“liabilities cap”) was originally proposed by former FRB 
Chairman Paul Volcker.162 
The liabilities cap in section 622 provides an additional method for 
restricting the growth of very large financial companies (e.g., 
Citigroup, Goldman, and Morgan Stanley) that rely mainly on 
 
159 The absence of any deposit cap limiting intrastate transactions is somewhat 
mitigated by the fact that any proposal by a large bank to acquire an in-state rival would be 
subject to antitrust scrutiny, especially if they were direct competitors in the same local 
markets.  However, federal regulators substantially relaxed their standards for reviewing 
bank mergers after 1980, with the result that very few bank mergers have been denied 
during the past two decades.  Bernard Shull & Gerald A. Hanweck, Bank Merger Policy: 
Proposals for Change, 119 BANKING L.J. 214, 215–24 (2002).  For example, the FRB 
denied only five bank acquisition proposals on competitive grounds between 1987 and 
1997, and the FRB evidently did not deny any bank merger applications based on 
competitive factors between 1997 and 2007.  See Bernard Shull & Gerald A. Hanweck, A 
New Merger Policy for Banks, 45 ANTITRUST BULL. 679, 694 (2000) (providing data for 
1987–1997); Edward Pekarek & Michela Huth, Bank Merger Reform Takes an Extended 
Philadelphia National Bank Holiday, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 595, 609 (2008) 
(providing information for 1997–2007). 
160 Dodd-Frank Act § 622 (enacting section 14(a)(2) of the Bank Holding Company 
(BHC) Act). 
161 Under section 622, the term “liabilities” is defined as the risk-weighted assets of a 
financial company minus its regulatory capital as determined under the applicable risk-
based capital rules.  Id. § 622 (enacting a new section 14(a)(3) of the BHC Act). 
162 See Rebecca Christie & Phil Mattingly, ‘Volcker Rule’ Draft Signals Obama Wants 
to Ease Market Impact, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 4, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps 
/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aHT_LKrSCQ1c. 
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funding from the capital markets instead of deposits.163  I supported 
the Volcker liabilities cap in my previous article.164 
However, the liabilities cap in section 622 has two significant 
exceptions.  First, it is subject to a “failing bank” exception (similar to 
the “failing bank” loophole in Riegel-Neal), which regulators can 
invoke without making any SRD.165 
Second, and more importantly, the liabilities cap is not self-
executing.  Section 622  requires the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (FSOC) to conduct a study of the potential costs and benefits 
of the liabilities cap, including any negative effects on (1) “the 
efficiency and competitiveness of U.S. financial firms and financial 
markets” and (2) “the cost and availability of credit and other 
financial services to [U.S.] households and businesses.”166  Based on 
the results of that study, section 622 directs the FSOC to “make 
recommendations regarding any modifications” to the liabilities 
cap.167  Section 622 further requires the FRB to adopt regulations for 
the purpose of “implementing” the liabilities cap in accordance with 
any “recommendations” by the FSOC for “modifications” of the 
cap.168  Thus, section 622 allows the FRB to weaken (and perhaps 
even eliminate) the liabilities cap if the FSOC determines that the cap 
would have adverse effects that would outweigh its potential benefits. 
LCFIs will almost certainly urge the FSOC and the FRB to weaken 
or remove the liabilities cap under section 622.  Consequently, it is 
questionable whether Dodd-Frank will impose any meaningful new 
limit on the growth of LCFIs beyond the statute’s beneficial extension 
of the nationwide deposit cap to reach all interstate acquisitions and 
mergers involving FDIC-insured institutions. 
 
163 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 137, at 213 (noting that Goldman and Morgan 
Stanley each had more than $1 trillion of assets at the end of 2007); Wilmarth, supra note 
6, at 749 n.166, 753 n.183 (stating that Goldman and Morgan Stanley relied primarily on 
the capital markets for funding, as each firm had less than $70 billion of deposits in 2009, 
while Citigroup had $1.8 trillion of assets but only $200 billion of domestic deposits). 
164 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 753. 
165 Dodd-Frank Act § 622 (enacting section 14(b) of the BHC Act). 
166 Id. (enacting section 14(e) of the BHC Act).  The FSOC’s study is also directed to 
take account of “financial stability [and] moral hazard in the financial system” in 
evaluating the costs and benefits of the liabilities cap.  Id. 
167 Id. (enacting section 14(e)(1) of the BHC Act). 
168 Id. (enacting section 14(d) and (e)(2) of the BHC Act). 
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B.  Dodd-Frank Establishes a Special Resolution Regime for 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions but Allows the FDIC to 
Provide Full Protection for Favored Creditors of Those Institutions 
1.  Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority Does Not Preclude 
Full Protection of Favored Creditors of SIFIs 
During the financial crisis—as shown by the FRB’s emergency 
assistance for Chase’s acquisition of Bear, the traumatic bankruptcy 
of Lehman, and the federal government’s massive bailout of AIG—
federal regulators confronted a “Hobson’s choice of bailout or 
disorderly bankruptcy” when they decided how to respond to a SIFI’s 
potential failure.169  Dodd-Frank establishes an “orderly liquidation 
authority” (OLA) for SIFIs.  The OLA seeks to provide a “viable 
alternative to the undesirable choice... between bankruptcy of a large, 
complex financial company that would disrupt markets and damage 
the economy, and bailout of such financial company that would 
expose taxpayers to losses and undermine market discipline.”170  In 
some respects, Dodd-Frank’s OLA for SIFIs—which is similar to the 
FDIC’s existing resolution regime for failed depository 
institutions171—resembles my proposal for a special resolution 
regime for SIFIs.172  However, contrary to the statute’s stated purpose 
of ending bailouts,173 Dodd-Frank’s OLA does not preclude future 
rescues of favored creditors of TBTF institutions. 
Dodd-Frank establishes the FSOC as an umbrella organization with 
systemic risk oversight authority.  The FSOC’s voting members 
include the leaders of nine major federal banking agencies and an 
independent member with insurance experience.174  By a two-thirds 
 
169 Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, U.S. Fed. Reserve Bd., Financial Regulatory Reform, 
Speech at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum (Feb. 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20100226a.htm. 
170 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 4 (2010). 
171 See CARNELL ET. AL., supra note 118, ch. 13 (describing the FDIC’s resolution 
regime for failed banks); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
Implementing Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173, 64,175 (Oct. 19, 2010) 
[hereinafter FDIC Proposed OLA Rule] (stating that “[p]arties who are familiar with the 
liquidation of insured depository institutions . . . will recognize many parallel provisions in 
Title II” of Dodd-Frank). 
172 See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 754–57. 
173 See Dodd-Frank Act pmbl. (stating that the statute is designed “to end ‘too big to 
fail’ [and] to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts”). 
174 The FSOC is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury and includes the following 
additional voting members: the chairmen of the FRB and the FDIC, the Comptroller of the 
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vote, the FSOC may determine that a domestic or foreign nonbank 
financial company should be subject to Dodd-Frank’s systemic risk 
regime, which includes prudential supervision by the FRB and 
potential liquidation by the FDIC under the OLA.175  In deciding 
whether to impose Dodd-Frank’s systemic risk regime on a nonbank 
financial company, the crucial question to be decided by the FSOC is 
whether “material financial distress at the . . . nonbank financial 
company, or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, 
interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the . . . nonbank 
financial company, could pose a threat to the financial stability of the 
United States.”176 
Dodd-Frank does not use the term “systemically important 
financial institution” to describe a nonbank financial company that is 
subject to the statute’s systemic risk regime, but I will generally refer 
to such companies as SIFIs.  Dodd-Frank generally treats BHCs with 
assets of more than $50 billion as SIFIs, and those BHCs are also 
subject to enhanced supervision by the FRB and potential liquidation 
by the FDIC under the OLA.177 
Dodd-Frank contemplates the public identification of SIFIs, as I 
have previously advocated.178  Some commentators have opposed any 
 
Currency, the chairmen of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the SEC, the 
director of the National Credit Union Administration, the chairman of the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency, the director of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (created by 
Title X of Dodd-Frank), and an independent member with insurance experience appointed 
by the President.  Dodd-Frank Act § 111(b).  In addition, the FSOC includes the following 
five non-voting advisory members: the director of the Office of Financial Research 
(created by Title I of Dodd-Frank), the director of the Federal Insurance Office (created by 
Title V of Dodd-Frank), a state banking supervisor, a state insurance commissioner, and a 
state securities regulator.  Id. 
175 Id. §§ 113(a), (b), 201(a)(11)(B)(ii), 204(a); S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 48–49, 57 
(2010).  A “nonbank financial company” is a U.S. or foreign company that is 
“predominantly engaged” in financial activities in the United States.  Dodd-Frank Act § 
102(a)(4).  A nonbank company is deemed to be “predominantly engaged” in financial 
activities if at least 85% of its consolidated annual gross revenues or at least 85% of its 
consolidated assets are derived from or related to activities that are “financial in nature” as 
defined in 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k).  Dodd-Frank Act § 102(a)(6). 
176 Dodd-Frank Act § 113(a)(1), (b)(1).  For a complete list of the factors to be 
considered by the FSOC in determining whether to impose Dodd-Frank’s systemic risk 
regime on a nonbank financial company, see id. § 113(a)(2), (b)(2). 
177 Id. §§ 115, 165.  The FRB may decide, pursuant to a recommendation from the 
FSOC, that Dodd-Frank’s systemic risk regime should be applied only to BHCs with an 
asset size threshold that is higher than $50 billion.  See id. §§ 115(a)(2), 165(a)(2)(B). 
178 See Dodd-Frank Act § 114 (requiring each nonbank SIFI to register with the FRB); 
id. § 165(f) (authorizing the FRB to prescribe enhanced public disclosure requirements for 
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identification of SIFIs, due to concerns that firms designated as SIFIs 
would be treated as TBTF by the financial markets and would create 
additional moral hazard.179  However, moral hazard already exists in 
abundance because the financial markets currently treat major LCFIs 
as presumptively TBTF.  The financial markets’ preferential 
treatment for major LCFIs is a rational response to the extraordinary 
support that federal regulators provided during the financial crisis to 
LCFIs, including Bear, AIG and the nineteen largest BHCs.180  Based 
on regulators’ past actions, depositors, bondholders, and CRAs 
clearly expect that leading LCFIs will receive TBTF treatment in the 
future.181 
Accordingly, federal regulators can no longer credibly retreat to 
their former policy of “constructive ambiguity” by asserting their 
willingness to allow major LCFIs to collapse into disorderly 
bankruptcies similar to the Lehman debacle.182  Neither the public nor 
the financial markets would believe such claims.183  Dodd-Frank 
properly recognizes that—absent mandatory breakups of LCFIs—the 
best way to impose effective discipline on SIFIs, and to reduce the 
federal subsidies they receive, is to designate them publicly as SIFIs 
and to impose stringent regulatory requirements that force them to 
internalize the potential costs of their TBTF status. 
 
nonbank SIFIs and BHCs with assets of $50 billion or more); see also Wilmarth, supra 
note 6, at 755–56 (arguing for public identification of SIFIs). 
179 See Malini Manickavasagam & Mike Ferullo, Regulatory Reform: Witnesses Warn 
Against Identifying Institutions as Systemically Significant, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 
502 (Mar. 23, 2009). 
180 See supra notes 11–14, 102–26 and accompanying text (discussing the Fed’s rescues 
of Bear and AIG and federal regulators’ treatment of the nineteen largest BHCs as TBTF). 
181 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 137, at 200–05; supra notes 120–26 and 
accompanying text. 
182 See James B. Thomson, On Systemically Important Financial Institutions and 
Progressive Systemic Mitigation 8–10 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Policy 
Discussion Paper No. 27, 2009) (agreeing that “constructive ambiguity” is not a credible 
regulatory policy and that SIFIs should be publicly identified). 
183 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 137, at 204.  In March 2010, Herbert Allison, a 
senior Treasury Department official, asserted before the Congressional Oversight Panel 
(COP) that “[t]here is no ‘too big to fail’ guarantee on the part of the U.S. government.”  
Cheyenne Hopkins, Pandit Sees a New Citigroup, but Others Aren’t Convinced, AM. 
BANKER, Mar. 5, 2010, at 1 (quoting Mr. Allison).  Members of the COP responded to Mr. 
Allison’s claim with derision and disbelief.  COP member Damon Silvers declared, “I do 
not understand why it is that the United States government cannot admit what everyone in 
the world knows.”  Id. (quoting Mr. Silver and noting that Mr. Allison’s claim “angered 
and baffled the panelists”). 
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As I and many others have proposed, Dodd-Frank establishes a 
systemic resolution process—the OLA—to handle the failures of 
SIFIs.184  In order to invoke the OLA for a “covered financial 
company,” the Treasury Secretary must issue an SRD, based on the 
recommendation of the FRB together with either the FDIC or the SEC 
(if the failing company’s largest subsidiary is a securities broker or 
dealer) or the Federal Insurance Office (if the failing company’s 
largest subsidiary is an insurance company).185  The Treasury 
Secretary’s SRD must find that (1) the covered financial company’s 
failure and resolution under otherwise applicable insolvency rules 
(e.g., the federal bankruptcy laws) would have “serious adverse 
effects on financial stability,” (2) application of the OLA would 
“avoid or mitigate such adverse effects,” and (3) “no viable private 
sector alternative is available to prevent” the company’s failure.186 
In my previous article, I argued that the systemic resolution process 
for SIFIs should embody three core principles in order to create a 
close similarity between that process and Chapter 11 of the federal 
Bankruptcy Code.  Those core principles are: (1) requiring equity 
owners in a failed SIFI to lose their entire investment if the SIFI’s 
assets are insufficient to pay all valid creditor claims, (2) removing 
senior managers and other employees who were responsible for the 
SIFI’s failure, and (3) requiring unsecured creditors to accept 
meaningful “haircuts” in the form of significant reductions of their 
 
184 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 4–6, 57–65 (2010); Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 756–57. 
185 Dodd-Frank Act § 203(a).  “Covered financial companies” include nonbank 
financial companies that have been designated as SIFIs under section 113 of the Dodd-
Frank Act, large BHCs, and any other financial company as to which the Treasury 
Secretary has issued an SRD in order to invoke the OLA.  Id. § 201(a)(8), (11). 
186 Id. § 203(b).  If the board of directors of a covered financial company does not agree 
to the appointment of the FDIC as receiver under the OLA, the Treasury Secretary’s SRD 
will be subject to expedited judicial review in an emergency confidential proceeding in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.  Id. § 202(a).  The district court must 
issue its order within twenty-four hours after the Treasury Secretary files a petition to 
initiate the proceeding.  Id. § 202(a)(1)(A).  If the district court fails to issue its order 
within that time period, the Treasury Secretary’s petition will be deemed approved as a 
matter of law.  Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(v).  The district court’s scope of review is limited to two 
issues: (1) whether the company in question is a “financial company” as defined in section 
201(11) of the Dodd-Frank Act and (2) whether the company is “in default or danger of 
default.”  Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iv).  After the SRD becomes final, the Treasury Secretary 
must provide reports of the SRD to Congress and the public, and the SRD must be audited 
by the GAO in a manner similar to my proposed SRD Review Procedure.  Id. § 203(b), 
(c); see also Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 752, 752 n.178.  In contrast to my proposal, 
congressional review of an SRD is discretionary rather than mandatory.  See Dodd-Frank 
Act § 203(c)(3)(C) (providing that the FDIC and the primary financial regulator—if any—
for a failed SIFI must appear before Congress to testify on the SRD “if requested”). 
WILMARTH 4/6/2011  11:07 AM 
2011] The Dodd-Frank Act 997 
debt claims or an exchange of substantial portions of their debt claims 
for equity in a successor institution.  I would have required the FDIC 
to prepare an SRD and to comply with the SRD Review Procedure if 
the FDIC proposed to depart from any of those principles based on 
systemic risk considerations.187 
Dodd-Frank incorporates the first two of my core principles.  It 
requires the FDIC to ensure that equity owners of a failed SIFI do not 
receive any payment until all creditor claims are paid and that the 
managers responsible for the failure are removed.188  At first glance, 
Dodd-Frank seems to embody the third principle by directing the 
FDIC to impose losses on unsecured creditors if the assets of the SIFI 
are insufficient to pay all secured and unsecured debts.189  However, a 
careful reading of the statute reveals that Dodd-Frank authorizes the 
FDIC to provide full protection to favored classes of unsecured 
creditors of failed SIFIs. 
In its capacity as receiver for a failed SIFI, the FDIC may provide 
funds for the payment or transfer of creditors’ claims in at least two 
ways.  First, the FDIC may provide funding directly to the SIFI’s 
receivership estate by making loans, purchasing or guaranteeing 
assets, or assuming or guaranteeing liabilities.190  Second, the FDIC 
may provide funding to establish a “bridge financial company” 
(BFC), and the FDIC may then approve a transfer of designated assets 
and liabilities from the failed SIFI to the BFC.191  In either case, the 
FDIC may (1) take steps to “mitigate[] the potential for serious 
adverse effects to the financial system”192 and (2) provide preferential 
treatment to certain creditors if the FDIC determines that such 
treatment is necessary to “maximize” the value of a failed SIFI’s 
assets or to preserve “essential” operations of the SIFI or a successor 
 
187 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 756–57, 752 (arguing that the FDIC should be required to 
show that a departure from the core principles was “necessary in order to avoid a 
substantial threat of severe systemic injury to the banking system, the financial markets, or 
the national economy” in order to satisfy the prerequisites for an SRD). 
188 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 204(a)(1), (2), 206(2), (4). 
189 §§ 204(a)(1), 206(3). 
190 § 204(d).  The FDIC may not acquire any equity interest in a failed SIFI or any 
subsidiary thereof.  § 206(6). 
191 Id. § 210(h)(1), (3), (5).  A BFC may not accept a transfer of any claims that are 
based on equity ownership interests in a failed SIFI.  § 210(h)(3)(B). 
192 Id. § 210(a)(9)(E)(iii); see also id. § 206(1) (requiring the FDIC to determine that its 
actions as receiver are “necessary for purposes of the financial stability of the United 
States, and not for the purpose of preserving the [failed SIFI]”). 
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BFC.193  Subject to the foregoing conditions, the FDIC may give 
preferential treatment to certain creditors as long as every creditor 
receives at least the amount she would have recovered in a liquidation 
proceeding under Chapter 7 of the federal Bankruptcy Code.194 
In October 2010, the FDIC issued a proposed rule to implement the 
OLA under Dodd-Frank.  The proposed rule states that the FDIC may 
provide preferential treatment to certain creditors in order “to 
continue key operations, services, and transactions that will maximize 
the value of the [failed SIFI’s] assets and avoid a disorderly collapse 
in the marketplace.”195  The proposed rule also declares that the 
FDIC’s powers under the OLA “parallel authority the FDIC has long 
had under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to continue operations 
after the closing of failed insured banks if necessary to maximize the 
value of the assets... or to prevent ‘serious adverse effects on 
economic conditions or financial stability.’”196  The proposed rule 
would exclude the following classes of creditors from any possibility 
of preferential treatment: (1) holders of unsecured senior debt with a 
term of more than 360 days and (2) holders of subordinated debt.  
Accordingly, the proposed rule would allow the FDIC to provide full 
protection to short-term, unsecured creditors of a failed SIFI 
whenever the FDIC determines that such protection is “essential for 
[the SIFI’s] continued operation and orderly liquidation.”197 
Under the proposed rule, the FDIC is likely to give full protection 
to short-term liabilities of SIFIs, including commercial paper and 
securities repurchase agreements, because those liabilities proved to 
be highly volatile and prone to creditor “runs” during the financial 
crisis.198  The proposed rule’s statement that the FDIC reserves the 
right to provide preferential treatment  to short-term creditors of failed 
SIFIs, but will never provide such treatment to holders of long-term 
debt or subordinated debt, will likely have at least two perverse 
results.  If adopted, the proposed rule will (1) provide an implicit 
subsidy to short-term creditors of SIFIs and (2) encourage SIFIs to 
 
193 § 210(b)(4), (h)(5)(E). 
194 Id.; see also FDIC Proposed OLA Rule, supra note 171, at 64,175, 64,177 
(explaining Dodd-Frank’s minimum guarantee for creditors of a failed SIFI). 
195 FDIC Proposed OLA Rule, supra note 171, at 64,175. 
196 Id. at 64177 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)). 
197 Id. at 64177–78. 
198 See Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking 2–6, 46–59 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 
Staff Report No. 458, 2010), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff 
_reports/sr458.pdf. 
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rely even more heavily on vulnerable, short-term funding strategies 
that led to repeated disasters during the financial crisis.  The proposed 
rule will make short-term liabilities more attractive to SIFIs because 
short-term creditors are likely to demand much lower yields, in light 
of their implicit subsidy under the proposed rule, compared to long-
term bondholders (who will charge higher yields to protect 
themselves against the significant risk of suffering haircuts in any 
future OLA receivership). 
As indicated by the proposed rule, Dodd-Frank gives the FDIC 
considerable leeway to provide de facto bailouts for favored creditors 
of failed SIFIs.  Dodd-Frank also provides a funding source for such 
bailouts.  Section 201(n) of Dodd-Frank establishes an Orderly 
Liquidation Fund (OLF) to finance liquidations of SIFIs.  As 
discussed below in Part V.D., Dodd-Frank does not establish a pre-
funding mechanism for the OLF.  However, the FDIC may obtain 
funds for the OLF by borrowing from the Treasury.  Under section 
201(n)(5) of Dodd-Frank, the FDIC may borrow up to (1) 10% of a 
failed SIFI’s assets within thirty days after the FDIC’s appointment as 
receiver plus (2) 90% of the “fair value” of the SIFI’s assets that are 
“available for repayment” thereafter.”199  The FDIC’s authority to 
borrow from the Treasury provides an immediate source of funding to 
protect unsecured creditors that are deemed to have systemic 
significance.  In addition, the “fair value” standard potentially gives 
the FDIC considerable discretion in appraising the assets of a failed 
SIFI because the standard does not require the FDIC to rely on current 
market values in measuring the worth of a failed SIFI’s assets.200 
 
199 Dodd-Frank Act § 210(n)(5), (6).  In order to borrow funds from the Treasury to 
finance an orderly liquidation, the FDIC must enter into a repayment agreement with the 
Treasury after consulting with the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs and the House Committee on Financial Services.  Id. § 210(n)(9). 
200 Jeffrey Gordon and Christopher Muller have criticized Dodd-Frank on somewhat 
different grounds.  In contrast to my concern that Dodd-Frank will allow the FDIC to 
finance future bailouts of favored creditors of failed SIFIs, Gordon and Muller believe that 
(1) the OLA provides “inadequate funding for the orderly resolution of individual firms,” 
and (2) Dodd-Frank’s “stringent constraints on government financial support of firms not 
in FDIC receivership will drive firms into receivership,” resulting in a  “nationalization of 
much of the financial sector” during a serious financial crisis.  Jeffrey N. Gordon & 
Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and the Case 
for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund 38–48 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working 
Paper No. 374, Draft 3.0, Sept. 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1636456.  
Gordon and Muller identify the FDIC’s authority to provide loan guarantees to SIFIs 
placed in receivership as the only source of financial assistance that Dodd-Frank allows for 
specific troubled firms, apart from the FDIC’s limited (and in their view inadequate) 
authority to borrow from the Treasury based on the value of a failed SIFI’s assets.  Id.  As 
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Dodd-Frank generally requires the FDIC to impose a “claw-back” 
on creditors who receive preferential treatment if the proceeds of 
liquidating a failed SIFI are insufficient to repay the full amount that 
the FDIC borrows from the Treasury to conduct the liquidation.201  
However, as noted above, Dodd-Frank authorizes the FDIC to 
exercise its powers under the OLA (including its authority to provide 
preferential treatment to favored creditors of a failed SIFI) for the 
purpose of preserving “the financial stability of the United States” and 
preventing “serious adverse effects to the financial system.”202  
Therefore, the FDIC could conceivably assert the power to waive its 
right of “claw-back” against a failed SIFI’s creditors who received 
preferential treatment if the FDIC determined that such a waiver were 
necessary to maintain the stability of the financial markets. 
2.  Dodd-Frank Does Not Prevent Federal Regulators from Using 
Other Sources of Funding to Protect Creditors of SIFIs 
Dodd-Frank could potentially be interpreted as allowing the FDIC 
to borrow an additional $100 billion from the Treasury for use in 
accomplishing the orderly liquidation of a SIFI.  Dodd-Frank states 
that the FDIC’s borrowing authority for the OLF does not “affect” the 
FDIC’s authority to borrow from the Treasury Department under 12 
U.S.C. § 1824(a).203  Under § 1824(a), the FDIC may exercise its 
“judgment” to borrow up to $100 billion from the Treasury “for 
insurance purposes,” and the term “insurance purposes” appears to 
include functions beyond the FDIC’s responsibility to administer the 
Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) for banks and thrifts.204  Dodd-Frank 
 
discussed below in Part V.B.2., I believe that the FDIC and the FRB can use additional 
sources of funding to support failing or failed SIFIs and their subsidiary banks.  However, 
I agree with Gordon and Muller that Dodd-Frank contains serious flaws, including its lack 
of a pre-funded systemic risk insurance fund.  See infra Part V.D. 
201 Dodd-Frank Act § 210(o)(1)(B), (D); see also FDIC Proposed OLA Rule, supra 
note 171, at 64,178 (stating that Dodd-Frank “includes the power to ‘claw-back’ or recoup 
some or all of any additional payments made to creditors if the proceeds of the sale of the 
[failed SIFI’s] assets are insufficient to repay any monies drawn from the Treasury during 
the liquidation”). 
202 Dodd-Frank Act § 206(1); see also § 210(a)(9)(E)(iii). 
203 Id. § 201(n)(8)(A). 
204 Under § 1824(a), the FDIC may exercise its “judgment” to borrow up to $100 billion 
“for insurance purposes,” and such borrowed funds “shall be used by the [FDIC] solely in 
carrying out its functions with respect to such insurance.”  12 U.S.C. § 1824(a).  Section 
1824(a) further provides that the FDIC “may employ any funds obtained under this section 
for purposes of the [DIF] and the borrowing shall become a liability of the [DIF] to the 
extent funds are employed therefor.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The foregoing language 
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bars the FDIC from using the DIF to assist the OLF or from using the 
OLF to assist the DIF.205  However, the FDIC could conceivably 
assert authority to borrow up to $100 billion from the Treasury under 
§ 1824(a) for the “insurance purpose” of financing an orderly 
liquidation of a SIFI outside the funding parameters of the OLF.  
Assuming that such supplemental borrowing authority is available to 
the FDIC, the FDIC could use that authority to protect a SIFI’s 
uninsured and unsecured creditors as long as such protection 
“maximizes” the value of the SIFI’s assets or “mitigates the potential 
for serious adverse effects to the financial system.”206 
The “systemic risk exception” (SRE) to the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act (FDIA) provides a further potential source of funding 
to protect creditors of failed SIFIs.207  Under the SRE, the Treasury 
Secretary can authorize the FDIC to provide full protection to 
uninsured creditors of a bank in order to avoid or mitigate “serious 
effects on economic conditions or financial stability.”208  Dodd-Frank 
amended and narrowed the SRE by requiring that a bank must be 
placed in receivership in order for the bank’s creditors to receive 
extraordinary protection under the SRE.209  Thus, if a failing SIFI 
owned a bank that was placed in receivership, the SRE would permit 
the FDIC (with the Treasury Secretary’s approval) to provide full 
protection to creditors of that bank in order to avoid or mitigate 
systemic risk.  By protecting a SIFI-owned bank’s creditors (which 
could include the SIFI itself), the FDIC could use the SRE to extend 
indirect support to the SIFI’s creditors. 
Two provisions of Dodd-Frank seek to prevent the FRB and the 
FDIC from providing financial support to failing SIFIs or their 
subsidiary banks outside the OLA or the SRE.  First, section 1101 of 
 
strongly indicates that funds borrowed by the FDIC under § 1824(a) do not have to be 
used exclusively for the DIF and can be used for other “insurance purposes” in accordance 
with the “judgment” of the Board of Directors of the FDIC.  It could be argued that 
borrowing for the purpose of funding the OLF would fall within such “insurance 
purposes.” 
205 Dodd-Frank Act § 210(n)(8)(A). 
206 § 210(a)(9)(E)(i), (iii). 
207 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 122, at 10–11, 29–32 (discussing the 
SRE under 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G), as originally enacted in 1991 and as invoked by 
federal regulators during the financial crisis). 
208 In order to invoke the SRE, the Treasury Secretary must receive a favorable 
recommendation from the FDIC and the FRB and consult with the President.  12 U.S.C. § 
1823(c)(4)(G)(i). 
209 See Dodd-Frank Act § 1106(b) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)). 
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Dodd-Frank provides that the FRB may not extend emergency 
secured loans under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act210 
except to solvent firms that are “participant[s] in any program or 
facility with broad-based eligibility” that has been approved by the 
Treasury Secretary and reported to Congress.211  Second, section 
1105 of Dodd-Frank provides that the FDIC may not guarantee debt 
obligations of depository institutions or their holding companies or 
other affiliates except pursuant to a “widely available program” for 
“solvent” institutions that has been approved by the Treasury 
Secretary and endorsed by a joint resolution of Congress.212 
In light of the foregoing constraints, it is difficult to envision how 
the FRB or the FDIC could provide loans or debt guarantees to 
individual failing SIFIs or their subsidiary banks under sections 1101 
or 1105 of Dodd-Frank.213  However, the FRB arguably could use its 
remaining authority under section 13(3) to create a “broad-based” 
program similar to the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) in order 
to provide emergency liquidity assistance to a selected group of 
LCFIs that the FRB deemed to be “solvent.”214  As the events of 2008 
 
210 12 U.S.C. § 343; see also FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 122, at 19, 21–
22, 25–26 (discussing section 13(3) as amended in 1991 and as applied by the FRB to 
provide emergency secured credit to particular firms and segments of the financial markets 
during the financial crisis). 
211 Dodd-Frank Act § 1101(a) (requiring the Fed to use its section 13(3) authority solely 
for the purpose of establishing a lending “program or facility with broad-based eligibility” 
that is open only to solvent firms and is designed “for the purpose of providing liquidity to 
the financial system, and not to aid a failing financial company”); see S. REP. NO. 111-
176, at 6, 182–83 (2010) (discussing Dodd-Frank’s restrictions on the FRB’s lending 
authority under section 13(3)). 
212 Dodd-Frank Act § 1105.  In addition, Dodd-Frank bars the FDIC from establishing 
any “widely available debt guarantee program” based on the SRE under the FDI Act.  Id. § 
1106(a).  In October 2008, federal regulators invoked the SRE in order to authorize the 
FDIC to establish the Debt Guarantee Program (DGP).  The DGP enabled depository 
institutions and their affiliates to issue more than $300 billion of FDIC-guaranteed debt 
securities between October 2008 and the end of 2009.  See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, 
supra note 122, at 29–32.  However, Dodd-Frank prohibits regulators from using the SRE 
to establish any program similar to the DGP.  Dodd-Frank Act § 1106(a); see also S. REP. 
NO. 111-176, at 6–7, 183–84 (discussing Dodd-Frank’s limitations on the FDIC’s 
authority to guarantee debt obligations of depository institutions and their holding 
companies). 
213 See Gordon & Muller, supra note 200, at 40, 44–47. 
214 The FRB established the PDCF in March 2008 (at the time of its rescue of Bear) and 
expanded that facility in September 2008 (at the time of Lehman’s failure).  The PDCF 
allowed the nineteen primary dealers in government securities to make secured borrowings 
from the FRB on a basis similar to the FRB’s discount window for banks.  The nineteen 
primary dealers eligible for participation in the PDCF were securities broker-dealers; 
however, all but four of those dealers were affiliated with banks.  As of March 1, 2008, the 
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demonstrated, it is extremely difficult for outsiders (including 
members of Congress) to second-guess a regulator’s determination of 
solvency during the midst of a systemic crisis.  Moreover, regulators 
are strongly inclined during a crisis to make generous assessments of 
solvency in order to justify their decision to provide emergency 
assistance to troubled LCFIs.215  Thus, during a financial crisis, the 
FRB could potentially assert its authority under amended section 
13(3) to provide emergency loans to a targeted group of LCFIs that it 
claimed to be “solvent,” such as the primary dealers, with the goal of 
helping one or more troubled members of that group. 
Moreover, Dodd-Frank does not limit the ability of banks owned 
by LCFIs to receive liquidity support from the FRB’s discount 
window or from Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs). The FRB’s 
discount window (often referred to as the FRB’s “lender of last 
resort” facility) provides short-term loans to depository institutions 
secured by qualifying collateral.216  Similarly, FHLBs—described in 
one study as “lender[s] of next-to-last resort”217—make collateralized 
 
FRB’s list of primary dealers included all of the “big eighteen” LCFIs except for AIG, 
Société Générale, and Wachovia.  See Tobias Adrian et al., The Federal Reserve’s 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility, 15 CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN. No. 4, Aug. 2009; 
Adam Ashcraft et al., The Federal Home Loan Bank System: The Lender of Next-to-Last 
Resort?, 42 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 551, 574–75 (2010); Primary Dealers List, 
FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. (Nov. 30, 2007), http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents 
/news/markets/2007/an071130.html. 
215 For example, on October 14, 2008, the Treasury Department announced that it 
would provide $125 billion of capital to Bank of America, Citigroup, and seven other 
major banks pursuant to the Troubled Asset Relief Program.  In its announcement, the 
Treasury Department declared that all nine banks were “healthy.”  Several weeks later, 
following public disclosures of serious problems at Bank of America and Citigroup, the 
Treasury Department made $40 billion of additional capital infusions into Bank of 
America and Citigroup, and federal regulators provided asset guarantees covering more 
than $400 billion of Bank of America’s and Citigroup’s assets.  The extraordinary 
assistance provided to Bank of America and Citigroup raised serious questions about the 
validity (and even the sincerity) of the Treasury Department’s declaration that both 
institutions were “healthy” in October 2008.  See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, NOVEMBER 
OVERSIGHT REPORT: GUARANTEES AND CONTINGENT PAYMENTS IN TARP AND 
RELATED PROGRAMS 13–27 (2009), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-110 
609-report.pdf; SIGTARP BANK OF AMERICA REPORT, supra note 14, at 14–31; 
SIGTARP CITIGROUP REPORT, supra note 14, at 4–32, 41–44. 
216 See 12 U.S.C. § 347b; Ashcraft et al., supra note 214, at 552–53, 568–69 (describing 
the FRB’s discount window); Stephen G. Cecchetti, Crisis and Responses: The Federal 
Reserve in the Early Stages of the Financial Crisis, 23 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES No. 1, at 
51, 56–57, 64–66 (2009) (same). 
217 Ashcraft et al., supra note 214, at 554. 
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“advances” to member institutions, including banks and insurance 
companies.218 
During the financial crisis, most banks did not borrow significant 
amounts from the discount window due to (1) the perceived “stigma” 
of doing so and (2) the availability of alternative sources of credit 
through FHLBs and several emergency liquidity facilities that the 
FRB established under its section 13(3) authority.219  In contrast, the 
FHLBs provided $235 billion of advances to member institutions 
during the second half of 2007, following the outbreak of the financial 
crisis.  During that period, FHLBs extended almost $150 billion of 
advances to ten major LCFIs.  Six of those LCFIs incurred large 
losses during the crisis, and they either failed, were acquired in 
emergency transactions, or received “exceptional assistance” from the 
federal government.220  Accordingly, FHLB advances provided a 
significant source of support for troubled LCFIs, especially during the 
early phase of the financial crisis.221  During future crises, it seems 
likely that individual LCFIs will use the FRB’s discount window 
more frequently, along with FHLB advances, because Dodd-Frank 
prevents the FRB from providing emergency credit to individual 
institutions under section 13(3).222 
Discount window loans and FHLB advances cannot be made to 
banks in receivership, but they do provide a potential source of 
funding for troubled SIFIs or SIFI-owned banks, as long as that 
funding is extended prior to the appointment of a receiver for either 
the bank or the SIFI.223  To the extent that the FRB or FHLBs provide 
 
218 Id. at 555–62, 577–59 (describing collateralized advances provided by FHLBs to 
member institutions, including banks); FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 2009, at 65 (2010) , available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/15784 
/FHFAReportToCongress52510.pdf (stating that 210 insurance companies were members 
of FHLBs and had received almost $50 billion of advances at the end of 2009). 
219 Ashcraft et al., supra note 214, at 567–79; Cecchetti, supra note 216, at 64–72. 
220 Ashcraft et al., supra note 214, at 553, 579–80.  Of the ten largest recipients of 
FHLB advances during the second half of 2007, WaMu and Wachovia failed, 
Countrywide and Merrill were acquired by Bank of America in emeregency transactions, 
and Citigroup and Bank of America received “exceptional assistance” from the federal 
government.  See id. at 580, 580 tbl.3; supra notes 14–15, 104–07 and accompanying text. 
221 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Subprime Crisis Confirms Wisdom of Separating Banking 
and Commerce, 27 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 1, 6 (2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1263453. 
222 See supra notes 210–11, 216–18 and accompanying text. 
223 See 12 U.S.C. § 347b(b) (allowing the FRB to make discount window loans to 
“undercapitalized” banks subject to specified limitations); supra notes 220–21 and 
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such funding, at least some short-term creditors of troubled SIFIs or 
SIFI-owned banks are likely to benefit by obtaining full payment of 
their claims before any receivership is created. 
Thus, notwithstanding Dodd-Frank’s explicit promise to end 
bailouts of TBTF institutions,224 federal agencies retain several 
powers that will permit them to protect creditors of weakened SIFIs.  
A more fundamental problem is that Dodd-Frank’s “no bailout” 
pledge will not bind future Congresses.  When a future Congress 
confronts the next systemic financial crisis, that Congress is likely to 
abandon Dodd-Frank’s “no bailout” position either explicitly (by 
amending or repealing the statute) or implicitly (by looking the other 
way while regulators expansively construe their authority to protect 
creditors of SIFIs).  For example, Congress and President George 
H.W. Bush made “never again” statements when they rescued the 
thrift industry with taxpayer funds in 1989,225 but those statements 
did not prevent Congress and President George W. Bush from using 
public funds to bail out major financial institutions in 2008.  As Adam 
Levitin has observed, 
 It is impossible . . . to create a standardized resolution system 
that will be rigidly adhered to in a crisis. . . . Any prefixed 
resolution regime will be abandoned whenever it cannot provide an 
acceptable distributional outcome.  In such cases, bailouts are 
inevitable. 
 This reality cannot be escaped by banning bailouts.  Law is an 
insufficient commitment device for avoiding bailouts altogether.  It 
is impossible to produce binding commitment to a preset resolution 
process, irrespective of the results.  The financial Ulysses cannot be 
bound to the mast. . . . Once the ship is foundering, we do not want 
Ulysses to be bound to the mast, lest [we] go down with the ship 
 
accompanying text (noting that FHLBs made large advances during 2007 to troubled 
LCFIs). 
224 See Dodd-Frank Act pmbl.; S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 1 (2010); Kaper, supra note 2. 
225 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(I), at 310 (1989) (declaring that “Never Again” was “the 
theme of the Committee’s deliberations” on legislation to rescue the thrift industry), 
reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 106; George Bush, Remarks on Signing the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (Aug. 9, 1989), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=17414#axzz1IIMYLfO9 (statement by 
President George H.W. Bush that the 1989 thrift rescue statute would “safeguard and 
stabilize America’s financial system and put in place permanent reforms so these problems 
will never happen again” and that “[n]ever again will America allow any insured 
institution to operate normally if owners lack sufficient tangible capital to protect 
depositors and taxpayers alike”). 
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and drown.  Instead, we want to be sure his hands are free—too 
bail.226 
Similarly, Cheryl Block has concluded that “despite all the . . . ‘no 
more taxpayer-funded bailout’ clamor included in recent financial 
reform legislation, bailouts in the future are likely if circumstances 
become sufficiently severe.”227  Accordingly, it seems probable that 
future Congresses will loosen or remove Dodd-Frank’s constraints on 
TBTF bailouts, or will permit federal regulators to evade those 
limitations, whenever such actions are deemed necessary to prevent 
failures of SIFIs that could destabilize our financial system. 228 
C.  Dodd-Frank Subjects SIFIs to Consolidated Supervision and 
Enhanced Prudential Standards, but Those Provisions Are Not Likely 
to Prevent Future Bailouts of SIFIs 
Dodd-Frank authorizes the FRB to obtain reports from and 
examine nonbank SIFIs and their subsidiaries.229  Dodd-Frank also 
provides the FRB with authority to take enforcement actions 
(including cease-and-desist orders, civil money penalty orders, and 
orders removing directors and officers) against nonbank SIFIs and 
their subsidiaries.230  Thus, Dodd-Frank provides the FRB with 
consolidated supervision and enforcement authority over nonbank 
SIFIs comparable to the FRB’s umbrella supervisory and enforcement 
 
226 Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 439 (2011). 
227 Block, supra note 127, at 224; see also id. at 227 (“pretending that there will never 
be another bailout simply leaves us less prepared when the next severe crisis hits”). 
228 See Levitin, supra note 226, at 489 (“If an OLA proceeding would result in socially 
unacceptable loss allocations, it is likely to be abandoned either for improvised resolution 
or for the statutory framework to be stretched . . . to permit outcomes not intended to be 
allowed.”). 
229 In obtaining reports from and making examinations of a nonbank SIFI and its 
subsidiaries, the FRB is required (1) to use “to the fullest extent possible” reports and 
supervisory information provided by the primary financial regulator of any subsidiary 
depository institution or other functionally regulated subsidiary (e.g., a securities broker-
dealer or an insurance company) and (2) to coordinate with the primary regulator of any 
such subsidiary.  Dodd-Frank Act § 161. 
230 In order to take an enforcement action against any depository institution subsidiary 
or functionally regulated subsidiary of a nonbank SIFI, the FRB must first recommend that 
the primary financial regulator should bring an enforcement proceeding against the 
designated subsidiary.  The FRB may initiate an enforcement action if the primary 
regulator does not take action with sixty days after receiving the FRB’s recommendation.  
Dodd-Frank Act § 162(b). 
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powers with respect to BHCs and financial holding companies 
(FHCs).231 
Dodd-Frank requires the FRB (either on its own motion or on the 
FSOC’s recommendation) to adopt enhanced prudential standards for 
nonbank SIFIs and large BHCs “[i]n order to prevent or mitigate risks 
to the financial stability of the United States.”232  The enhanced 
standards must be “more stringent” than the ordinary supervisory 
rules that apply to nonbank financial companies and BHCs that are 
not SIFIs.233 
At a minimum, Dodd-Frank requires the FRB to adopt enhanced 
risk-based capital requirements, leverage limits, liquidity 
requirements, overall risk management rules, risk concentration 
limits, and requirements for resolution plans (“living wills”) and 
credit exposure reports.234  In addition, the FRB may, in its discretion, 
require SIFIs to satisfy contingent capital requirements, enhanced 
public disclosures, short-term debt limits, and additional prudential 
standards.235 
Dodd-Frank’s requirements for consolidated supervision and 
stronger prudential standards for SIFIs are generally consistent with 
proposals contained in my previous article on financial regulatory 
reform.236  In that article, I gave particular attention to the idea of 
requiring SIFIs to issue contingent capital in the form of convertible 
subordinated debt.  The contingent capital concept would require such 
debt to convert automatically into common stock upon the occurrence 
of a designated event of financial stress, such as (1) a decline in a 
SIFI’s capital below a specified level that would “trigger” an 
automatic conversion or (2) the initiation of the special resolution 
process for a SIFI.  One advantage of contingent capital is that the 
SIFI’s common equity would be increased (due to the mandatory 
conversion of subordinated debt) at a time when the SIFI was under 
 
231 See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 53–54, 83–85 (2010); see also CARNELL ET AL., supra 
note 118, at 437–74 (discussing the FRB’s authority to regulate BHCs and FHCs under the 
BHC Act). 
232 Dodd-Frank Act § 165(a); see also id. § 115 (authorizing the FSOC to recommend 
that the FRB should adopt various types of enhanced prudential standards for nonbank 
SIFIs and large BHCs). 
233 Id. § 161(a)(1)(A), (d). 
234 Id.§ 165(b)(1)(A). 
235 § 165(b)(1)(B).  The FRB may not impose a contingent capital requirement on 
nonbank SIFIs or large BHCs until the FSOC completes a study of the potential costs and 
benefits of such a requirement.  Id. §§ 115(c), 165(c)(1). 
236 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 757–61. 
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severe stress and probably could not sell stock in the market. 
Additionally, mandatory conversion would give holders of 
convertible subordinated debt a strong incentive to exercise greater 
discipline over the SIFI’s management because those holders would 
risk losing their entire investment if mandatory conversion 
occurred.237 
As I explained, it may be very difficult for LCFIs to reach 
agreement with outside investors on terms for contingent capital that 
are mutually satisfactory.  Institutional investors are not likely to 
purchase mandatory convertible debt securities unless those securities 
offer a comparatively high yield and other investor-friendly features 
that may not be acceptable to LCFIs.  Despite widespread support 
among regulators for mandatory convertible debt, only two foreign 
banks (and no U.S. banks) sold such debt between 2007 and the end 
of 2010.238  However, John Coffee has recently suggested that 
mandatory convertible debt would be more attractive to investors, 
managers, and regulators of LCFIs if the debt were converted into 
voting preferred stock instead of common stock.239  Coffee explains 
that “voting, non-convertible senior preferred stock, with a fixed 
return and cumulative dividends” would “create a constituency with 
voting rights that would naturally be resistant to increased leverage 
and higher risk.”240  He believes that mandatory conversion of debt 
securities into voting preferred stock would “reduce shareholder 
pressure on management” by providing a “counterweight” to common 
shareholders, who typically favor greater risk taking.241 
Whether or not contingent capital proves to be a feasible option for 
outside investors, I previously argued that contingent capital should 
become a significant component of compensation packages for senior 
managers and other key employees (e.g., risk managers and traders) 
of LCFIs.  In contrast to outside investors, senior managers and key 
employees are “captive investors” who can be required, as a condition 
 
237 Id. at 760. 
238 Id. at 760–61; John Glover, UBS, Credit Suisse Need New Investor Base for CoCo 
Bonds, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-06/ubs      
-credit-suisse-may-need-new-investor-base-for-coco-bonds.html; Sara Schaefer Muñoz, A 
Hard Road for ‘Coco’ Debt: Bonds That Convert to Equity Get a Cautious Reception from 
Potential Issuers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2010, at C3. 
239 John C. Coffee, Jr., Bail-Ins Versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent Capital to Mitigate 
Systemic Risk (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 380, 
2010), at 6–9, 25–41. 
240 Id. at 9. 
241 Id. at 8. 
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of their continued employment, to accept convertible subordinated 
debentures in payment of a significant portion (e.g., one-third) of their 
total annual compensation, including incentive-based compensation.  
Managers and key employees should not be allowed to make 
voluntary conversions of their subordinated debentures into common 
stock until the expiration of a minimum holding period (e.g., three 
years) after the termination date of their employment.  Such a 
minimum post-employment holding period would discourage 
managers and key employees from taking excessive risks to boost the 
value of the conversion option during the term of their employment. 
At the same time, their debentures should be subject to mandatory 
conversion into common stock upon the occurrence of a designated 
“triggering” event of financial distress.242 
Requiring managers and key employees to hold significant 
amounts of contingent capital during their employment, and for a 
lengthy period thereafter, should give them positive incentives to 
manage their institution prudently and with appropriate regard for the 
interests of creditors as well as longer-term shareholders.  Such a 
requirement would cause managers and key employees to realize that 
(1) they will not be able to “cash out” a significant percentage of their 
accrued compensation unless their organization achieves long-term 
success and viability, and (2) they will lose a significant portion of 
their accrued compensation if their institution is threatened with 
failure.243 
Dodd-Frank’s provisions requiring consolidated FRB supervision 
and enhanced prudential standards for SIFIs represent valuable 
improvements.  For at least five reasons, however, those provisions 
are unlikely to prevent future failures of SIFIs with the attendant risk 
of governmental bailouts for systemically significant creditors.  First, 
like previous regulatory reforms, Dodd-Frank relies heavily on the 
concept of stronger capital requirements.  Unfortunately, capital-
 
242 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 761. 
243 Id.  For other recent proposals that call for managers and key employees to receive 
part of their compensation in debt securities in order to encourage them to avoid excessive 
risk taking, see Lucian Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 247, 283–86 (2010); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation and Corporate 
Governance in Financial Firms: The Case for Convertible Equity Based Pay 11–14 
(Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 373, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1633906; Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive 
Compensation and Risk Regulation 31–51 (Emory Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 10-
60, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =1546229.  Professor Gordon’s proposal is 
most similar to my own. 
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based regulation has repeatedly failed in the past.244  As regulators 
learned during the banking and thrift crises of the 1980s and early 
1990s, capital levels are “lagging indicators” of bank problems245 
because (1) “many assets held by banks... are not traded on any 
organized market and, therefore, are very difficult for regulators and 
outside investors to value,” and (2) bank managers “have strong 
incentives to postpone any recognition of asset depreciation and 
capital losses” until their banks have already suffered serious 
damage.246 
Second, LCFIs have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to 
engage in “regulatory capital arbitrage” in order to weaken the 
effectiveness of capital requirements.247  For example, the Basel II 
international capital accord was designed to prevent the arbitrage 
techniques (including securitization) that banks used to undermine the 
effectiveness of the Basel I accord.248  However, many analysts 
concluded that the Basel II accord (including its heavy reliance on 
internal risk-based models developed by LCFIs) was seriously flawed 
and allowed LCFIs to operate with capital levels that were “very, very 
low... unacceptably low” during the period leading up to the financial 
crisis.249  In September 2010, the Basel Committee on Bank 
Supervision (BCBS) gave tentative approval to a new set of proposals 
known as “Basel III,” which seeks to strengthen the Basel II capital 
standards significantly.250  BCBS’ adoption of Basel III was widely 
 
244 See Reforming Banking: Base Camp Basel, ECONOMIST (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www 
.economist.com/node/15328883 (stating that “the record of bank-capital rules is crushingly 
bad”). 
245 1 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
39–40, 55–56 (1997). 
246 Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 459; see also DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON 
BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION 171–72 (2008). 
247 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 137, at 137–41; Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 457–
61. 
248 TARULLO, supra note 246, at 79–83. 
249 Reforming Banking: Base Camp Basel, supra note 244 (quoting unnamed regulator); 
see also supra note 76 and accompanying text (noting that European banks and U.S. 
securities firms that followed Basel II rules operated with very high leverage during the 
pre-crisis period); TARULLO, supra note 246, at 139–214 (identifying numerous 
shortcomings in the Basel II accord). 
250 Daniel Pruzin, Capital: Financial Sector Gives Cautious Welcome to Agreement on 
Bank Capital Standards, 95 Banking Rep. (BNA) 385 (Sept. 14, 2010); see infra note 261 
and accompanying text (discussing adoption of the Basel III accord and criticisms of its 
apparent shortcomings). 
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viewed as an implicit admission of Basel II’s inadequacy.251  After 
reviewing a preliminary version of the Basel III proposals, a 
prominent U.K. financial commentator observed, “We can say with 
conviction now that Basel II failed.”252 
Third, the past shortcomings of capital-based rules are part of a 
broader phenomenon of supervisory failure.  Regulators did not stop 
large banks from pursuing hazardous (and in many cases fatal) 
strategies during the 1980s, including rapid growth with heavy 
concentrations in high-risk assets and excessive reliance on volatile, 
short-term liabilities.  During the 1980s, regulators proved to be 
unwilling or unable to stop risky behavior as long as banks continued 
to report profits.253  Similarly, although the full story is yet to be told, 
there is wide agreement that federal banking and securities regulators 
repeatedly failed to restrain excessive risk taking by LCFIs during the 
decade leading up to the financial crisis.254 
Fourth, repeated regulatory failures during past financial crises 
reflect a “political economy of regulation”255 in which regulators face 
significant political and practical challenges that undermine their 
efforts to discipline LCFIs.  A full discussion of those challenges is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  For present purposes, it is sufficient 
to note that analysts have pointed to strong evidence of “capture” of 
financial regulatory agencies by LCFIs during the two decades 
leading up to the financial crisis, due to factors such as (1) large 
political contributions made by LCFIs, (2) an intellectual and policy 
environment favoring deregulation, and (3) a continuous interchange 
of senior personnel between the largest financial institutions and the 
top echelons of the financial regulatory agencies.256  Commentators 
 
251 See, e.g., Reforming Banking: Base Camp Basel, supra note 244; Yalman Onaran et 
al., The Global Battle over New Rules for Banks, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, May 31–
June 6, 2010, at 41. 
252 Onaran et al., supra note 251, at 42 (quoting Charles Goodhart). 
253 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 245, at 39–46, 245–47, 373–78. 
254 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 137, at 120–50; McCoy et al., supra note 14, at 
1343–66; see also Coffee, supra note 239, at 17–18 (stating that “[a]greement is virtually 
universal that lax regulation by all the financial regulators played a significant role in the 
2008 financial crisis”). 
255 Gordon & Muller, supra note 200, at 26. 
256 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 137, at 82–109, 118–21, 133–50; see also Deniz 
Igan et al., A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis (Int’l Monetary Fund, 
Working Paper 09/287, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1531520; ROBERT 
WEISSMAN & JAMES DONAHUE, ESSENTIAL INFO. & CONSUMER EDUC. FOUND., SOLD 
OUT: HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON BETRAYED AMERICA (2009), available at 
http://www.wallstreetwatch.org/reports/sold _out.pdf. 
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have also noted that LCFIs skillfully engaged in global regulatory 
arbitrage by threatening to move operations from the United States to 
London or to other foreign financial centers if U.S. regulators did not 
make regulatory concessions.257 
Fifth, Dodd-Frank does not provide specific instructions about the 
higher capital requirements and other enhanced prudential standards 
that the FRB must adopt.  Instead, Dodd-Frank sets forth general 
categories of supervisory requirements that the FRB either must or 
may address.258  Thus, the actual achievement of stronger prudential 
standards will depend upon implementation by the FRB through rule 
making, and LCFIs have marshaled an imposing array of lobbying 
resources to persuade the FRB to adopt more lenient rules.259  When 
Congress passed Dodd-Frank, the head of a leading Wall Street trade 
association declared that “[t]he bottom line is that this saga will 
continue,” and he noted that there are “more than 200 items in [Dodd-
Frank] where final details will be left up to regulators.”260 
 
257 Coffee, supra note 239, at 18–21; Gordon & Muller, supra note 200, at 27. 
258 See supra notes 232–35 and accompanying text; see also Stacy Kaper, Now for the 
Hard Part: Writing All the Rules, AM. BANKER, July 22, 2010, at 1 (stating that although 
Dodd-Frank will “require the Fed to impose tougher risk-based capital and leverage 
requirements, it is unspecific about how this should be done”). 
259 See Binyamin Appelbaum, On Finance Bill, Lobbying Shifts to Regulations, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 27, 2010, at A1 (noting that “[r]egulators are charged with deciding how 
much money banks have to set aside against unexpected losses, so the Financial Services 
Roundtable, which represents large financial companies, and other banking groups have 
been making a case to the regulators that squeezing too hard would hurt the economy”); 
see also Kaper, supra note 258; Congress’s Approval of Finance Bill Shifts Focus to 
Regulators, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 16, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com 
/news/2010-07-16/congress-s-approval-of-finance-bill-shifts-focus-to-regulators.html. 
260 Randall Smith & Aaron Lucchetti, The Financial Regulatory Overhaul: Biggest 
Banks Manage to Dodge Some Bullets, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2010, at A5 (quoting, in 
part, Timothy Ryan, chief executive of the Securities and Financial Markets Ass’n); see 
also Edward J. Kane, Missing Elements in U.S. Financial Reform: A Kubler-Ross 
Interpretation of the Inadequacy of the Dodd-Frank Act 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=1654051 (“During and after what will be an extended post-Act rulemaking 
process, decisionmakers will be opportunistically lobbied to scale back taxpayer and 
consumer protections to sustain opportunities for extracting safety-net subsidies.  . . .  
Financial-sector lobbyists’ ability to influence regulatory and supervisory decisions 
remains strong because the legislative framework Congress has asked regulators to 
implement gives a free pass to the dysfunctional ethical culture of lobbying that helped 
both to generate the crisis and to dictate the extravagant cost of the diverse ways that the 
financial sector was bailed out.”); Kaper, supra note 258 (reporting that, “[b]y some 
estimates, federal regulators must complete 243 rules, . . . along with 67 one-time reports 
or studies and 22 periodic reports” in order to implement Dodd-Frank’s mandates). 
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During the summer of 2010, domestic and foreign LCFIs 
succeeded in weakening and delaying the imposition of enhanced 
capital standards under the Basel III proposal, and they expressed 
their determination to prevent U.S. regulators from adopting stronger 
capital requirements that would go beyond Basel III.261  During the 
2010 midterm congressional elections, LCFIs and their trade 
associations made large contributions to Republican candidates, 
which helped Republicans to take control of the House of 
Representatives and significantly reduce the Democrats’ majority in 
the Senate.262  The financial services industry strongly backed 
President Obama and Democratic congressional candidates in 2008, 
but the passage of Dodd-Frank caused big financial institutions and 
their trade associations to shift their support to Republicans in 
2010.263  The new Republican House leaders quickly announced their 
 
261 As discussed above, the BCBS agreed in September 2010 on a proposal to 
strengthen international capital standards.  Under the proposal, banks would be required to 
maintain common equity equal to 7% of their risk-weighted assets, including a 2.5% 
“buffer” for extra protection against future losses.  See supra note 250 and accompanying 
text.  However, the BCBS significantly weakened many of the terms of the proposal in 
comparison with its original recommendation in December 2009, and the BCBS also 
extended the time for full compliance with Basel III until the end of 2018.  The BCBS 
made those concessions in response to extensive lobbying by U.S. and foreign LCFIs as 
well as the governments of France, Germany, and Japan.  See Pruzin, supra note 250; 
Yalman Onaran, Basel Means Higher Capital Ratios, Time to Comply, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-09-13/basel   
-means-higher-capital-ratios-time-to-comply.html.  Stock prices of major LCFIs rose 
significantly in response to the BCBS’s compromise proposal, indicating that the 
compromise was more favorable to leading banks than analysts had expected.  Michael J. 
Moore & Yalman Onaran, Banks Stocks Climb as Basel Gives Firms Eight Years to 
Comply, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 13 2000), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-13 
/banks-climb-as-regulators-allow-eight-years-to-meet-capital-requirements.html.  In 
addition, LCFIs declared that they strongly opposed efforts by individual nations, 
including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland, to impose capital 
requirements that are stronger than the Basel III proposal.  Yalman Onaran, Banks Resist 
as Regulators Say Basel Is Just a Start, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 11, 2010), 
http://www .businessweek.com/news/2010-10-11/banks-resist-as-regulators-say-basel-is   
-just-a-start.html. 
262 Clea Benson & Phil Mattingly, Firms That Fought Dodd-Frank May Gain Under 
New House, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com 
/news/2010-11-03/firms-that-fought-dodd-frank-may-gain-under-new-house.html; Stacy 
Kaper, Banks Use Election as Payback for Reg Reform, AM. BANKER, Sept. 7, 2010, at 1; 
Robert Schmidt, Wall Street Banking on Republicans to Push Legislative Goals, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 14, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-14/wall-street-
banking-on-republicans-to-push-legislative-goals.html. 
263 Kaper, supra note 262; Brody Mullins & Alicia Mundy, Corporate Political Giving 
Swings Toward the GOP, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2010, at A5; Editorial, Troubled 
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intention to oversee and influence the implementation of Dodd-Frank 
by federal agencies in order to secure outcomes that were more 
favorable to the financial services industry.264  Thus, notwithstanding 
the widespread public outrage created by bailouts of major banks and 
Wall Street firms, the continued political clout of LCFIs is 
undeniable.265 
For all of the foregoing reasons, as John Coffee has noted, “the 
intensity of regulatory supervision” is likely to weaken over time as 
the economy improves and “the crisis fades in the public’s memory” 
as well as in the memories of regulators.266  When the next economic 
boom occurs, regulators will face escalating political pressures to 
reduce the regulatory burden on LCFIs as long as those institutions 
continue to finance the boom and also continue to report profits.267  
Accordingly, while Dodd-Frank’s provisions for stronger supervision 
and enhanced prudential standards represent improvements over prior 
 
Marriage: Feeling Scorned by the President, Big Business Is Turning to the GOP: How 
Fair Is That?, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2010, at A16. 
264 Benson & Mattingly, supra note 262; Cheyenne Hopkins, Oversight by House GOP 
to Shape Rules, AM. BANKER, Nov. 8, 2010, at 1; Stacy Kaper, REVIEW 2010/PREVIEW 
2011: Redrawing the Battle Lines on Reform, AM. BANKER, Jan. 3, 2011, at 1; Phil 
Mattingly, Derivatives, ‘Volcker’ Rules May Be House Republican Targets, BLOOMBERG 
(Nov. 14, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-19/derivatives-volcker-rules-
may-be-house-republican-targets.html. 
265 John Cassidy, What Good Is Wall Street?, NEW YORKER (Nov. 29, 2010), http: 
//www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/11/29/101129fa_fact_cassidy; Catherine Dodge, 
Banning Big Wall Street Bonus Favored by 70% of Americans in National Poll, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 12, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-13/banning-big  
-wall-street-bonus-favored-by-70-of-americans-in-national-poll.html; Michael J. Moore, 
Wall Street Sees Record Revenue in ’09-10 Recovery from Bailout, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 12, 
2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-13/wall-street-sees-record-revenue-in-
09-10-recovery-from-government-bailout.html; Paul Starobin, Too Big To Like?, NAT’L J., 
Sept. 4, 2010, at 17. 
266 Coffee, supra note 239, at 21, 20; see also Kane, supra note 260, at 7 (arguing that, 
due to the financial sector’s skill in “mixing . . . innovation with well-placed political 
pressure,” the strength and effectiveness of Dodd-Frank’s regulatory reforms “are unlikely 
to hold up over time . . . [a]s memory of the crisis recedes”). 
267 In this regard, Jeffrey Gordon and Christopher Muller observe: 
[G]rowing [financial sector] profits seem to attest to the skill and sagacity of 
industry participants and increase normative deference to their views.  . . .  [T]he 
added profits generate additional resources for lobbying, campaign contributions, 
and media campaigns that not only enhance the industry’s ability to block new 
legislation but also to enlist legislative and executive [branch] pressure against 
regulatory intervention under existing authorities . . . .  [T]he enhanced 
profitability of the financial sector typically produces economic spillovers that 
add to overall economic growth, which is highly desired by political actors. 
Gordon & Muller, supra note 200, at 27. 
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law, they are unlikely to prevent future failures of SIFIs and their 
accompanying pressures for governmental protection of systemically 
important creditors.268 
D.  Dodd-Frank Does Not Require SIFIs to Pay Insurance Premiums 
to Pre-Fund the Orderly Liquidation Fund 
As noted above, Dodd-Frank establishes an Orderly Liquidation 
Fund (OLF) to provide financing for the FDIC’s liquidation of failed 
SIFIs.  However, Dodd-Frank does not require LCFIs to pay 
assessments for the purpose of pre-funding the OLF.269  Instead, 
Dodd-Frank authorizes the FDIC borrow from the Treasury to 
provide the necessary funding for the OLF after a SIFI is placed in 
receivership.270 
The FDIC must repay any borrowings from the Treasury within 
five years, unless the Treasury determines that an extension of the 
repayment period is “necessary to avoid a serious adverse effect on 
the financial system of the United States.”271  Dodd-Frank authorizes 
the FDIC to repay borrowings from the Treasury by making ex post 
assessments on (1) creditors who received preferential payments (to 
the extent of such preferences), (2) nonbank SIFIs supervised by the 
FRB under Dodd-Frank, (3) BHCs with assets of $50 billion or more, 
and (4) other financial companies with assets of $50 billion or 
more.272  Dodd-Frank requires the FDIC to determine the appropriate 
assessment levels for nonbank SIFIs, large BHCs and other large 
financial companies by (1) setting a “graduated basis” for assessments 
that requires larger and riskier financial companies to pay higher rates 
and (2) establishing a “risk matrix” that incorporates 
recommendations from the FSOC.273 
Thus, Dodd-Frank relies on an ex post funding system for 
financing liquidations of SIFIs.  That was not the case with early 
versions of the legislation.  The bill passed by the House of 
Representatives would have authorized the FDIC to pre-fund the OLF 
by collecting up to $150 billion in risk-based assessments from 
 
268 Id. at 22–23; JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 137, at 205–08. 
269 See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text. 
270 Dodd-Frank Act § 210(n)(5), (6); see also supra note 199 and accompanying text 
(discussing the FDIC’s authority to borrow from the Treasury). 
271 Dodd-Frank Act § 210(n)(9)(B), (o)(1)(B), (C) (quote). 
272 § 210(o)(1). 
273 § 210(o)(4). 
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nonbank SIFIs and large BHCs.274  The bill reported by the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs would also have 
established a pre-funded OLF, albeit with a smaller “target size” of 
$50 billion.275  FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair strongly championed the 
concept of a pre-funded OLF.276 
However, Senate Republicans repeatedly blocked consideration of 
the bill on the Senate floor until Senate Democrats agreed to remove 
the pre-funding provision.277  Republican legislators denounced the 
pre-funding provision as a “permanent taxpayer bailout” fund, even 
though the fund would have been paid for by LCFIs and would 
therefore have provided at least partial protection to taxpayers.  The 
Obama Administration never supported the pre-funding mechanism 
and eventually urged Senate leaders to remove it from the bill.278  
During the House-Senate conference committee’s deliberations on 
 
274 See Mike Ferrulo et al., Regulatory Reform: House Clears Regulatory Reform 
Package Calling for New Controls on Financial Sector, 93 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1167 
(Dec. 15, 2009). 
275 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 4, 5, 63–64 (2010). 
276 Id. at 5, 5 n.10; see also Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 
Statement on the Causes and Current State of the Financial Crisis Before the Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission 38–39 (Jan. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Bair FCIC Testimony], 
available at http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/documents/view/2144 (supporting establishment 
of a pre-funded OLF). 
277 Alison Vekshin & James Rowley, Senate Republicans Vow to Amend Finance Bill 
on Floor (Update 1), BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www 
.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-29/senate-republicans-vow-to-amend-finance-bill-on    
-floor-update1-.html (reporting that “[o]n three previous votes this week, the [Senate’s] 41 
Republicans united to block consideration of the bill” until Republicans “got assurances 
that Democrats would remove from the bill a $50 billion industry-supported fund that 
would be used to wind down failing firms”). 
278 Finance-Overhaul Bill Would Reshape Wall Street, Washington, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (May 21, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-21 
/finance-overhaul-bill-would-reshape-wall-street-washington.html (reporting that the 
Senate committee’s proposal for “a $50 billion [resolution] fund, paid for by the financial 
industry,” was removed from the Senate bill in order “to allow debate on the bill to begin” 
after “[b]ank lobbyists opposed the fund, and Republicans argued that the provision would 
create a permanent taxpayer bailout of Wall Street banks”); Stacy Kaper, Democrats 
Soften Stand on $50B Resolution Fund, AM. BANKER, April 20, 2010, at 3 (noting the 
claim of Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell that his opposition to the $50 billion 
fund was “vindicated by President Obama’s request to remove it”); David M. Herszenhorn 
& Sheryl Gay Stolberg, White House and Democrats Join to Press Case on Financial 
Controls, N.Y. TIMES, April 15, 2010, at B1 (reporting  that “[t]he Obama administration 
has not supported the creation of the $50 billion fund” and citing Senator McConnell’s 
claim that the fund would “encourage bailouts”); see also infra note 284 and 
accompanying text (explaining that removal of the pre-funded OLF from Dodd-Frank was 
widely viewed as a significant victory for LCFIs). 
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Dodd-Frank, House Democratic conferees tried to revive the pre-
funding mechanism, but their efforts failed.279 
It is contrary to customary insurance principles to establish an OLF 
that is funded only after a SIFI fails and must be liquidated.280  When 
commentators have considered analogous insurance issues created by 
the DIF, they have recognized that moral hazard is reduced when 
banks pay risk-based premiums that compel “each bank [to] bear the 
cost of its own risk-taking.”281  In stark contrast to the FDI Act 
(which requires banks to pre-fund the DIF), Dodd-Frank does not 
require SIFIs to pay risk-based premiums to pre-fund the OLF.  As a 
result, SIFIs will derive implicit subsidies from the protection their 
creditors expect to receive from the OLF, and SIFIs will pay nothing 
for those subsidies until the first SIFI fails.282 
When reporters asked Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell 
why big banks were opposing a pre-funded OLF if the fund actually 
benefited them by “guarantee[ing] future bailouts,” he had no 
response.283  The true answer, of course, was that SIFIs did not wish 
to pay for the implicit benefits they expected to receive from a post-
funded OLF.  SIFIs had good reason to anticipate that a post-funded 
OLF, backed by the Treasury and ultimately by the taxpayers, would 
be viewed by creditors as an implicit subsidy for SIFIs and would 
 
279 R. Christian Bruce & Mike Ferullo, Regulatory Reform: Oversight Council Still a 
Sticking Point as Bank Reform Conference Plows Ahead, 94 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1227 
(June 22, 2010); Alison Vekshin, House Backs Off Reserve Fund for Unwinding Failed 
Companies, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 23, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com 
/news/2010-06-23/house-backs-off-reserve-fund-for-unwinding-failed-companies.html; 
see also House-Senate Conference Committee Holds a Meeting on the Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, FIN. MARKETS REG. WIRE, June 17, 2010 [hereinafter 
Conference Committee Transcript] (transcript of deliberations of House-Senate conference 
committee on Dodd-Frank on June 17, 2010, during which House Democratic conferees 
voted to propose a restoration of a pre-funded OLF with $150 billion of assessments to be 
paid by LCFIs). 
280 See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 118, at 535 (noting that ordinarily “an insurer 
collects, pools, and invests policyholders’ premiums and draws on that pool to pay 
policyholders’ claims”). 
281 Id. at 328. 
282 See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 763 (contending that “a post-funded SRIF would not 
be successful in eliminating many of the implicit subsidies (and associated moral hazard) 
that our current TBTF policy has created”); Conference Committee Transcript, supra note 
279 (remarks of Rep. Guttierez, arguing that a post-funded OLF would create “moral 
hazard” by “allowing [large financial institutions] to act and not be responsible for their 
actions by contributing to a fund which dissolves the riskiest of them”). 
283 Herszenhorn & Stolberg, supra note 278 (reporting on a press conference with Sen. 
McConnell). 
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therefore reduce their funding costs.  The elimination of pre-funding 
for the OLF was a significant “victory” for LCFIs because it relieved 
them of the burden of paying an “upfront fee” to cover the potential 
costs of that implicit subsidy.284 
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that Dodd-Frank 
would produce a ten-year net budget deficit of $19 billion, due 
primarily to “potential net outlays for the orderly liquidation of 
[SIFIs], measured on an expected value basis.”285  To offset that 
deficit, the House-Senate conferees proposed a $19 billion tax on 
financial companies with assets of $50 billion or more and on hedge 
funds with assets of $10 billion or more.  LCFIs strongly objected to 
the tax, and Republicans who had voted for the Senate bill threatened 
to block final passage of the legislation unless the tax was removed.  
To ensure Dodd-Frank’s passage, the House-Senate conference 
committee reconvened and removed the $19 billion tax.286 
In place of the discarded tax, the conferees approved two other 
measures—a capture of the savings from ending the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) and an assessment of higher deposit 
insurance premiums on banks.  Those measures effectively shifted to 
taxpayers and midsize banks most of Dodd-Frank’s estimated ten-
year cost impact on the federal budget.287  Thus, LCFIs and their 
 
284 Mike Ferrulo, Regulatory Reform: Democrats Set to Begin Final Push to Enact 
Dodd-Frank Financial Overhaul, 94 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1277 (June 29, 2010) (reporting 
that the elimination of a pre-funded OLF “is seen as a victory for large financial 
institutions” and quoting analyst Jaret Seiberg’s comment that “[t]he key for [the financial 
services] industry was to avoid the upfront fee”); Joe Adler & Cheyenne Hopkins, 
Assessing the Final Reg Reform Bill: Some Win, Some Lose, Many Glad It’s Not Worse, 
AM. BANKER, June 28, 2010, at 1 (quoting my view that “[t]he elimination of a prefunded 
systemic resolution fund . . . is a huge win for the ‘too big to fail’ players and a huge loss 
for the FDIC and taxpayers”). 
285 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE, H.R. 4173: RESTORING FINANCIAL 
STABILITY ACT OF 2010: AS PASSED BY THE SENATE ON MAY 20, 2010, at 6 (2010). 
286 Rob Blackwell & Stacy Kaper, Lawmakers Try FDIC Premiums to Save Bill, AM. 
BANKER, June 30, 2010, at 1; Ferrulo, supra note 284. 
287 In order to pay for Dodd-Frank’s estimated ten-year budgetary cost of $19 billion, 
the conferees voted to cap TARP at $475 billion (in lieu of the originally authorized $700 
billion) and to prohibit any additional spending under TARP, thereby saving an estimated 
$11 billion.  To cover the remaining $8 billion of Dodd-Frank’s estimated ten-year cost, 
the conferees required banks with assets of $10 billion or more to pay increased deposit 
insurance premiums to the FDIC.  David M. Herszenhorn, Bank Tax Is Dropped in 
Overhaul of Industry, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2010, at 1; Jim Puzzanghera & Lisa Mascaro, 
Plan Would Cut Off TARP: House-Senate Panel Votes to End Bailout Fund Early to Help 
Pay for Financial Reform, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2010, at B1.  The practical results of those 
changes were (1) to shift the $11 billion benefit from ending TARP from taxpayers to 
LCFIs and (2) to require banks with assets between $10 and $50 billion to help larger 
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allies were successful in defeating both the $19 billion tax and the 
pre-funded OLF.  As I observed in a contemporaneous blog post, 
“[t]he biggest banks have once again proven their political clout . . . 
[and] have also avoided any significant payment for the subsidies they 
continue to receive.”288 
I have previously argued that a pre-funded “systemic risk insurance 
fund” (SRIF) is essential to shrink TBTF subsidies for LCFIs.  I 
proposed that the FDIC should assess risk-adjusted premiums over a 
period of several years to establish a SRIF with financial resources 
that would provide reasonable protection to taxpayers against the cost 
of resolving failures of SIFIs during a future systemic financial 
crisis.289  As explained above, federal regulators provided $290 
billion of capital assistance to the nineteen largest BHCs (each with 
assets of more than $100 billion) and to AIG during the current 
crisis.290  I therefore proposed (1) that $300 billion (appropriately 
adjusted for inflation) would be the minimum acceptable size for the 
SRIF and (2) that SRIF premiums should be paid by all BHCs with 
assets of more than $100 billion (also adjusted for inflation) and by all 
other designated SIFIs.291  I also recommended that the FDIC should 
 
banks in covering the remaining $8 billion of Dodd-Frank’s estimated ten-year cost, even 
though midsize banks were not responsible for originating the unsound home mortgage 
loans that triggered the financial crisis.  Joe Adler, Plenty of Reservation on Hiking 
Reserves, AM. BANKER, July 1, 2010, at 1; Herszenhorn, supra. 
288 Art Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail=Too Powerful to Pay, CREDIT SLIPS (July 7, 2010), 
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2010/07/too-big-to-fail-too-powerful-to-pay.html 
#more. 
289 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 761–64; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Viewpoint: 
Prefund a Systemic Resolution Fund, AM. BANKER, June 11, 2010, at 8.  Representative 
Luis Guttierez, who was the leading congressional proponent of a pre-funded OLF, quoted 
my Viewpoint article during the House-Senate conference committee’s consideration of a 
pre-funded OLF.  See Conference Committee Transcript, supra note 279 (remarks of Rep. 
Guttierez). 
290 See supra notes 14–17, 108–09 and accompanying text. 
291 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 762.  Jeffrey Gordon and Christopher Muller have 
proposed a similar “Systemic Risk Emergency Fund” with a pre-funded base of $250 
billion to be financed by risk-adjusted assessments paid by large financial firms.  They 
would also provide their proposed fund with a supplemental borrowing authority of up to 
$750 billion from the Treasury.  Gordon & Muller, supra note 200, at 51–53.  Thus, 
Gordon and Muller’s proposal is consistent with my recommendation for a pre-funded 
SRIF financed by $300 billion of assessments paid by SIFIs.  Cf. Xin Huang et al., A 
Framework for Assessing the Systemic Risk of Major Financial Institutions, 33 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 2036 (2009) (proposing a stress-testing methodology for calculating an 
insurance premium sufficient to protect a hypothetical fund against losses of more than 
15% of the total liabilities of twelve major U.S. banks during the period from 2001 to 
2008, and concluding that the hypothetical aggregate insurance premium would have had 
an “upper bound” of $250 billion in July 2008). 
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impose additional assessments on SIFIs in order to replenish the SRIF 
within three years after the SRIF incurs any loss due to the failure of a 
SIFI.292 
For four additional reasons, Congress should amend Dodd-Frank to 
require SIFIs to pay risk-based insurance premiums to prefund the 
OLF.  First, it is unlikely that most SIFIs would have adequate 
financial resources to pay large OLF assessments after one or more of 
their peers failed during a financial crisis.  SIFIs are frequently 
exposed to highly correlated risk exposures during a serious financial 
disruption because they followed similar high-risk business strategies 
(e.g., “herding”) during the credit boom that led to the crisis.293  
Many SIFIs are therefore likely to suffer severe losses and to face a 
substantial risk of failure during a major disturbance in the financial 
markets.294  Consequently, the FDIC (1) probably will not be able in 
the short term to collect enough premiums from surviving SIFIs to 
cover the costs of resolving one or more failed SIFIs and (2) therefore 
will have to borrow large sums from the Treasury to cover short-term 
 
292 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 762. 
293 A recent study concluded that market returns of the hundred largest banks, securities 
firms, insurers, and hedge funds became “highly interconnected,” and their risk exposures 
became “highly interrelated,” during the current financial crisis as well as during (1) the 
dotcom-telecom bust of 2000–2002 and (2) the 1998 crisis resulting from Russia’s debt 
default and the threatened failure of Long-Term Capital Management, a major hedge fund.  
Monica Billio et al., Measuring Systemic Risk in the Finance and Insurance Sectors 16–
17, 40–47 (MIT Sloan School of Mgmt., Working Paper 4774-10, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571277; see also JIAN YANG & YINGGANG ZHOU, FINDING 
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AROUND THE GLOBAL CREDIT 
CRISIS: EVIDENCE FROM CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 20–24, 38 tbl.2, 51–52 fig.3, fig.4 
(2010) (concluding, based on a study of CDS spreads, that the four largest U.S. banks and 
five largest U.S. securities firms were “intensively connected” from 2007 to 2009, with 
credit shocks being rapidly transmitted among members of that group and also between 
members of that group and leading U.S. insurance companies, including AIG and 
MetLife), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1691111.  For additional evidence 
indicating that banks and other financial institutions engage in herding behavior that can 
trigger systemic financial crises, see Viral V. Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, Information 
Contagion and Bank Herding, 40 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 215, 215–17, 227–29 
(2008); Raghuram G. Rajan, Has Finance Made the World Riskier?, 12 EUROPEAN FIN. 
MANAGEMENT 499, 500–02, 513–22 (2006).  As described above in Part III, LCFIs 
engaged in parallel behavior that resembled herding during the credit boom that 
precipitated the recent crisis, particularly with regard to high-risk securitized lending in the 
residential and commercial mortgage markets and the corporate LBO market. 
294 See supra notes 102–11 and accompanying text (explaining that (1) the “big 
eighteen” LCFIs accounted for three-fifths of the $1.5 trillion of losses that were incurred 
by global banks, securities firms, and insurers during the financial  crisis, and (2) Lehman 
failed during the crisis, while twelve of the other “big eighteen” institutions were bailed 
out or received substantial governmental assistance). 
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resolution costs.  Even if the FDIC ultimately repays the borrowed 
funds by imposing ex post assessments on surviving SIFIs, the public 
and the financial markets will correctly infer that the federal 
government (and, ultimately, the taxpayers) provided bridge loans to 
pay the creditors of failed SIFIs.295 
Second, under Dodd-Frank’s post-funded OLF, the most reckless 
SIFIs will effectively shift the potential costs of their risk taking to the 
most prudent SIFIs because the latter will be more likely to survive 
and bear the ex post costs of resolving their failed peers.  Thus, a 
post-funded OLF is undesirable because “firms that fail never pay and 
the costs are borne by surviving firms.”296 
Third, a pre-funded OLF would create beneficial incentives that 
would encourage each SIFI to monitor other SIFIs and to inform 
regulators about excessive risk taking by those institutions.  Every 
SIFI would know that the failure of another SIFI would deplete the 
SRIF and would also trigger future assessments that it and other 
surviving SIFIs would have to pay.  Thus, each SIFI would have good 
reason to complain to regulators if it became aware of unsound 
practices or conditions at another SIFI.297 
Fourth, the payment of risk-based assessments to pre-fund the OLF 
would reduce TBTF subsidies for SIFIs by forcing them to internalize 
more of the “negative externality” (i.e., the potential public bailout 
 
295 Bair FCIC Testimony, supra note 276, at 38–39; see also Cheyenne Hopkins, 
Resolution Fund New Reg Reform Headache, AM. BANKER, Nov. 12, 2009, at 1 (quoting 
observation by Doug Elliott, a fellow at the Brookings Institution, that pre-funding a 
systemic resolution fund would be advantageous “because you can start funding while the 
institutions are still strong . . . [while] if you do it after the fact you are almost certain to do 
it when institutions are weak and less funds are available”); Gordon & Muller, supra note 
200, at 41 (observing that, under Dodd-Frank, “[r]esolution funds will be borrowed from 
Treasury and ultimately, the taxpayers. Politically, this will likely register as a taxpayer 
‘bailout,’ notwithstanding the [statute’s] strong repayment mandate”). 
296 Bair FCIC Testimony, supra note 276, at 38–39.  During the conference 
committee’s deliberations on Dodd-Frank, House Democratic conferees unsuccessfully 
pushed for a pre-funded OLF.  See supra note 279 and accompanying text.  In warning 
against the dangers of a post-funded OLF, Representative Gregory Meeks observed: 
What kind of system are we promoting if the biggest risk takers now know that 
they won’t have to pitch in for the cleanup because they will be out of business 
and [will] have run off with the accrued . . . profits from the good days, while 
those who are more prudent and survive the crises are left holding the tab for . . .  
their wild neighbors. 
Conference Committee Transcript, supra note 279 (remarks of Rep. Meeks). 
297 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 763. 
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cost) of their activities.298  To accomplish the goal of internalizing 
risk, the marginal rates for OLF assessments should become 
progressively higher for SIFIs that create a greater potential for 
systemic risk, based on factors such as size, complexity, opacity and 
interconnectedness with other SIFIs.  A pre-funded OLF with 
appropriately calibrated risk-based assessments would reduce moral 
hazard among SIFIs and would shield governments and taxpayers 
from at least “first loss” exposure for the cost of resolving future 
failures of SIFIs.299 
Gordon and Muller point out that a pre-funded OLF would also 
reduce TBTF subsidies by making Dodd-Frank’s “liquidation threat 
more credible.”300  In their view, a pre-funded OLF would encourage 
regulators to “impos[e] an FDIC receivership” on a failing SIFI.301  In 
contrast, Dodd-Frank’s post-funded OLF creates a strong incentive 
for regulators to grant forbearance in order to avoid or postpone the 
politically unpopular step of borrowing from the Treasury to finance a 
failed SIFI’s liquidation.302 
To further reduce the potential TBTF subsidy for SIFIs, Congress 
should prevent the DIF, which insures bank deposits, from being used 
to protect nondeposit creditors of SIFIs.  As discussed above, the 
“systemic-risk exception” (SRE) in the FDI Act is a potential source 
of bailout funds for SIFI-owned banks, and those funds could 
indirectly support creditors of SIFIs.303  The FDIC relied on the SRE 
when it jointly agreed with the Treasury Department and the FRB to 
provide more than $400 billion of asset guarantees to Citigroup and 
Bank of America.304  Dodd-Frank now requires the SRE to be 
 
298 Viral V. Acharya et al., Regulating Systemic Risk, in RESTORING FINANCIAL 
STABILITY, supra note 34, at 283, 293–95. 
299 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 762–3; see also Acharya et al., supra note 298, at 293–
95. 
300 Gordon & Muller, supra note 200, at 55. 
301 Id. 
302 Id. at 55–56; see also id. at 41 (contending that Dodd-Frank’s post-funded OLF will 
encourage regulators to “delay putting a troubled financial firm into receivership”). 
303 See supra notes 207–09 and accompanying text. 
304 See Press Release, Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal Reserve and the FDIC on 
Citigroup (Nov. 23, 2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/pres/2008 
/pr08125.html; FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair, Statement on Bank of America Acquisition 
of Merrill Lynch before the House Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform and the 
Subcomm. on Domestic Policy (Dec. 11, 2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news 
/news/speeches/archives/2009/spdec1109.html.  Although the terms of the asset guarantee 
for Bank of America were agreed to in principle, they were never finalized, and the 
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invoked solely in the context of a failed bank receivership.  However, 
the FDIC could still use the SRE in that context to protect the 
creditors of SIFI-owned banks (including, potentially, the parent 
companies of such banks).305 
The DIF should be strictly separated from the systemic resolution 
process to ensure that the DIF cannot be used as a potential source of 
protection for creditors of SIFIs (except for bank depositors).  To 
accomplish that goal, Congress should repeal the SRE and should 
designate the OLF as the exclusive source of future funding for all 
resolutions of failed SIFIs.  By repealing the SRE, Congress would 
ensure that (1) the FDIC must apply the least-cost test in resolving all 
future bank failures,306 (2) the DIF must be used solely to pay the 
claims of bank depositors, and (3) non-deposit creditors of SIFIs 
could no longer view the DIF as a potential source of financial 
support.  By making those changes, Congress would significantly 
reduce the implicit TBTF subsidies currently enjoyed by SIFIs.307 
E.  The Dodd-Frank Act Does Not Prevent Financial Holding 
Companies from Using Federal Safety Net Subsidies to Support Risky 
Nonbanking Activities 
1.  Dodd-Frank Does Not Prevent the Exploitation of Federal Safety 
Net Subsidies 
Dodd-Frank contains three sections that are intended to prevent the 
federal “safety net” for banks308 from being used to support 
speculative nonbanking activities connected to the capital markets.  
As discussed below, none of the three sections adequately insulates 
the federal safety net from potential exposure to significant losses 
arising out of risky nonbanking activities conducted by LCFIs.  The 
 
Treasury Secretary did not formally invoke the SRE for Bank of America.  See FIN. CRISIS 
INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 122, at 32. 
305 See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
306 The least-cost test requires the FDIC to “meet the obligation of the [FDIC] to 
provide insurance coverage for the insured deposits” in a failed bank by using the 
approach that is “least costly to the [DIF].”  12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A)(i), (ii) (2006); see 
also CARNELL ET AL., supra note 118, at 303, 331, 731–32 (discussing the FDIC’s “least-
cost” requirement for resolving bank failures, and noting that the SRE represents the only 
exception to the “least-cost” requirement). 
307 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 764. 
308 The federal “safety net” for banks includes (1) federal deposit insurance, (2) 
protection of uninsured depositors and other uninsured creditors in TBTF banks under the 
SRE, and (3) discount window advances and other liquidity assistance provided by the 
FRB as lender of last resort.  See Wilmarth, supra note 221, at 16 n.39. 
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first provision (the Kanjorski Amendment) is unwieldy and 
constrained by stringent procedural requirements.  The other two 
provisions (the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln Amendment) are 
riddled with loopholes and have long phase-in periods.  In addition, 
the implementation of all three provisions is subject to broad 
regulatory discretion and is therefore likely to be influenced by 
aggressive industry lobbying. 
a.  The Kanjorski Amendment 
Section 121 of Dodd-Frank, the “Kanjorski Amendment,” was 
originally sponsored by Representative Paul Kanjorski (D-PA).309  
Section 121 provides the FRB with potential authority to require large 
BHCs or nonbank SIFIs to divest high-risk operations.  However, the 
FRB may exercise its divestiture authority under section 121 only if 
(1) the BHC or nonbank SIFI “poses a grave threat to the financial 
stability of the United States” and (2) the FRB’s proposed action is 
approved by at least two-thirds of the FSOC’s voting members.310  
Moreover, the FRB may not exercise its divestiture authority unless it 
has previously attempted to “mitigate” the threat posed by the BHC or 
nonbank SIFI by taking several, less drastic remedial measures.311  If, 
and only if, the FRB determines that all of those remedial measures 
are “inadequate to mitigate [the] threat,” the FRB may then exercise 
its residual authority to “require the company to sell or otherwise 
transfer assets or off-balance-sheet items to unaffiliated parties.”312 
The FRB’s divestiture authority under section 121 is thus a last 
resort, and it is restricted by numerous procedural requirements 
 
309 Simon Johnson, Flawed Financial Bill Contains Huge Surprise, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (July 8, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-08/flawed    
-financial-bill-contains-huge-surprise-simon-johnson.html.  Representative Kanjorski was 
the second-ranking Democrat on the House Financial Services Committee.  He lost his bid 
for reelection in November 2010, along with ten other Democratic members of that 
committee.  Donna Borak & Joe Adler, Voters Shake Up the House Financial Services 
Roster, AM. BANKER, Nov. 4, 2010, at 4. 
310 Dodd-Frank Act § 121(a).  The FRB must provide a large BHC (i.e., a BHC with 
assets of $50 billion or more) or a nonbank SIFI with notice and an opportunity for hearing 
before the FRB takes any action under section 121.  Id. § 121(b). 
311 Before the FRB may require a breakup of a large BHC or nonbank SIFI under 
section 121, the FRB must first take all of the following actions with regard to that 
company: (1) imposing limitations on mergers or affiliations, (2) placing restrictions on 
financial products, (3) requiring termination of activities, and (4) imposing conditions on 
the manner of conducting activities.  Dodd-Frank Act § 121(a). 
312 Id. § 121(a)(5); see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 51–52 (2010) (explaining section 
121). 
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(including, most notably, a two-thirds vote by the FSOC). The Bank 
Holding Company Act (BHC Act)313 contains a similar provision, 
under which the FRB can force a BHC to divest a nonbank subsidiary 
that “constitutes a serious risk to the financial safety, soundness or 
stability” of any of the BHC’s banking subsidiaries.314  The FRB may 
exercise its divestiture authority under the BHC Act without the 
concurrence of any other federal agency, and the FRB is not required 
to take any intermediate remedial steps before requiring the 
divestiture.  However, according to a senior Federal Reserve official, 
the FRB’s divestiture authority under the BHC Act “has never been 
successfully used for a major banking organization.”315  In view of 
the much more stringent procedural and substantive constraints on the 
FRB’s authority under the Kanjorski Amendment, the prospects for 
an FRB-ordered breakup of a SIFI seem remote at best. 
b.  The Volcker Rule 
Section 619 of Dodd-Frank, the “Volcker Rule,” was originally 
proposed by former FRB Chairman Paul Volcker, who wanted to stop 
banking organizations from continuing to engage in speculative 
trading activities in the capital markets.316  In January 2010, President 
Obama publicly endorsed the Volcker Rule as a means of rallying 
support for financial regulatory reform after Republican Scott Brown 
won a special election to fill the Massachusetts Senate seat formerly 
held by the late Edward Kennedy.317  As approved by the Senate 
Banking Committee, the Volcker Rule prohibited banks and BHCs 
from (1) sponsoring or investing in hedge funds or private equity 
funds and (2) engaging in proprietary trading (i.e., buying and selling 
securities, derivatives, and other tradable assets for their own 
account).318 
 
313 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–50 (2006). 
314 Id. § 1844(e)(1). 
315 Hoenig, supra note 137, at 4. 
316 Uchitelle, supra note 3 (describing the genesis of the Volcker Rule). 
317 Senator Brown’s surprise election was a major political development because it gave 
the Republicans forty-one seats in the Senate, thereby depriving the Democrats of their 
previous filibuster-proof majority.  R. Christian Bruce, Outlook 2010: Three Days of 
Political Upheaval Jolt Outlook for Financial Regulatory Reform, 94 Banking Rep. 
(BNA) 167 (Jan. 26, 2010); Cheyenne Hopkins, In Shift, Obama Decides Big Is Bad, AM. 
BANKER, Jan. 22, 2010, at 1; Jonathan Weisman, Obama’s Bank Proposal: Policy Pivot 
Followed Months of Wrangling, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2010, at A4. 
318 The Senate committee bill required the FSOC to conduct a study and to make 
recommendations for implementation of the Volcker Rule through regulations to be 
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The Senate committee report explained that the Volcker Rule 
would prevent banks “protected by the federal safety net, which have 
a lower cost of funds, from directing those funds to high-risk uses.”319  
The report endorsed Mr. Volcker’s view that public policy does not 
favor having “public funds—taxpayer funds—protecting and 
supporting essentially proprietary and speculative activities.”320  The 
report further declared that the Volcker Rule was directed at “limiting 
the inappropriate transfer of economic subsidies” by banks and 
“reducing inappropriate conflicts of interest between [banks] and their 
affiliates.”321  Thus, the Senate report argued that deposit insurance 
and other elements of the federal safety net should be used to protect 
depositors and to support traditional banking activities but should not 
be allowed to subsidize speculative capital markets activities.322 
LCFIs strongly opposed the Volcker Rule as approved by the 
Senate committee.323  However, the Volcker Rule—and the Senate’s 
reform bill as a whole—gained significant political momentum from 
two events related to Goldman.  First, the SEC filed a lawsuit on 
April 16, 2010, alleging that Goldman defrauded two institutional 
purchasers of interests in a CDO, designated as “Abacus 2007-AC1,” 
which Goldman structured and marketed in early 2007.  The SEC 
charged that Goldman did not disclose to the CDO’s investors that a 
large hedge fund, Paulson & Co., had helped to select the CDO’s 
 
adopted by the federal banking agencies.  S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 8–9, 90–92; Chris 
Dieterich, Volcker Rule Is Showing Some Staying Power, AM. BANKER, April 13, 2010, at 
1; Alison Vekshin, Dodd’s Financial Overhaul Bill Approved by Senate Banking Panel, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 23, 2010) (article removed from Web site); Mike 
Ferullo, Regulatory Reform: Proprietary Trading Language from Treasury Targets All 
Financial Firms for Restrictions, 94 Banking Rep. (BNA) 459 (Mar. 9, 2010). 
319 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 8–9. 
320 Id. at 91 (quoting testimony by Mr. Volcker).  The report also quoted Mr. Volcker’s 
contention that 
conflicts of interest [are] inherent in the participation of commercial banking 
organizations in proprietary or private investment activity.  . . .  When the bank 
itself is a “customer,” i.e., it is trading for its own account, it will almost 
inevitably find itself, consciously or inadvertently, acting at cross purposes to the 
interests of an unrelated commercial customer of a bank. 
Id. 
321 Id. at 90. 
322 Id. (explaining that the Volcker Rule was intended to “eliminate any economic 
subsidy to high-risk activities that is provided by access to lower-cost capital because of 
participation in the regulatory safety net”). 
323 See Eamon Javers & Victoria McGrane, Chris Dodd Proposal Hits Wall Street 
Hard, POLITICO.COM (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0310/34463 
.html (noting that the Volcker Rule was “hated on Wall Street”). 
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portfolio of RMBS while intending to short the CDO by purchasing 
CDS from Goldman.  The SEC alleged that Goldman knew, and did 
not disclose, that Paulson & Co. had an “economic incentive” to 
select RMBS that it expected to default within the near-term future.  
CRAs downgraded almost all of the RMBS in the CDO’s portfolio 
within nine months after the CDO’s securities were sold to investors.  
The institutional investors in the CDO lost more than $1 billion, while 
Paulson & Co. reaped a corresponding gain.324  Goldman 
subsequently settled the SEC’s lawsuit by paying restitution and 
penalties of $550 million.325 
Second, on April 27, 2010, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Oversight interrogated Goldman’s chairman and several of 
Goldman’s other current and former officers during a highly 
adversarial eleven-hour hearing.  The Subcommittee also released a 
report charging, based on internal Goldman documents, that Goldman 
aggressively sold nonprime, mortgage-backed investments to clients 
in late 2006 and 2007 while Goldman was “making huge and 
profitable bets against the housing market and acting against the 
interest of its clients.”326  The allegations against Goldman presented 
in the SEC’s lawsuit and at the Senate hearing provoked widespread 
public outrage and gave a major political boost to the Volcker Rule 
and the Dodd-Frank legislation as a whole.327 
 
324 Securities and Exchange Comm’n, Litigation Release No. 21,489 (April 16, 2010), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21489.htm. 
325 Goldman did not admit or deny the SEC’s allegations in settling the lawsuit.  
However, Goldman did acknowledge that “the marketing materials for the [CDO] 
contained incomplete information” and that it was a “mistake” to sell the CDO “without 
disclosing the role of Paulson & Co. in the portfolio selection process and that Paulson’s 
economic interests were adverse to CDO investors.”  Litigation Release No. 21592, SEC. 
EXCH. COMM’N (July 15, 2010), http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21592.htm.  
The SEC and Goldman entered into the settlement “just hours after the U.S. Senate passed 
. . . Dodd-Frank,” but SEC Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami “claimed that 
‘absolutely no consideration’ had been given to the political timing of the settlement’s 
announcement.”  R.J. Lehmann, SEC Will Have Goldman’s Help in Other Wall Street 
Investigations, SNL Financial Services Daily, July 16, 2010. 
326 Zachary A. Goldfarb, Goldman Sachs Executives Face Senators Investigating Role 
in Financial Crisis, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2010, at A01; see also Joshua Gallu & Jesse 
Westbrook, Goldman Armed Salespeople to Dump Bonds, E-mails Show (Update 1), 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010  
-04-27/goldman-armed-salespeople-to-dump-bonds-e-mails-show-update1-.html. 
327 Donna Borak & Cheyenne Hopkins, Volcker Ban Bolstered by Goldman 
Allegations, AM. BANKER, Apr. 28, 2010, at 1; Michael J. Moore & Joshua Gallu, 
Goldman Sachs E-mails Spur Democrats to Push Wall Street Rules, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 25, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-25 
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Nevertheless, large financial institutions continued their campaign 
of “lobbying vigorously to weaken the Volcker rule” during the 
conference committee’s deliberations on the final terms of Dodd-
Frank.328  House and Senate Democratic leaders agreed (with the 
Obama Administration’s concurrence) on a last-minute compromise 
that significantly weakened the Volcker Rule and “disappointed” Mr. 
Volcker.329  The compromise inserted exemptions in the Volcker 
Rule that allow banks and BHCs (1) to invest up to three percent of 
their Tier 1 capital in hedge funds or private equity funds (as long as a 
bank’s investments do not exceed three percent of the total ownership 
interests in any single fund), (2) to purchase and sell government 
securities, (3) to engage in “risk-mitigating hedging activities,” (4) to 
make investments through insurance company affiliates, and (5) to 
make small business investment company investments.330  The 
compromise also delayed the Volcker Rule’s effective date so that 
banks and BHCs will have (1) up to seven years after Dodd-Frank’s 
enactment date to bring most of their equity-investing and 
proprietary-trading activities into compliance with the Volcker Rule 
and (2) up to twelve years to bring “illiquid” investments that were 
already in existence on May 1, 2010, into compliance with the 
Rule.331 
Probably the most troublesome aspect of the final Volcker Rule is 
that the Rule fails to establish a clear demarcation between prohibited 
“proprietary trading” and permissible “market making.”  The rule 
 
/goldman-sachs-e-mails-spur-democrats-to-push-wall-street-rules.html; Stacy Kaper, 
Goldman Suit, Wamu Mess Rev Reg Reform, AM. BANKER, Apr. 19, 2010, at 1. 
328 John Cassidy, The Volcker Rule: Obama’s Economic Adviser and His Battles over 
the Financial-Reform Bill, NEW YORKER (July 26, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com 
/reporting/2010/07/26/100726fa_fact_cassidy; see also Yalman Onaran, Volcker Rule 
Attacked as Lawmakers Seek Fund Loophole, BLOOMBERG (June 23, 2010), http://www 
.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-23/volcker-rule-under-attack-as-lawmakers-seek-hedge     
-fund-loophole.html; Eric Dash & Nelson D. Schwartz, In a Final Push, Banking 
Lobbyists Make a Run at Reform Measures, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2010, at B1. 
329 Cassidy, supra note 328.  After reviewing the final terms of the Volcker Rule, Mr. 
Volcker remarked, “I’m a little pained that it doesn’t have the purity I was searching for.”  
Id. 
330 Id.; Christine Harper & Bradley Keoun, Financial Reform: The New Rules Won’t 
Stop the Next Crisis, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, July 6–11, 2010, at 42, 43; Stacy 
Kaper & Cheyenne Hopkins, Key Issues Unresolved as Reform Finishes Up: Fate of 
derivatives, Volcker Rule Still in Limbo in Final Hours, AM. BANKER, June 25, 2010, at 1; 
see also Dodd-Frank Act § 619 (enacting §§ 13(d)(1)(A), (B), (C), (E), (F), (G), & (d)(4) 
of the BHC Act). 
331 Harper & Keoun, supra note 330; see also new § 13(d) of the BHC Act, added by 
Dodd-Frank Act § 619. 
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defines “proprietary trading” as “engaging as a principal for the 
trading account of the banking entity,” while “market making” is 
defined as “[t]he purchase, sale, acquisition, or disposition of 
securities and other instruments . . . on behalf of customers.”332  
Distinguishing between proprietary trading and market making is 
notoriously difficult,333 and analysts expect large Wall Street banks to 
seek to evade the Volcker Rule by shifting their trading operations 
into so-called “client-related businesses.”334  Moreover, the 
parameters of “proprietary trading,” “market making” and other 
ambiguous terms in the Volcker Rule—including the exemption for 
“[r]isk-mitigating hedging activities”335—are yet to be determined.  
Those terms will be defined in regulations to be issued jointly by the 
federal banking regulators, the CFTC, and the SEC after those 
agencies review recommendations contained in a forthcoming FSOC 
study.336 
Mr. Volcker has urged the FSOC to recommend “[c]lear and 
concise definitions [and] firmly worded prohibitions” to carry out 
“the basic intent” of section 619.337  However, LCFIs have already 
deployed their considerable political influence to weaken the Volcker 
Rule, and newly-elected Republican House leaders have declared 
their intention to exercise “aggressive oversight” with respect to the 
Rule’s implementation by federal regulators.338  Given the Volcker 
 
332 Dodd-Frank Act § 619 (enacting new § 13(d)(1)(D) & (h)(4) of the BHC Act). 
333 See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 118, at 130, 528–29 (describing the roles of 
“dealers” (i.e., proprietary traders) and “market makers” and indicating that the two roles 
frequently overlap). 
334 Nelson D. Schwartz & Eric Dash, Despite Reform, Banks Have Room for Risky 
Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2010, at A1; see also Michael Lewis, Proprietary Trading 
Under Cover, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10     
-27/wall-street-proprietary-trading-under-cover-commentary-by-michael-lewis.html; Jia 
Lynn Yang, Major Banks Gird for “Volcker rule,” WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2010, at A08. 
335 Dodd-Frank Act § 619 (adding new § 13(d)(1)(C) of the BHC Act); see also Dash & 
Schwartz, supra note 328 (“[T]raders [on Wall Street] say it will be tricky for regulators to 
define what constitutes a proprietary trade as opposed to a reasonable hedge against 
looming risks.  Therefore, banks might still be able to make big bets by simply classifying 
them differently.”). 
336 Id. (adding new § 13(b) of the BHC Act). 
337 Cheyenne Hopkins, Volcker Wants a Clear, Concise Rule, AM. BANKER, Nov. 3, 
2010, at 3. 
338 Hopkins, supra note 264; Kaper, supra note 264 (reporting that incoming House 
Financial Services Committee Chairman Spencer Bachus sent a letter to FSOC opposing 
any “rigid interpretation” of the Volcker Rule and arguing that regulators should not 
“unfairly disadvantage U.S. financial firms”); Mattingly, supra note 264 (quoting 
Representative Bachus’s statement that House Republicans would use “aggressive 
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Rule’s ambiguous terms and numerous exemptions that rely on 
regulatory interpretation, as well as its long phase-in period, 
commentators have concluded that the rule probably will not have a 
significant impact in restraining risk taking by major banks or in 
preventing them from exploiting their safety net subsidies to fund 
speculative activities.339 
c.  The Lincoln Amendment 
Section 726 of Dodd-Frank, the “Lincoln Amendment,” was 
originally sponsored by Senator Blanche Lincoln (D-AR).340  In April 
2010, Senator Lincoln, as chair of the Senate Agriculture Committee, 
included the Lincoln Amendment in derivatives reform legislation, 
which was passed by the Agriculture Committee and subsequently 
combined with the Senate Banking Committee’s regulatory reform 
bill.  As adopted by the Agriculture Committee, the Lincoln 
Amendment would have barred dealers in swaps and other OTC 
derivatives from receiving assistance from the DIF or from the Fed’s 
discount window or other emergency lending facilities.341 
Senator Lincoln designed the provision to force major banks to 
“spin off their derivatives operations” in order “to prevent a situation 
in which a bank’s derivatives deals failed and forced taxpayers to bail 
 
oversight” to influence the implementation of the Volcker Rule and other provisions of 
Dodd-Frank).  Cf. Cassidy, supra note 328 (quoting the statement of Anthony Dowd, Mr. 
Volcker’s personal assistant, that the financial services industry deployed “fifty-four 
lobbying firms and three hundred million dollars . . . against us” during congressional 
consideration of Dodd-Frank). 
339 Cassidy, supra note 328 (stating that “[w]ithout the legislative purity that Volcker 
was hoping for, enforcing his rule will be difficult, and will rely on many of the same 
regulators who did such a poor job the last time around”); Harper & Keoun, supra note 
330, at 43 (quoting the comment of William T. Winters, former co-chief executive officer 
of Chase’s investment bank, that “I don’t think [the Volcker Rule] will have any impact at 
all on most banks”); Johnson, supra note 309 (stating that the Volcker Rule was 
“negotiated down to almost nothing”); Bradley Keoun & Dawn Kopecki, Bank of 
America, JPMorgan Lead Bank Shares of Reform Deal, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(June 25, 2010), http://www .businessweek.com/news/2010-06-25/bank-of-america           
-jpmorgan-lead-bank-shares-on-reform-deal.html (quoting analyst Nancy Bush’s view that 
the final compromise on the Volcker Rule meant that “the largest banks’ operations are 
largely left intact”). 
340 Harper & Keoun, supra note 330, at 43; Johnson, supra note 309. 
341 Richard Hill, Derivatives: Lincoln Derivatives Language Recommended by Ag 
Panel: Merger with Dodd Bill Expected, 42 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 810 (April 26, 
2010). 
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out the institution.”342  The Lincoln Amendment was “also an effort 
to crack down on the possibility that banks would use cheaper 
funding provided by deposits insured by the FDIC, to subsidize their 
trading activities.”343  Thus, the purposes of the Lincoln 
Amendment—to insulate banks from the risks of speculative activities 
and to prevent the spread of safety net subsidies—were similar to the 
objectives of the Volcker Rule, but the Lincoln Amendment focused 
on dealing and trading in derivatives instead of all types of 
proprietary trading.344 
Senator Lincoln’s decision to sponsor the provision was reportedly 
motivated in part by her involvement in a difficult primary election, in 
which some liberal groups criticized her for being too close to Wall 
Street.345  Senator Lincoln’s sponsorship of a “spinoff requirement” 
for bank derivatives dealers was eagerly applauded by consumer 
advocates and was also endorsed by Senator Maria Cantwell as a 
“stare-down of Wall Street interests.”346  Senator Lincoln prevailed in 
her primary election on June 8, 2010, a victory that “bolstered” her 
political leverage to fight for passage of the Lincoln Amendment.347  
However, Senator Lincoln’s Amendment and her support for Dodd-
Frank alienated bankers and may have contributed to her defeat in the 
November general election.348 
 
342 Richard Hill, Derivatives: Conferees Reach Compromise: Banks Could Continue to 
Trade Some Derivatives, 42 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1234 (June 28, 2010); see also 
Hill, supra note 341. 
343 Robert Schmidt & Phil Mattingly, Banks Would Be Forced to Push Out Derivative 
Trading Under Plan, BLOOMBERG (April 14, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com 
/news/2010-04-15/banks-would-be-forced-to-push-out-derivative-trading-under-plan.html. 
344 Cf. Cassidy, supra note 328. 
After Senator Blanche Lincoln . . . put forward an amendment that would force 
the big banks to move their derivatives-trading desks into separate subsidiaries 
backed by more capital, Volcker wrote a letter to [Senator] Dodd saying that 
such a move was unnecessary, providing that the Merkley-Levin amendment 
[which embodied a strict version of the Volcker Rule] was enacted. 
Id. 
345 See Phil Mattingly & Robert Schmidt, How ‘Hard to Fathom’ Derivatives Rule 
Emerged in U.S. Senate, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 6, 2010), http://www 
.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-06/how-hard-to-fathom-derivatives-rule-emerged-in-u-s 
-senate.html. 
346 Kaper & Hopkins, supra note 330; Mattingly & Schmidt, supra note 345. 
347 Kaper & Hopkins, supra note 330. 
348 Seth Blomley, Boozman Trounces Senate’s Lincoln, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE 
(Little Rock), Nov. 3, 2010 (reporting that Republican John Boozman, who defeated 
Senator Lincoln, campaigned against her for supporting federal health-care legislation as 
well as “the federal economic-stimulus package and banking regulatory changes”); Stacy 
WILMARTH 4/6/2011  11:07 AM 
1032 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89, 951 
The Lincoln Amendment “engendered tremendous pushback . . . 
from Republicans, fellow Democrats, the White House, banking 
regulators, and Wall Street interests.”349  Large banks claimed that 
the provision would require them to provide more than $100 billion of 
additional capital to organize separate derivatives trading 
subsidiaries.350  A prominent industry analyst opined that the 
provision “eliminates all of the advantages of the affiliation with an 
insured depository institution, which are profound.”351  Those 
statements reflected the fact that, as discussed below, bank dealers in 
OTC derivatives enjoy significant competitive advantages over 
nonbank dealers due to the banks’ explicit and implicit safety net 
subsidies.352  The Lincoln Amendment was specifically intended to 
remove those advantages and to force major banks to conduct their 
derivatives trading operations without reliance on federal 
subsidies.353 
In addition to broad opposition from Republicans (with the 
prominent exceptions of Senators Charles Grassley and Olympia 
Snowe), the Lincoln Amendment encountered intense opposition 
from the “New Democrats” of moderate House Democrats, especially 
those from New York who claimed that the provision would drive a 
significant portion of the derivatives trading business out of New 
York City and into foreign financial centers.354  As was also true with 
 
Kaper, Election 2010: Reshaping of Senate Panel Is a Certainty, AM. BANKER, Sept. 9, 
2010, at 1 (reporting that Arkansas bankers were unhappy with Senator Lincoln’s vote for 
Dodd-Frank, and they also felt that she “supported amendments that made the bill worse in 
our mind” (quoting Charles Miller, chief lobbyist for the Arkansas Bankers Association)). 
349 Hill, supra note 342; see also Kaper & Hopkins, supra note 330 (“Banks have 
vigorously opposed the Lincoln amendment, arguing it would cost them billions of dollars 
to spin off their derivatives units.  Regulators, too, have argued against the provision, 
saying it would drive derivatives trades overseas or underground, where they would not be 
regulated.”). 
350 Agnes Crane & Rolfe Winkler, Reuters Breakingviews: Systemic Risk Knows No 
Borders, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2010, at B2. 
351 Schmidt & Mattingly, supra note 343 (quoting Karen Petrou). 
352 See infra notes 407–10 and accompanying text. 
353 Schmidt & Mattingly, supra note 343; see also Crane & Winkler, supra note 350 
(“Senator Blanche Lincoln . . . says that there should be a clear division between banking 
activities that the government should support or at least provide liquidity to, and riskier 
business that it should not.”). 
354 See Devlin Barrett & Damien Paletta, A Fight to the Wire as Pro-Business 
Democrats Dig In on Derivatives, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2010, http://online.wsj.com 
/article/SB10001424052748704569204575329222524350534.html; Phil Mattingly, House 
Democrats Target Senator Lincoln’s Swap Proposal for Banking Bill, BLOOMBERG (May 
24, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-24/house-democrats-target-senator   
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the Volcker Rule, the Obama Administration negotiated a last-minute 
compromise that significantly weakened the Lincoln Amendment.355  
As enacted, the Lincoln Amendment allows an FDIC-insured bank to 
act as a swaps dealer with regard to (1) “[h]edging and other similar 
risk mitigating activities directly related to the [bank’s] activities”; (2) 
swaps involving interest rates, currency rates, and other “reference 
assets that are permissible for investment by a national bank,” 
including gold and silver but not other types of metals, energy, or 
agricultural commodities; and (3) credit default swaps that are cleared 
pursuant to Dodd-Frank and carry investment-grade ratings.356  In 
addition, the Lincoln Amendment allows banks up to five years to 
divest or spin off nonconforming derivatives operations into separate 
affiliates.357 
Analysts estimate that the compromised Lincoln Amendment will 
require major banks to spin off only 10-20% of their existing 
derivatives activities into separate affiliates.358  In addition, banks 
will able to argue for retention of derivatives that are used for 
“hedging” purposes, an open-ended standard that will require 
elaboration by regulators.359  As in the case of the Volcker Rule, 
commentators concluded that the Lincoln Amendment was “greatly 
diluted,”360 “significantly weakened,”361 and “watered down,”362 
 
-lincoln-s-swaps-proposal-for-banking-bill.html; Edward Wyatt & David M. Herszenhorn, 
Accord Reached for an Overhaul of Finance Rules, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2010, at A1. 
355 See Barrett & Paletta, supra note 354; David Cho et al., Lawmakers Guide Wall 
Street Reform into Homestretch: Industry Left Largely Intact, WASH. POST, June 26, 2010, 
at A1; see also supra notes 329–31 and accompanying text (discussing the last-minute 
compromise that weakened the Volcker Rule). 
356 Dodd-Frank Act § 716(d); see also Hill, supra note 342; Heather Landy, Derivatives 
Compromise Is All About Enforcement, AM. BANKER, June 30, 2010, at 1; Wyatt & 
Herszenhorn, supra note 354.  It is highly ironic that Congress chose to rely on credit 
ratings as a reliable basis for exempting CDS from the Lincoln Amendment.  Congress 
declared in section 931(5) of Dodd-Frank that inaccurate credit ratings on structured 
financial products “contributed significantly to the mismanagement of risks by financial 
institutions and investors, which in turn adversely impacted the health of the economy in 
the United States and around the world.”  Dodd-Frank Act § 931(5); see also supra Part 
III.B. (describing conflicts of interest that encouraged CRAs to assign inaccurate and 
misleading credit ratings to structured financial products). 
357 See Dodd-Frank Act § 716(h) (providing that the Lincoln Amendment will take 
effect two years after Dodd-Frank’s effective date); id. § 716(f) (permitting up to three 
additional years for banks to divest or cease nonconforming derivatives operations). 
358 Harper & Keoun, supra note 330; Smith & Lucchetti, supra note 260. 
359 Wyatt & Herszenhorn, supra note 354. 
360 Johnson, supra note 309. 
361 Hill, supra note 342 (quoting the Consumer Federation of America). 
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with the result that “the largest banks’ [derivatives] operations are 
largely left intact.”363 
The requirement that banks must clear their trades of CDS to be 
exempt from the Lincoln Amendment is potentially significant, in 
view of the new clearing requirements set forth in other provisions of 
Dodd-Frank.364  However, there is no clearing requirement for other 
derivatives (e.g., interest and currency rate swaps) that reference 
assets permissible for investment by national banks (“bank-eligible” 
derivatives).  Consequently, banks may continue to trade and deal in 
OTC derivatives (except for CDS) without any interference from the 
Lincoln Amendment, as long as those derivatives are bank-eligible.365  
As discussed above, all “proprietary trading” by banks in derivatives 
must also comply with the Volcker Rule as implemented by 
regulators.366 
2.  Banks Controlled by Financial Holding Companies Should 
Operate as “Narrow Banks” so That They Cannot Transfer Their 
Federal Safety Net Subsidies to Their Nonbank Affiliates 
A fundamental purpose of both the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln 
Amendment is to prevent LCFIs from using the federal safety net 
subsidies to support their speculative activities in the capital markets.  
As enacted, however, both provisions have numerous gaps and 
exemptions that undermine their stated purpose.367  Given the greatly 
 
362 Smith & Lucchetti, supra note 260. 
363 Keoun & Kopecki, supra note 339 (quoting analyst Nancy Bush). 
364 Title VII of Dodd-Frank establishes comprehensive clearing, reporting, and margin 
requirements for a wide range of derivatives.  See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 29–35, 92–101 
(2010) (discussing Title VII as proposed in the Senate committee bill); Alison Vekshin & 
Phil Mattingly, Lawmakers Reach Compromise on Finanical Regulation, BLOOMBERG 
(June 25, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-25/lawmakers-reach                
-compromise-on-financial-regulation.html (summarizing Title VII as approved by the 
House-Senate conference committee).  A detailed analysis of Title VII is beyond the scope 
of this Article.  Major financial institutions have already engaged in heavy lobbying to 
influence the adoption of regulations that will implement Title VII.  See Asjylyn Loder & 
Phil Mattingly, Wall Street Lobbyists Besiege CFTC to Shape Derivatives Rules, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-14/wall-street     
-lobbyists-besiege-cftc-to-influence-regulations-on-derivatives.html. 
365 Dodd-Frank Act § 716(d)(2); see also Andrew Leonard, How the World Works: The 
Dodd-Frank Bank Reform Bill: A Deeply Flawed Success, SALON.COM (June 25, 2010), 
http://www.salon.com/technology/how_the_world_works/2010/06/25/the_dodd_frank 
_bank_reform_bill. 
366 See supra Part V.D.1.b. 
367 See supra Part V.D.1.b & 1.c. 
WILMARTH 4/6/2011  11:07 AM 
2011] The Dodd-Frank Act 1035 
weakened versions of both statutes, Paul Volcker was undoubtedly 
correct when he said that the Dodd-Frank legislation “went from what 
is best to what could be passed.”368 
As shown below, the most effective way to prevent the spread of 
federal safety net subsidies from banks to their affiliates involved in 
the capital markets would be to create a two-tiered structure of bank 
regulation and deposit insurance.  The first tier of “traditional” 
banking organizations would provide a relatively broad range of 
banking-related services, but those organizations would not be 
allowed to engage (or affiliate with firms that are engaged) in 
securities underwriting or dealing, insurance underwriting, or 
derivatives dealing or trading.  In contrast, the second tier of “narrow 
banks” could affiliate with “nontraditional” financial conglomerates 
engaged in capital markets activities (except for private equity 
investments).  However, as described below, “narrow banks” would 
be prohibited from making any extensions of credit or other transfers 
of funds to their nonbank affiliates, with the exception of lawful 
dividends paid to their parent holding companies.  The “narrow bank” 
approach provides the most feasible approach for ensuring that banks 
cannot transfer their safety net subsidies to affiliated companies 
engaged in speculative activities in the capital markets, and it is 
therefore clearly superior to both the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln 
Amendment.369 
a.  The First Tier of Traditional Banking Organizations 
Under my proposal, the first tier of regulated banking firms would 
be “traditional” banking organizations that limit their activities 
(including the activities of all holding company affiliates) to lines of 
business that satisfy the “closely related to banking” test under 
 
368 Uchitelle, supra note 3 (quoting Mr. Volcker). 
369 The following discussion of my proposal for a two-tiered structure of bank 
regulation and deposit insurance is adapted from Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 764–79.  I am 
indebted to Robert Litan for a number of the concepts incorporated in my two-tiered 
proposal.  See generally ROBERT E. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS DO? 164–89 (1987).  
For additional works favoring the use of “narrow banks” to achieve a strict separation 
between banking institutions and affiliates engaged in capital markets operations, see 
Emilios Avgouleas, The Reform of ‘Too Big-to-Fail’ Bank: A New Regulatory Model for 
the Institutional Separation of ‘Casino’ from ‘Utility’ Banking (Feb. 14, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1552970; Kay, supra note 
144, at 39–92; Ronnie J. Phillips & Alessandro Roselli, How to Avoid the Next Taxpayer 
Bailout of the Financial System: The Narrow Banking Proposal (Networks Fin. Inst., 
Pol’y Brief 2009-PB-05, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1459065. 
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Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act.370  For example, this first tier of 
traditional banks could take deposits, make loans, offer fiduciary 
services, and act as agents in selling securities, mutual funds, and 
insurance products underwritten by non-affiliated firms.  
Additionally, they could underwrite and deal solely in “bank-eligible” 
securities that national banks are permitted to underwrite and deal in 
directly.371  First-tier banking organizations could also purchase, as 
end users, derivatives that (1) hedge against their own firm-specific 
risks and (2) qualify for hedging treatment under Financial 
Accounting Standard (FAS) Statement No. 133.372 
Most first-tier banking firms would probably be small and midsize 
community-oriented banks, because those banks have shown little 
interest in engaging in insurance underwriting, securities underwriting 
or dealing, derivatives dealing or trading, or other capital markets 
activities.  Community banks are well positioned to continue their 
traditional business of attracting core deposits, providing relationship 
loans to consumers and to small and midsize businesses, and offering 
wealth management and other fiduciary services to local 
customers.373  First-tier banks and their holding companies should 
continue to operate under their current supervisory arrangements, and 
all deposits of first-tier banks (up to the current statutory maximum of 
$250,000374) should be covered by deposit insurance. 
In order to provide reasonable flexibility to first-tier banking 
organizations, Congress should amend section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act 
by permitting the FRB to expand the list of “closely related” activities 
that are permissible for holding company affiliates of traditional 
banks.375  However, Congress should prohibit first-tier BHCs from 
 
370 See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (2006); CARNELL ET AL., supra note 118, at 442–44 
(describing “closely related to banking” activities that are permissible for nonbank 
subsidiaries of BHCs under § 4(c)(8)). 
371 See Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 225, 225–26 n.30 (discussing “bank-eligible” 
securities that national banks are authorized to underwrite or purchase or sell for their own 
account); CARNELL ET AL., supra note 118, at 132–34 (same). 
372 See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 766. 
373 For a discussion of the business strategies typically followed by community banks, 
see Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 268–72. 
374 Dodd-Frank Act § 335(a) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) to increase 
permanently the “standard maximum deposit insurance amount” to $250,000). 
375 Unfortunately, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 prohibits the FRB 
from approving any new “closely related” activities for bank holding companies under 
section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act.  See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 118, at 444 (explaining 
that the GLBA does not permit the FRB to expand the list of permissible activities under 
section 4(c)(8) beyond the activities that were approved as of November 11, 1999).  
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engaging as principal in underwriting or dealing in securities, 
underwriting any type of insurance (except for credit insurance), 
dealing or trading in derivatives, or making private equity 
investments. 
b.  The Second Tier of Nontraditional Banking Organizations 
Unlike first-tier banking firms, the second tier of “nontraditional” 
banking organizations would be allowed, through nonbank 
subsidiaries, to engage in (1) underwriting and dealing (i.e., 
proprietary trading) in “bank-ineligible” securities,376 (2) 
underwriting all types of insurance, and (3) dealing and trading in 
derivatives.  Second-tier banking organizations would include (1) 
FHCs registered under sections 4(k) and 4(l) of the BHC Act,377 (2) 
holding companies owning grandfathered “nonbank banks,” and (3) 
grandfathered “unitary thrift” holding companies.378  In addition, 
firms controlling industrial banks should be required either to register 
as FHCs or to divest their ownership of such banks if they cannot 
comply with the BHC Act’s prohibition against commercial 
activities.379  Second-tier holding companies would thus encompass 
 
Congress should revise section 4(c)(8) by authorizing the FRB to approve a limited range 
of new activities that are “closely related” to the traditional banking functions of accepting 
deposits, extending credit, discounting negotiable instruments, and providing fiduciary 
services.  See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 767. 
376 See Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 219–20, 225–26 n.30, 318–20 (discussing the 
distinction between (1) “bank-eligible” securities, which banks may underwrite and deal in 
directly, and (2) “bank-ineligible” securities, which affiliates of banks—but not banks 
themselves—may underwrite and deal in under GLBA). 
377 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k), (l) (2006); see also CARNELL ET AL., supra note 118, at 467–
70 (describing “financial” activities, such as securities underwriting and dealing and 
insurance underwriting, that are authorized for FHCs under the BHC Act, as amended by 
GLBA). 
378 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and 
Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1569–71, 1584–86 (2007) (explaining that (1) during 
the 1980s and 1990s, many securities firms, life insurers, and industrial firms used the 
“nonbank bank” loophole or the “unitary thrift” loophole to acquire FDIC-insured 
institutions, and (2) those loopholes were closed to new acquisitions by a 1987 statute and 
by GLBA, respectively). 
379 Industrial banks are exempted from treatment as “banks” under the BHC Act.  See 
12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H).  As a result, the BHC Act allows commercial (i.e., 
nonfinancial) firms to retain their existing ownership of industrial banks.  However, Dodd-
Frank imposes a three-year moratorium on the authority of federal regulators to approve 
any new acquisitions of industrial banks by commercial firms.  Dodd-Frank Act § 603(a).  
In addition, Dodd-Frank requires the GAO to conduct a study and report to Congress on 
whether commercial firms should be permanently barred from owning industrial banks.  
Id. § 603(b); see also Wilmarth, supra note 378, at 1543–44, 1554–1620 (arguing that 
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all of the largest banking organizations—most of which are heavily 
engaged in capital markets activities—as well as other financial 
conglomerates that control FDIC-insured depository institutions. 
(i) Congress Should Require a “Narrow Bank” Structure for Second-
Tier Banks 
Under my proposal, FDIC-insured banks that are subsidiaries of 
second-tier holding companies would be required to operate as 
“narrow banks.”  The purpose of the narrow bank structure would be 
to prevent a “nontraditional” second-tier holding company from 
transferring the benefits of the bank’s federal safety net subsidies to 
its nonbank affiliates. 
Narrow banks could offer FDIC-insured deposit accounts, 
including checking and savings accounts and certificates of deposit.  
Narrow banks would hold all of their assets in the form of cash and 
marketable, short-term debt obligations, including qualifying 
government securities; highly rated commercial paper; and other 
liquid, short-term debt instruments that are eligible for investment by 
money market mutual funds (MMMFs) under the SEC’s rules.380  
Narrow banks could not hold any other types of loans or investments, 
nor could they accept any uninsured deposits.  Narrow banks would 
present a very small risk to the DIF because (1) each narrow bank’s 
noncash assets would consist solely of short-term securities that could 
be “marked to market” on a daily basis and the FDIC could therefore 
readily determine whether a narrow bank was threatened with 
insolvency and (2) the FDIC could promptly convert a narrow bank’s 
assets into cash if the FDIC decided to liquidate the bank and pay off 
the claims of its insured depositors.381 
 
Congress should prohibit commercial firms from owning industrial banks because such 
ownership (1) undermines the long-established U.S. policy of separating banking and 
commerce, (2) threatens to spread federal safety net subsidies to the commercial sector of 
the U.S. economy, (3) threatens the solvency of the DIF, (4) creates competitive inequities 
between commercial firms that own industrial banks and other commercial firms, and (5) 
increases the likelihood of federal bailouts of commercial companies). 
380 See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS: 
MONEY MARKET FUND REFORM OPTIONS (2010) [hereinafter PWGFM-MMF REPORT], 
at 7–8 (describing restrictions imposed by the SEC’s Rule 2a-7 on the investments and 
other assets that MMMFs may hold), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center 
/press-releases/Documents/10.21%20PWG%20Report%20Final.pdf. 
381 See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 768; Kenneth E. Scott, Deposit Insurance and Bank 
Regulation: The Policy Choices, 44 BUS. LAWYER 907, 921–22, 928–29 (1989). 
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Thus, narrow banks would effectively operate as FDIC-insured 
MMMFs.  To prevent unfair competition with narrow banks, and to 
avoid future government bailouts of uninsured MMMFs, MMMFs 
should be prohibited from representing, either explicitly or implicitly, 
that they will redeem their shares based on a “constant net asset 
value” (NAV) of $1 per share.382  Currently, the MMMF industry, 
which manages about $3 trillion of assets, leads investors to believe 
that their funds will be available for withdrawal (redemption) based 
on “a stable price of $1 per share.”383  Not surprisingly, “the $1 share 
price gives investors the false impression that money-market funds 
are like [FDIC-insured] banks accounts and can’t lose money.”384  
However, “[t]hat myth was shattered in 2008” when Lehman’s default 
on its commercial paper caused Reserve Primary Fund (a large 
MMMF that invested heavily in Lehman’s paper) to suffer large 
losses and to “break the buck.”385  Reserve Primary Fund’s inability 
to redeem its shares based on a NAV of $1 per share caused an 
investor panic that precipitated runs on several MMMFs.  The 
Treasury Department responded by establishing the Money Market 
Fund Guarantee Program (MMFGP), which protected investors in 
participating MMMFs between October 2008 and September 2009.386 
Critics of MMMFs maintain that the Treasury’s MMFGP has 
created an expectation of similar government bailouts if MMMFs 
 
382 Cf. Daisy Maxey, Money Funds Exhale After New SEC Rules, but Should They?, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2010, at C9 (describing the SEC’s adoption of new rules governing 
MMMFs and reporting on concerns expressed by representatives of the MMMF industry 
that the SEC might someday force the industry to adopt a “floating NAV” in place of the 
industry’s current practice of quoting a constant NAV of $1 per share). 
383 David Reilly, Goldman Sachs Wimps Out in Buck-Breaking Brawl, BLOOMBERG 
(Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-02-02/goldman-sachs-wimps-out   
-in-buck-breaking-brawl-david-reilly.html. 
384 Id.; see also Kay, supra note 144, at 65 (arguing that an MMMF with a constant 
NAV of $1 per share “either confuses consumers or creates an expectation of government 
guarantee”). 
385 Reilly, supra note 383; see also Christopher Condon, Volcker Says Money-Market 
Funds Weaken U.S. Financial System, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 25, 2009), http://www 
.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5O9Upz5e0Qc. 
386 Reilly, supra note 383 (describing “panic” that occurred among investors in 
MMMFs after Lehman’s collapse forced the Reserve Primary Fund to “break the buck”); 
Malini Manickavasagam, Mutual Funds: Citing Stability, Treasury Allows Expiration of 
Money Market Fund Guarantee Program, 93 Banking Rep. (BNA) 508 (Sept. 22, 2009) 
(reporting that “[t]o prevent other money market funds from meeting the Reserve fund’s 
fate, Treasury launched its [MMFGP] in October 2008” and continued that program until 
September 18, 2009); see also PWGFM-MMF REPORT, supra note 380, at 8–13 
(discussing support provided by the Treasury and the FRB in order to stop the “run” by 
investors on MMMFs following Lehman’s collapse in September 2008). 
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“break the buck” in the future.387  In addition, former FRB chairman 
Paul Volcker has argued that MMMFs weaken banks because of their 
ability to offer bank-like products without equivalent regulation.  
MMMFs typically offer accounts with check-writing features, and 
they provide returns to investors that are higher than bank checking 
accounts because MMMFs do not have to pay FDIC insurance 
premiums or comply with other bank regulations.388  A Group of 
Thirty report, which Mr. Volcker spearheaded, proposed that 
MMMFs “that want to offer bank-like services, such as checking 
accounts and withdrawals at $1 a share, should reorganize as a type of 
bank, with appropriate supervision and government insurance.”389  In 
contrast, MMMFs that do not wish to operate as banks “should not 
maintain the implicit promise that investors’ money is always safe” 
and should be required to base their redemption price on a floating 
NAV.390 
 
387 Jane Bryant Quinn, Money Funds Are Ripe for ‘Radical Surgery,’ BLOOMBERG 
(July 28, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid 
=a6iLSlGSSoFo; see also Reilly, supra note 383 (arguing that the failure of federal 
authorities to reform the regulation of MMMFs “creates the possibility of future market 
runs and the need for more government bailouts”); PWGFM-MMF REPORT, supra note 
380, at 17 (warning that “if further measures to insulate the [MMMF] industry from 
systemic risk are not taken before the next liquidity crisis, market participants will likely 
expect that the government would provide emergency support at minimal cost for 
[MMMFs] during the next crisis”). 
388 Condon, supra note 385; Quinn, supra note 387 (“Banks have to hold reserves 
against demand deposits and pay for [FDIC] insurance” while “[m]oney funds offer 
similar transaction accounts without being burdened by these costs.  That’s why they 
usually offer higher interest rates than banks.”). 
389 Quinn, supra note 387 (summarizing recommendation presented in a January 2009 
report by the Group of Thirty); see also GRP. OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 29 (2009) (recommending that “[m]oney market 
mutual funds wishing to continue to offer bank-like services, such as transaction account 
services, withdrawals on demand at par, and assurances of maintaining a stable net asset 
value (NAV) at par, should be required to reorganize as special-purpose banks, with 
appropriate prudential regulation and supervision, government insurance, and access to 
central bank lender-of-last resort facilities” (Recommendation 3.a.)). 
390 Quinn, supra note 387 (summarizing recommendation of Group of Thirty); see also 
GRP. OF THIRTY, supra note 389, at 29 (Recommendation 3.b., stating that MMMFs 
“should be clearly differentiated from federally insured instruments offered by banks” and 
should base their pricing on “a fluctuating NAV”); Reilly, supra note 383 (supporting the 
Group of Thirty’s recommendation that MMMFs “either use floating values—and so 
prepare investors for the idea that these instruments can lose money—or be regulated as if 
they are bank products”); Kay, supra note 144, at 65 (similarly arguing that “[i]t is 
important to create very clear blue water between deposits, subject to government 
guarantee, and [uninsured MMMFs], which may be subject to market fluctuation”). 
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For the above reasons, uninsured MMMFs should be prohibited 
from representing, either explicitly or implicitly, that they will redeem 
shares based on a stable NAV.  If Congress imposed this prohibition 
on MMMFs and also adopted my proposal for a two-tiered structure 
of bank regulation, many MMMFs would probably reorganize as 
FDIC-insured narrow banks and would become subsidiaries of 
second-tier FHCs.391  As noted above, my proposed rules restricting 
the assets of narrow banks to commercial paper, government 
securities, and other types of marketable, highly-liquid investments 
should protect the DIF from any significant loss if a narrow bank 
failed.392 
(ii) Four Additional Rules Would Prevent Narrow Banks from 
Transferring the Benefits of Their Safety Net Subsidies to Their 
Affiliates 
Four supplemental rules are needed to prevent second-tier holding 
companies from exploiting their narrow banks’ safety net subsidies.  
First, narrow banks should be absolutely prohibited—without any 
possibility of a regulatory waiver—from making any extensions of 
credit or other transfers of funds to their affiliates, except for the 
payment of lawful dividends out of profits to their parent holding 
companies.393  Currently, transactions between FDIC-insured banks 
and their affiliates are restricted by sections 23A and 23B of the 
Federal Reserve Act.394  However, the FRB repeatedly waived those 
restrictions during recent financial crises.  The FRB’s waivers 
allowed bank subsidiaries of FHCs to provide extensive support to 
affiliated securities broker-dealers and MMMFs.  By granting those 
waivers, the FRB enabled banks controlled by FHCs to transfer to 
 
391 See Quinn, supra note 387 (describing strong opposition by Paul Schott Stevens, 
Chairman of the Investment Company Institute (the trade association representing the 
mutual fund industry), against any rule requiring uninsured MMMFs to quote floating 
NAVs because “[i]nvestors seeking guaranteed safety and soundness would migrate back 
to banks” and “[t]he remaining funds would become less attractive because of their 
fluctuating price”); see also PWGFM-MMF REPORT, supra note 380, at 32–35 (discussing 
potential advantages and logistical challenges that could result from adopting the Group of 
Thirty’s proposal to require MMMFs with stable NAVs to reorganize and operate as 
regulated banks). 
392 See supra notes 380–81 and accompanying text. 
393 Scott, supra note 381, at 929; Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 771–72. 
394 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1 (2006). 
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their nonbank affiliates the safety net subsidy provided by the banks’ 
low-cost, FDIC-insured deposits.395 
Dodd-Frank limits the authority of the FRB to issue orders or rules 
granting future waivers or exemptions under sections 23A and 23B 
because it requires the FRB to act with the concurrence of the OCC 
and the FDIC (with respect to waivers granted by orders for national 
banks) or the FDIC alone (with respect to waivers granted by orders 
for state banks or exemptions granted by regulation for any type of 
bank).396  Even so, it is unlikely that the OCC or the FDIC would 
refuse to concur with the FRB’s proposal for a waiver under 
conditions of financial stress.  Accordingly, Dodd-Frank does not 
ensure that the restrictions on affiliate transactions in sections 23A 
and 23B will be adhered to in a crisis setting. 
In contrast, my proposal for second-tier narrow banks would 
replace sections 23A and 23B with an absolute rule.  That rule would 
completely prohibit any extensions of credit or other transfers of 
funds by second-tier banks to their nonbank affiliates (except for 
lawful dividends paid to parent holding companies).  That rule would 
also bar federal regulators from approving any such transactions 
between narrow banks and their nonbank affiliates.  An absolute bar 
on affiliate transactions is necessary to prevent either LCFIs or federal 
regulators from using the low-cost funding advantages of FDIC-
insured banks to provide backdoor bailouts to nonbank affiliates. 
Second, as discussed above, Congress should repeal the “systemic 
risk exception” (SRE) currently included in the FDI Act.  By 
repealing the SRE, Congress would require the FDIC to follow the 
 
395 Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 456–57, 472–73 (discussing the FRB’s waiver of 
section 23A restrictions so major banks could make large loans to their securities affiliates 
following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001); Ashcraft et al., supra note 214, at 
563–64, 564 n.22, 575 n.34 (explaining that, after the subprime financial crisis began in 
August 2007, the FRB granted exemptions from section 23A restrictions to six major U.S. 
and foreign banks—Bank of America, Citigroup, Chase, Barclays, Deutsche, and RBS—
so those banks could provide loans to support their securities affiliates); Transactions 
Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates: Exemption for Certain Purchases of Asset-
Backed Commercial Paper by a Member Bank from an Affiliate, 74 Fed. Reg. 6226 (Feb. 
6, 2009) (adopting rules to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 223.42(o), 223.56(a)) (announcing 
the FRB’s approval of blanket waivers of sections 23A and 23B to “increase the capacity” 
of banks to purchase ABCP from affiliated MMMFs, and declaring that such waivers—
which were originally granted in September 2008—were justified “[i]n light of ongoing 
dislocations in the financial markets, and the impact of such dislocations on the 
functioning of ABCP markets and on the operation of [MMMFs]”). 
396 Dodd-Frank Act § 608(a)(4) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 371c(f)); id. § 608(b)(6) 
(amending 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1(e)(2)). 
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least costly resolution procedure for every failed bank, and the FDIC 
could no longer rely on the TBTF policy as a justification for 
protecting uninsured creditors of a failed bank or its nonbank 
affiliates.397 
Repealing the SRE would ensure that the DIF could not be used to 
support a bailout of uninsured creditors of a failed or failing SIFI.  
Removing the SRE from the FDIA would make clear to the financial 
markets that the DIF could be used only to protect depositors of failed 
banks.  Uninsured creditors of SIFIs and their nonbank subsidiaries 
would therefore have stronger incentives to monitor the financial 
operations and condition of such entities.398 
Additionally, a repeal of the SRE would mean that smaller banks 
would no longer bear any part of the cost of protecting uninsured 
creditors of TBTF banks.399  Under current law, all FDIC-insured 
banks must pay a special assessment (allocated in proportion to their 
total assets) to reimburse the FDIC for the cost of protecting 
uninsured claimants of a TBTF bank under the SRE.400  A 2000 FDIC 
report noted the unfairness of expecting smaller banks to help pay for 
“systemic risk” bailouts when “it is virtually inconceivable that they 
would receive similar treatment if distressed.”401  The FDIC report 
suggested that the way to correct this inequity is “to remove the 
[SRE],”402 as I have proposed here. 
Third, second-tier narrow banks should be barred from purchasing 
derivatives except as end users in transactions that qualify for hedging 
treatment under FAS 133.403  That prohibition would require all 
derivatives dealing and trading activities of second-tier banking 
organizations to be conducted through separate nonbank affiliates.  
GLBA currently allows FHCs to underwrite and deal in bank-
ineligible securities and to underwrite insurance products only if such 
activities are conducted through nonbank subsidiaries.404  
 
397 See supra notes 303–07 and accompanying text. 
398 See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 772. 
399 See id. 
400 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(ii) (2006). 
401 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., OPTIONS PAPER, AUG. 2000, at 33, available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/initiative/Options_080700m.pdf. 
402 Id. 
403 See supra note 372 and accompanying text (discussing FAS 133). 
404 See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 118, at 27, 130–34, 153, 467–70, 490–91 
(explaining that, under GLBA, all underwriting of bank-ineligible securities and insurance 
products by FHCs must be conducted either through nonbank holding company 
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Accordingly, FHC-owned banks (1) should be barred from dealing or 
trading in derivatives that function as synthetic substitutes for bank-
ineligible securities or insurance, and (2) should be required to 
conduct such activities in separate nonbank affiliates.405  Prohibiting 
second-tier banks from dealing and trading in derivatives would 
accomplish an essential goal of the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln 
Amendment because it would prevent FHCs from conducting 
speculative capital markets activities within subsidiary banks in order 
to exploit the banks’ low-cost funding due to federal safety net 
subsidies.406 
I have previously pointed out that bank dealers in OTC derivatives 
enjoy significant competitive advantages over nonbank dealers 
because of the banks’ explicit and implicit safety net subsidies.407  
Banks typically borrow funds at significantly lower interest rates than 
their holding company affiliates because (1) banks can obtain direct, 
low-cost funding through FDIC-insured deposits and (2) banks 
present lower risks to their creditors because of their direct access to 
other federal safety net resources, including (a) the FRB’s discount 
window lending facility, (b) the FRB’s guarantee of interbank 
payments made on Fedwire, and (c) the greater potential availability 
of TBTF bailouts for uninsured creditors of banks (as compared to 
creditors of BHCs).408  The OCC has confirmed that FHCs generate 
higher profits when they conduct derivatives activities directly within 
their banks, in part because the “favorable [funding] rate enjoyed by 
the banks” is lower than “the borrowing rate of their holding 
 
subsidiaries or (in the case of securities) through nonbank financial subsidiaries of banks); 
Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 219–20, 225–26 n.30, 226 n.31, 227 n.33, 318–20 (same). 
405 See Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 337–38 (describing financial derivatives as 
“‘synthetic investments’ because they can be tailored to mimic, with desired variations, the 
risk and return profiles of ‘fundamental securities’ such as stocks and bonds”); Caiola v. 
Citibank, N.A., 295 F.3d 312, 315–17 (2d Cir. 2002) (describing a “synthetic trading” 
program designed by Citibank that enabled the plaintiff to use equity swaps and cash-
settled, over-the-counter options to “economically replicate the ownership and physical 
trading of shares and [exchange-traded] options” without leaving “footprints” in the public 
securities markets); supra note 40 and accompanying text (explaining that a CDS operates 
as the functional equivalent of insurance with respect to specified credit-related events). 
406 See supra notes 319–22, 342–44, 353 and accompanying text (explaining that a 
central objective of the both Volcker Rule and the Lincoln Amendment is to prevent the 
transfer of safety net subsidies from FDIC-insured banks to their nonbank affiliates). 
407 Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 336–37, 372–73. 
408 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 118, at 492; Wilmarth, supra note 221, at 5–7, 16 n.39. 
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companies.”409  Such an outcome may be favorable to FHCs, but it is 
certainly not beneficial to the DIF or the taxpayers.  The DIF and the 
taxpayers are exposed to a significantly higher risk of losses when 
derivatives dealing and trading activities are conducted directly within 
banks instead of within nonbank holding company affiliates.410  
Congress should terminate this artificial, federally subsidized 
advantage for bank derivatives dealers. 
Fourth, Congress should strengthen the Volcker Rule by 
prohibiting all private equity investments by second-tier banks and 
their holding company affiliates.411  To accomplish this reform, 
Congress should repeal sections 4(k)(4)(H) and (I) of the BHC Act,412 
which allow FHCs to make merchant banking investments and 
insurance company portfolio investments.413  Private equity 
investments involve a high degree of risk and have inflicted 
significant losses on FHCs in the past.414  In addition, private equity 
investments threaten to “weaken the separation of banking and 
commerce” by allowing FHCs “to maintain long-term control over 
entities that conduct commercial (i.e., nonfinancial) businesses.”415  
Such affiliations between banks and commercial firms are undesirable 
because they are likely to create serious competitive and economic 
distortions, including the spread of federal safety net benefits to the 
commercial sector of our economy.416 
In combination, the four supplemental rules described above would 
help to ensure that narrow banks cannot transfer the benefits of their 
federal safety net subsidies to their nonbank affiliates.  Restricting the 
scope of safety net subsidies is of utmost importance in order to 
 
409 Interpretive Letter #892 from John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, to 
James A. Leach, Chairman of House Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs. (Sept. 30, 2000), 
available at http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents/sep00/int892.pdf. 
410 Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 372–73.  For general discussions of the risks posed by 
OTC derivatives to banks and other financial institutions, see id. at 337–78; RICHARD 
BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE 
PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 7–147 (2007); TETT, supra note 79, passim. 
411 As discussed above, the Volcker Rule limits, but does not completely bar, private 
equity investments by BHCs and FHCs.  See supra Part V.E.1.b. 
412 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H), (I) (2006). 
413 See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 118, at 483–85 (explaining that “through the 
merchant banking and insurance company investment provisions, [GLBA] allows 
significant nonfinancial affiliations” with banks). 
414 See Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 330–32, 375–78. 
415 Wilmarth, supra note 378, at 1581–82. 
416 For further discussion of this argument, see id. at 1588–1613; supra note 379. 
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restore a more level playing field between small and large banks and 
between banking and nonbanking firms.  The safety net and TBTF 
subsidies enjoyed by large banking organizations—in the form of 
lower capital ratios, higher risk-adjusted stock prices and reduced 
funding costs—have increasingly distorted our regulatory and 
economic policies over the past three decades.417  During the same 
period, (1) nonbanking firms have pursued every available avenue to 
acquire FDIC-insured depository institutions so they can secure the 
funding advantages provided by low-cost, FDIC-insured deposits, and 
(2) nonbank affiliates of banks have made every effort to exploit the 
funding advantages and other safety net benefits conferred by their 
affiliation with FDIC-insured institutions.418  The enormous benefits 
conferred by federal safety net subsidies are conclusively shown by 
the following facts: (1) no major banking organization has ever 
voluntarily surrendered its bank charter and (2) large nonbanking 
firms have aggressively pursued strategies to secure control of FDIC-
insured depository institutions.419 
The most practicable way to prevent the spread of federal safety 
net subsidies—as well as their distorting effects on regulation and 
economic activity—is to establish strong barriers that prohibit narrow 
banks from transferring the benefits of those subsidies to their 
nonbanking affiliates, including those engaged in speculative capital 
markets activities.420  The narrow bank structure and the 
supplemental rules described above would force financial 
conglomerates to prove that they can produce superior risk-related 
returns to investors without relying on explicit and implicit 
government subsidies.  As I have previously explained elsewhere, 
economic studies have failed to confirm the existence of favorable 
economies of scale or scope in financial conglomerates, and those 
conglomerates have not been able to generate consistently positive 
 
417 See supra notes 116–39 and accompanying text (discussing competitive and 
economic distortions created by safety net and TBTF subsidies). 
418 Wilmarth, supra note 378, at 1569–70, 1584–93; Wilmarth, supra note 221, at 5–8.  
As John Kay has pointed out: 
The opportunity to gain access to the retail deposit base has been and remains 
irresistible to ambitious deal makers.  That deposit base carries an explicit or 
implicit government guarantee and can be used to leverage a range of other, more 
exciting, financial activities.  The archetype of these deal-makers was Sandy 
Weill, the architect of Citigroup. 
Kay, supra note 144, at 43. 
419 Wilmarth, supra note 378, at 1590–93. 
420 See Kay, supra note 144, at 57–59. 
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returns, even under the current regulatory system that allows them to 
receive extensive federal subsidies.421 
In late 2009, a prominent bank analyst suggested that, if Congress 
prevented nonbank subsidiaries of FHCs from relying on low-cost 
deposit funding provided by their affiliated banks, large FHCs would 
not be economically viable and would be forced to break up 
voluntarily.422  It is noteworthy that many of the largest commercial 
and industrial conglomerates in the United States and Europe have 
been broken up through hostile takeovers and voluntary divestitures 
during the past three decades because they proved to be “less efficient 
and less profitable than companies pursuing more focused business 
strategies.”423  It is long past time for financial conglomerates to be 
stripped of their safety net subsidies (except for the carefully limited 
protection that would be provided to narrow banks) as well as their 
presumptive access to TBTF bailouts.  If Congress took such action, 
financial conglomerates would become subject to the same type of 
scrutiny and discipline that the capital markets have applied to 
commercial and industrial conglomerates during the past thirty years.  
Hence, the narrow bank concept provides a workable plan to impose 
effective market discipline on FHCs. 
c.  Responses to Critiques of the Narrow Bank Proposal 
Critics have raised three major objections to the narrow bank 
concept.  First, critics point out that the asset restrictions imposed on 
narrow banks would prevent them from acting as intermediaries of 
funds between depositors and most borrowers.  Many narrow bank 
proposals (including mine) would require narrow banks to invest their 
deposits in safe, highly marketable assets such as those permitted for 
MMMFs.  Narrow banks would therefore be largely or entirely barred 
from making commercial loans.  As a result, critics warn that a 
 
421 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 748–49; see also JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 137, at 
212–13. 
422 Karen Shaw Petrou, the managing partner of Federal Financial Analytics, explained 
that “[i]nteraffiliate restrictions would limit the use of bank deposits on nonbanking 
activities,” and “[y]ou don’t own a bank because you like branches, you own a bank 
because you want cheap core funding.”  Stacy Kaper, Big Banks Face Most Pain Under 
House Bill, AM. BANKER, Dec. 2, 2009, at 1 (quoting Ms. Petrou).  Ms. Petrou therefore 
concluded that an imposition of stringent limits on affiliate transactions, “really strikes at 
the heart of a diversified banking organization” and “I think you would see most of the 
very large banking organizations pull themselves apart” if Congress passed such 
legislation.  Id. (same). 
423 Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 284; see also Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 775–76. 
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banking system composed exclusively of narrow banks could not 
provide credit to small and midsize business firms that lack access to 
the capital markets and depend on banks as their primary source of 
outside credit.424 
However, my two-tiered proposal would greatly reduce any 
disruption of the traditional role of banks in acting as intermediaries 
between depositors and bank-dependent firms because my proposal 
would allow first-tier “traditional” banks (primarily community-
oriented banks) to continue making commercial loans that are funded 
by deposits.  Community banks make most of their commercial loans 
in the form of longer-term “relationship” loans to small and midsize 
firms.425  Under my proposal, community banks could continue to 
carry on their deposit-taking and lending activities as first-tier 
banking organizations without any change from current law, and their 
primary commercial lending customers would continue to be smaller, 
bank-dependent firms. 
In contrast to community banks, big banks do not make a 
substantial amount of relationship loans to small firms.  Instead, big 
banks primarily make loans to large and well-established firms, and 
they provide credit to small businesses mainly through highly 
automated programs that use impersonal credit scoring techniques.426  
Under my proposal, as indicated above, most large banks would 
operate as subsidiaries of second-tier “nontraditional” banking 
organizations.  Second-tier holding companies would conduct their 
business lending programs through nonbank finance subsidiaries that 
are funded by commercial paper and other debt instruments sold to 
investors in the capital markets.  This operational structure should not 
create a substantial disincentive for the highly automated small-
business lending programs offered by big banks because most loans 
produced by those programs (e.g., business credit card loans) can be 
financed by the capital markets through securitization.427 
Thus, my two-tier proposal should not cause a significant reduction 
in bank loans to bank-dependent firms because big banks have 
 
424 See, e.g., Neil Wallace, Narrow Banking Meets the Diamond-Dybvig Model, 20 FED. 
RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS Q. REV. No. 1, Winter 1996, at 3. 
425 Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 261–66; see also Allen N. Berger et al., Does Function 
Follow Organizational Form? Evidence from the Lending Practices of Large and Small 
Banks, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 237, 239–46, 254–62, 266 (2005). 
426 Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 264–66; see also Berger et al., supra note 425, at 240–
41, 266. 
427 Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 777–78. 
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already moved away from traditional relationship-based lending 
funded by deposits.  If Congress wanted to give LCFIs a strong 
incentive to make relationship loans to small and midsize firms, 
Congress could authorize second-tier narrow banks to devote a 
specified percentage (e.g., 10%) of their assets to such loans, as long 
as the banks held appropriate risk-based capital, retained the loans on 
their balance sheets and did not securitize them.  By authorizing such 
a limited “basket” of relationship loans, Congress could allow second-
tier narrow banks to use deposits to fund those loans without exposing 
the banks to a significant risk of failure, as the remainder of their 
assets would be highly liquid and marketable. 
The second major criticism of the narrow bank proposal is that it 
would lack credibility because regulators would retain the inherent 
authority (whether explicit or implicit) to organize bailouts of major 
financial firms during periods of severe economic distress.  
Accordingly, some critics warn that the narrow bank concept would 
simply shift the TBTF problem from insured banks to their nonbank 
affiliates.428  However, the force of this objection has been 
diminished by the systemic risk oversight and resolution regime 
established by Dodd-Frank.  Under Dodd-Frank, LCFIs that might 
have been considered for TBTF bailouts in the past will be designated 
and regulated as SIFIs and will also be subject to resolution under 
Dodd-Frank’s OLA.  As shown above, the potential for TBTF 
bailouts of SIFIs would be reduced further if (1) Congress required all 
SIFIs to pay risk-based premiums to pre-fund the OLF, so the OLF 
would have the necessary resources to handle the foreseeable costs of 
resolving future failures of SIFIs, and (2) Congress repealed the SRE, 
so the DIF would no longer be available as a potential bailout fund for 
TBTF institutions.429 
Thus, if my proposed reforms were fully implemented, (1) the 
narrow-bank structure would prevent SIFI-owned banks from 
transferring the benefits of their safety net subsidies to their nonbank 
affiliates, and (2) the systemic risk oversight and resolution regime 
would require SIFIs to internalize the potential risks that their 
operations present to financial and economic stability.  In 
combination, both sets of regulatory reforms should greatly reduce the 
 
428 See Scott, supra note 381, at 929–30 (noting the claim of some critics that there 
would be “irresistible political pressure” for bailouts of uninsured “substitute-banks” that 
are created to provide the credit previously extended by FDIC-insured banks). 
429 See supra Part V.D. (explaining reasons for pre-funding the OLF and repealing the 
SRE). 
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TBTF subsidies that might otherwise be available to large financial 
conglomerates. 
Moreover, the narrow bank structure could advance Dodd-Frank’s 
mandate for developing viable resolution plans (“living wills”) for 
SIFIs.430  Because narrow banks would be barred from making 
extensions of credit and other transfers of funds to their nonbank 
affiliates, the narrow bank structure would make it easier to separate 
SIFI-owned banks from their nonbank affiliates if the parent company 
failed.431 
The narrow bank structure would also be consistent with a policy 
known as “subsidiarization,” which could potentially facilitate cross-
border resolutions of multinational SIFIs.  Subsidiarization would 
require multinational LCFIs to reorganize their international 
operations into separate, “clear-cut subsidiaries” in each country, 
thereby making it easier for home and host country regulators to 
assume distinct responsibilities for resolving the subsidiaries located 
within their respective jurisdictions.432  Because the narrow bank 
concept embraces a policy of strict separation between banks and 
their nonbank affiliates, it might provide greater impetus toward 
adoption of subsidiarization as a means to promote a coordinated 
approach to resolution of cross-border SIFIs. 
The third principal objection to the narrow-bank proposal is that it 
would place U.S. FHCs at a significant disadvantage in competing 
with foreign universal banks that are not required to comply with 
similar constraints.433  Again, there are persuasive rebuttals to this 
objection.  For example, government officials in the United Kingdom 
are considering the possible adoption of a narrow-banking structure 
based on a proposal developed by John Kay.434  In May 2010, the 
 
430 See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 115(d)(1), 165(d) (authorizing the adoption of standards 
requiring nonbank SIFIs and large BHCs to adopt plans for “rapid and orderly resolution 
in the event of material financial distress or failure”); see also Joe Adler, Living Wills a 
Live Issue at Big Banks, AM. BANKER, Sept. 20, 2010, at 1 (discussing Dodd-Frank’s 
requirement for large BHCs to produce resolution plans and the likelihood that, to meet 
that requirement, “many firms may have to think about creating a simpler structure with 
clearer lines between entities underneath the holding company”). 
431 See supra notes 393–97 and accompanying text. 
432 Joe Adler, Resolution Idea Hard to Say, May Be Hard to Sell, AM. BANKER, Nov. 
16, 2010, at 1 (reporting that financial regulators were discussing the concept of 
“subsidiarization” as a method of enabling “host countries [to exercise] more authority 
over subsidiaries operating inside their borders”). 
433 See Kay, supra note 144, at 71–74; Scott, supra note 381, at 931. 
434 See Kay, supra note 144, at 51–69 (describing the narrow bank proposal as a means 
for accomplishing “the separation of utility from casino banking”); King, supra note 118, 
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United Kingdom’s new coalition government announced that it would 
establish “an independent commission to investigate separating retail 
and investment banking in a sustainable way.”435  In September, the 
commission issued its first report, which stated that the narrow 
banking approach was among the options the commission planned to 
consider.436  If the United States and the United Kingdom both 
decided to implement a narrow banking structure (supplemented by 
strong systemic risk oversight and resolution regimes), their 
combined leadership in global financial markets would place 
considerable pressure on other developed countries to adopt similar 
financial reforms.437 
The financial sector accounts for a large share of the domestic 
economies of the United States and the United Kingdom.  Both 
economies were severely damaged by two financial crises during the 
past decade (the dotcom-telecom bust and the subprime lending 
crisis).  Both crises were produced by the same set of LCFIs that 
 
at 6–7 (expressing support for Kay’s narrow bank proposal and for the Volcker Rule as 
two alternative possibilities for separating the “utility aspects of banking” from “some of 
the riskier financial activities, such as proprietary trading”); HOUSE OF COMMONS 
TREASURY COMM., TOO IMPORTANT TO FAIL—TOO IMPORTANT TO IGNORE, 2009-10, 
H.C. 9-Vol. 1, at 52, 59, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910 
/cmselect/cmtreasy/261/261i.pdf (expressing qualified support for Kay’s narrow banking 
proposal). 
435 Ali Qassim, International Banking: U.K.’s Ruling Coalition to Investigate 
Separating Investment, Retail Banks, 94 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1055 (May 25, 2010). 
436 INDEP. COMM’N ON BANKING, ISSUES PAPER: CALL FOR EVIDENCE 4–5, 33–34 
(2010), available at http://bankingcommission.independent.gov.uk/bankingcommission 
/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Issues-Paper-24-September-2010.pdf.  For discussions of the 
Commission’s preliminary work, see Richard Northedge, To Split or Not to Split? What Is 
the Future for Britain’s Banks?, INDEP. ON SUNDAY (London), Sept. 26, 2010, at 80; 
Michael Settle, Big Banks Could Be Broken Up, HERALD (Glasgow, Scotland), Sept. 25, 
2010, at 12. 
437 Kay, supra note 144, at 74; HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY COMM., supra note 
434, at 70–71 (quoting views of former FRB Chairman Paul Volcker); see also TARULLO, 
supra note 246, at 45–54 (describing how the United States and the United Kingdom first 
reached a mutual agreement on proposed international risk-based bank capital rules in the 
1980s and then pressured other developed nations to adopt the Basel I international capital 
accord).  In addition, the FRB could refuse to allow a foreign LCFI to acquire a U.S. bank, 
or to establish a branch or agency in the United States unless the foreign LCFI agreed to 
structure its operations within the United States to conform to any narrow bank restrictions 
imposed on U.S. FHCs.  See Pharaon v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Bd., 135 
F.3d 148, 152–54 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding the FRB’s authority under the BHC Act to 
regulate foreign companies that control U.S. banks), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 947 (1998); 12 
U.S.C. § 3105(d) (requiring foreign banks to obtain the FRB’s approval before they 
establish any U.S. branches or agencies); id. § 3106 (requiring foreign banks with U.S. 
branches or agencies to comply with the BHC Act’s restrictions on nonbanking activities). 
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continue to dominate the financial systems in both nations.  
Accordingly, regardless of what other nations may do, the United 
States and the United Kingdom have compelling national reasons to 
make sweeping changes to their financial systems to protect their 
domestic economies from the threat of a similar crisis in the future.438 
Finally, the view that the United States and the United Kingdom 
must refrain from implementing fundamental financial reforms until 
all other major developed nations have agreed to do so rests upon two 
deeply flawed assumptions: (1) the United States and the United 
Kingdom must allow foreign nations with the weakest systems of 
financial regulation to dictate the level of supervisory constraints on 
LCFIs until an international accord with stronger standards has been 
approved by all major developed nations, and (2) until a 
comprehensive international agreement on reform is achieved, the 
United States and the United Kingdom should be obliged to provide 
TBTF bailouts and other safety net subsidies that impose huge costs, 
create moral hazard, and distort economic incentives simply because 
other nations provide similar benefits to their LCFIs.439  Both 
assumptions are unacceptable and must be rejected. 
VI 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The TBTF policy remains “the great unresolved problem of bank 
supervision” more than a quarter century after the policy was invoked 
to justify the federal government’s rescue of Continental Illinois in 
1984.440  The recent financial crisis confirms that TBTF institutions 
“present formidable risks to the federal safety net and are largely 
insulated from both market discipline and supervisory 
intervention.”441  Accordingly, as I observed in 2002, “fundamentally 
different approaches for regulating financial conglomerates and 
containing safety net subsidies are urgently needed.”442 
 
438 See, e.g., Hoenig, supra note 110, at 4–10; Kay, supra note 144, at 14–17, 20–24, 
28–31, 39–47, 57–58, 66–75, 86–87; King, supra note 118; HOUSE OF COMMONS 
TREASURY COMM., supra note 434, at 71–74; Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 712–15, 736–47. 
439 See, e.g., Hoenig, supra note 110, at 4–10; Kay, supra note 144, at 42–46, 57–59, 
66–75. 
440 Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 475; see also id. at 300–01, 314–15. 
441 Id. at 476; see also Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 968–72, 1046–50. 
442 Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 476. 
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Dodd-Frank makes meaningful improvements in the regulation of 
large financial conglomerates.  As discussed in Part V, Dodd-Frank 
establishes a new umbrella oversight body—the FSOC—that will 
designate SIFIs and make recommendations for their supervision.  
Dodd-Frank also empowers the FRB to adopt stronger capital 
requirements and other enhanced prudential standards for SIFIs.  
Most importantly, Dodd-Frank establishes a new systemic resolution 
regime (the OLA), which should provide a superior alternative to the 
“bailout or bankruptcy” choice that federal regulators confronted 
when they dealt with failing SIFIs during the financial crisis. 
In addition, Title X of Dodd-Frank reduces systemic risk by 
creating a new federal authority, the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB), to protect consumers from unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive financial products.443  As the recent financial crisis 
demonstrated, ineffective consumer protection poses a severe threat to 
financial stability when regulators allow unfair and unsound 
consumer lending practices to become widespread within the financial 
system.444  During the decade leading up to the financial crisis, 
federal financial regulators repeatedly failed to protect consumers 
against pervasive predatory lending abuses and thereby contributed to 
the severity and persistence of the crisis.445  Focusing the mission of 
consumer financial protection within the CFPB significantly increases 
the likelihood that the CFPB will act decisively to prevent future 
lending abuses from threatening the stability of our financial 
system.446 
Nevertheless, Dodd-Frank does not solve the TBTF problem.  
Dodd-Frank (like Basel III) relies primarily on the same supervisory 
tool—capital-based regulation—that failed to prevent the banking and 
thrift crises of the 1980s as well as the recent financial crisis.447  In 
addition, the supervisory reforms contained in Dodd-Frank depend for 
 
443 See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 11, 161–74 (2010). 
444 See id. at 9–17; Bair FCIC Testimony, supra note 276, at 3–6, 9–12, 14–20, 47–50; 
Elizabeth A. Duke, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., The Systemic Importance of Consumer 
Protection, Speech at the Community Development Policy Summit (June 10, 2009), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/duke20090610a.htm. 
445 See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 9–19; see also JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 137, at 
120–44; Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
70–97 (2008); McCoy et al., supra note 14, at 1343–66; Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 19–
31. 
446 See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 9–11; see also Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 445, at 
98–101. 
447 See supra notes 244–52 and accompanying text. 
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their effectiveness on the same federal regulatory agencies that failed 
to stop excessive risk taking by financial institutions during the 
booms that preceded both crises.448  As Johnson and Kwak observe: 
[S]olutions that depend on smarter, better regulatory supervision 
and corrective action ignore the political constraints on regulation 
and the political power of the large banks.  The idea that we can 
simply regulate large banks more effectively assumes that 
regulators will have the incentive to do so, despite everything we 
know about regulatory capture and political constraints on 
regulation.449 
Moreover, the future effectiveness of the FSOC is open to serious 
question in light of the agency turf battles and other bureaucratic 
failings that have plagued similar multiagency oversight bodies in 
other fields of governmental activity (e.g., the Department of 
Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence).450 
As explained above, Dodd-Frank’s most promising reform for 
preventing future TBTF bailouts—the OLA—does not completely 
shut the door to future rescues for creditors of LCFIs.  The FRB can 
provide emergency liquidity assistance to troubled LCFIs through the 
discount window and (perhaps) through “broad-based” liquidity 
facilities (like the Primary Dealer Credit Facility) that are designed to 
help targeted groups of the largest financial institutions.  The FHLBs 
can make secured advances to LCFIs.  The FDIC can use its Treasury 
borrowing authority and the SRE to protect uninsured creditors of 
failed SIFIs and their subsidiary banks.  While Dodd-Frank has 
undoubtedly made TBTF bailouts more difficult, the continued 
existence of these avenues for financial assistance indicates that 
Dodd-Frank is not likely to prevent future TBTF rescues during 
episodes of systemic financial distress.451 
 
448 See supra notes 253–60 and accompanying text. 
449 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 137, at 207. 
450 See, e.g., Dara Kay Cohen et al., Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the 
Political Design of Legal Mandates, 59 STAN. L. REV. 673, 675–78, 718–20, 738–43 
(2006) (analyzing organizational problems and operational failures within the Department 
of Homeland Security); Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, A Hidden World, Growing 
Beyond Control, WASH. POST, July 19, 2010, at A1 (discussing organizational problems 
and operational failures within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence); Paul R. 
Pillar, Unintelligent Design, NAT’L INTEREST (Aug. 24, 2010), http://nationalinterest.org 
/article/unintelligent-design-3918 (same). 
451 See supra Part V.C.  Other commentators agree that Dodd-Frank will not prevent 
future bailouts of TBTF institutions.  See, e.g., Peter Eavis, A Bank Overhaul Too Weak to 
Hail, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2010, at B14; David Pauly, Congress Puts Out ‘Sell’ Order on 
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As an alternative to Dodd-Frank’s regulatory reforms, Congress 
could have addressed the TBTF problem directly by mandating a 
breakup of large financial conglomerates.  That is the approach 
advocated by Simon Johnson and James Kwak, who have proposed 
maximum size limits of four percent of GDP (about $570 billion in 
assets) for commercial banks and two percent of GDP (about $285 
billion of assets) for securities firms.  Those size caps would require a 
significant reduction in size for the six largest U.S. banking 
organizations (Bank of America, Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, 
Goldman, and Morgan Stanley).452  Like Joseph Stiglitz, Johnson and 
Kwak maintain that “[t]he best defense against a massive financial 
crisis is a popular consensus that too big to fail is too big to exist.”453 
Congress did not follow the approach recommended by Johnson, 
Kwak, and Stiglitz.  In fact, the Senate rejected a similar proposal for 
maximum size limits by almost a two-to-one vote.454  As noted 
above, Congress modestly strengthened the Riegle-Neal Act’s 10% 
nationwide deposit cap, which limits interstate mergers and 
acquisitions involving depository institutions or their parent holding 
companies.  However, that provision does not restrict intrastate 
 
American Banks, BLOOMBERG (June 28, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010     
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452 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 137, at 214–17. 
453 Id. at 221; accord id. at 217 (“Saying that we cannot break up our largest banks is 
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454 A proposed amendment by Senators Sherrod Brown and Ted Kaufman would have 
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GDP for banking institutions and 3% of GDP for nonbanking institutions.  The size caps 
proposed by Brown and Kaufman would have limited a single institution to about $750 
billion of deposits and about $300 billion of non-deposit liabilities.  The Senate rejected 
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mergers or acquisitions or organic (internal) growth by LCFIs.  In 
addition, Congress gave the FSOC and the FRB broad discretion to 
decide whether to impose a 10% nationwide liabilities cap on mergers 
and acquisitions involving financial companies.455  LCFIs will 
undoubtedly seek to block the adoption of any such liabilities cap. 
I am sympathetic to the maximum size limits proposed by Johnson 
and Kwak.  However, it seems highly unlikely—especially in light of 
megabanks’ enormous political clout—that Congress could be 
persuaded to adopt such draconian limits, absent a future disaster 
comparable to the present financial crisis.456 
A third possible approach—and the one I advocate—would be to 
impose structural requirements and activity limitations that would (1) 
prevent LCFIs from using the federal safety net protections for their 
subsidiary banks to subsidize their speculative activities in the capital 
markets and (2) make it easier for regulators to separate banks from 
their nonbank affiliates if FHCs or their subsidiary banks fail.  As 
originally proposed, both the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln 
Amendment would have barred proprietary trading and private equity 
investments by banking organizations and would have forced banks to 
spin off their derivatives trading and dealing activities into nonbank 
affiliates.  However, the House-Senate conferees on Dodd-Frank 
greatly weakened both provisions and postponed their effective dates.  
In addition, both provisions as enacted contain multiple potential 
loopholes that will allow LCFIs to lobby regulators for further 
concessions.  Consequently, neither provision is likely to be highly 
effective in restraining risk taking or the spread of safety net subsidies 
by LCFIs.457 
My proposals for a pre-funded OLF, a repeal of the SRE, and a 
two-tiered system of bank regulation would provide a simple, 
straightforward strategy for accomplishing the goals of shrinking 
safety net subsidies and minimizing the need for taxpayer-financed 
bailouts of LCFIs.  A pre-funded OLF would require SIFIs to pay 
risk-based assessments to finance the future costs of resolving failed 
SIFIs.  A repeal of the SRE would prevent the DIF from being used to 
protect uninsured creditors of megabanks.  A two-tiered system of 
bank regulation would (1) restrict traditional banking organizations to 
 
455 See supra Part V.A. 
456 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 137, at 222 (“The Panic of 1907 only led to the 
reforms of the 1930s by way of the 1929 crash and the Great Depression.  We hope that a 
similar [second] calamity will not be a prerequisite to action again.”). 
457 See supra Parts V.E.1.b. & V.E.1.c. 
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deposit-taking, lending, and fiduciary services and other activities 
“closely related” to banking and (2) mandate a “narrow bank” 
structure for banks owned by financial conglomerates.  In turn, the 
narrow bank structure would (1) insulate narrow banks and the DIF 
from the risks of capital markets activities conducted by nonbank 
affiliates and (2) prevent narrow banks from transferring the benefits 
of their low-cost funding and other safety net subsidies to nonbank 
affiliates. 
In combination, my proposed reforms would strip away many of 
the artificial funding advantages that are currently exploited by LCFIs 
and would subject them to the same type of market discipline that 
investors have applied to commercial and industrial conglomerates 
over the past thirty years.  Financial conglomerates have never 
demonstrated that they can provide beneficial services to their 
customers and attractive returns to their investors without relying on 
safety net subsidies during good times and massive taxpayer-funded 
bailouts during crises.458  It is long past time for LCFIs to prove—
based on a true market test—that their claimed synergies and their 
supposedly superior business models are real and not mythical.459  If, 
as I suspect, LCFIs cannot produce favorable returns when they are 
deprived of their current subsidies and TBTF status, market forces 
should compel them to break up voluntarily. 
 
458 See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 748–49. 
459 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 137, at 212–13 (contending that “[t]here is little 
evidence that large banks gain economies of scale above a very low size threshold” and 
questioning the existence of favorable economies of scope for LCFIs); STIGLITZ, supra 
note 453, at 166 (“The much-vaunted synergies of bringing together various parts of the 
financial industry have been a phantasm; more apparent are the managerial failures and the 
conflicts of interest.”). 
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